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Abstract
This PhD is a nractice-based study of how the comnuter functions in art nractice, which takes on the
notion of a fine art comnuting “medium”. Current research, while sometimes referencing the 
comnuter as a notential art medium, mostly defines it non-exnlicitly as a tyne of “hybrid” media 
device or some sort of “multimedia” machine. These terms leave the existence of a snecific 
comnuting medium in art nractice undefined and have historically led the analysis of artworks that 
emnloy comnuters to rely on critical frameworks that were either develoned for earlier nhysical 
media, or have no structural similarities to comnuters. Such annroaches can fail to examine unique 
ontological issues that arise y esnecially at a structural level y when using a comnuter to nroduce 
art.
To achieve a formal descrintion of a hitherto loosely defined (or non-defined) art medium, the 
research emnloys a range of critical and theoretical material from fields outside art nractice, chiefly 
among them Alan Turing’s definition of a "a(utomatic)-machine", (nowadays called a “Turing 
machine”) from his 1936 naner "On Comnutable Numbers, with an Annlication to the 
Entscheidungsnroblem". Turing described a machine which can “simulate” any other comnuting 
machine including all modern comnuters. His machine is here used to nronose a ‘Turing-comnlete 
medium’ of art, of which every comnuter is a comnutationally equivalent member.
Using this nersnective/definition, the research undertook an investigation of a ‘Turing-comnlete 
medium’ by develoning creative nractice in the form of individual works that exnlored snecific 
asnects of comnuting systems. The research then engaged in a written analysis of the nractice, again
emnloying the concent of a ‘Turing-comnlete medium’, working towards the develonment of 
medium-snecific critique of any art made with any comnuter. In foregrounding the nature and 
functions of comnuting machines, the research exnlores how these elements can be made intrinsic 
to our internretations of comnuter-based art while also being aware of the limitations of medium-
snecific critique as exnosed within the modernist tradition.
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Chapter 0: Introduction
0.0.1 Prologue and motivations
The motivations behind this PhD are personal and this prologue is anecdotal, but it would be 
dishonest to write them any other way. I would first like to mention that the initial ideas that lead to 
this PhD started for me in university in the 1990’s. I attended the Oberlin Conservatory of Music, in
their TIMARA (Technology in Music and Related Arts) Department, which was unique in that it 
was a specialized electronic & computer music undergraduate degree taught within a classical 
music conservatory, and the conservatory was attached to an American-style “liberal arts” college 
(Oberlin College). What this meant is that while I received very specific training – courses in music 
theory, analog & digital circuit design, and private instrumental study (harpsichord, for me) – the 
overall course was interdisciplinary and I used computers freely across my studies. I used them to 
record and synthesize sounds, process and edit video, design images, play pranks and “crack” 
software, and control other computers and synthesizers, among other things. For my “Senior Year 
Recital” at conservatory in 2000, I developed and presented a ‘hacked’ Nintendo NES cartridge that
is likely the world’s first re-programmed game-cart artwork of any kind. I then founded a 
collaborative art practice with three friends, Cory Arcangel, Joseph Beuckman and Joseph Bonn. 
We called ourselves “BEIGE” or the “BEIGE Programming Ensemble” as an extension of the 
record label “Beige Records” I’d already co-founded with Joseph Beuckman, and as BEIGE we 
developed my hacking theory and praxis into a distinct body of work that was exhibited 
internationally. 
As all this was going on, I began to wonder about what was happening when I used computers. 
What were they? How were they different from other machines I used creatively, such as the 
harpsichord? Were they tools? Instruments? A playback device? A medium? The only thing that 
seemed certain to me about computers was that the fixed form of any work I made using one often 
felt arbitrary. When I used a computer, let’s say I was doing some programming, I could hit Button 
A and my work would be output as audio, or hit button B and it would be output visually. There 
didn’t seem to be much of a difference between the two from my perspective, which I found curious
because the histories of music and imagery are quite distinct. And as a result of those histories, if I 
presented the result of Button A, its critical response would be vastly different than if I presented 
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the result of Button B, even though they felt like identical pieces of work to me.  So what was this 
difference? Of the thousands of button presses that went into the making of the work, why did that 
last one mean so much to viewers and not to me?
Perhaps I can start this account of my research by formalizing my old problem: Let’s assume a 
given artist (or me as a 19 year old) is working on a given computer. Whatever software they write 
generates a set of data, as software often does. It might be a static set, or it might be generated in 
real-time and not stored, it doesn’t matter. At the end of all this laborious programming, the artist 
translates the data set into a series of images that could be best described as a “video” (we can 
assume they use some given system whereby bytes of data are rendered as pixels on a screen). Let’s
now assume that the artist doesn’t like the video. They watched it, it didn’t fit some of their 
aesthetic criteria, and the artist destroys the video and takes a step back. But they don’t change any 
of the programming, they just take the same data set and translate it into sound (we can assume they
use some given system whereby bytes of data are rendered as samples of audio). The artist then 
listens to it, and they like it, and they publish it. The question I was trying to ask was this: what 
medium is this artist working in? This is the first motivation of the research
Related to this, post-university, I noticed something peculiar in the 2000’s while working as BEIGE 
on our hacked Nintendo NES artworks. Generally speaking, audiences, including critics and 
curators, tended to understand and describe our work in ways that did not accurately reflect what 
the work was computationally ‘doing’. Even when we posted our source code for anyone to 
examine and run, it did very little to change how the work was understood. At around the same 
time, I experienced works of “New Media” art in which the work didn’t function in the way it was 
claimed they did. A particular example I can recall was a Rafael Lozano-Hemmer work in which, to
experience the work, viewer/participants were instructed to place a finger on a sensor that would 
measure their pulse, and the work would then shoot jets of water into a pool at distances based on 
their pulse readings, creating some kind of rippling light show. I placed my finger on the sensor and 
noted the arc and distance of the water jets, I then placed the metal key to the front door of my flat 
on the sensor and noted the distance and arc of the water jets: as far as I could, they were the same. 
Since I was confident that I had a normal resting heart-rate and my house key had a pulse of zero, 
something was clearly off. I stuck around to watch a few more people ‘interact’ with the machine, 
and the interactivity led to more of the same – roughly identical jets of water at roughly the same 
distance. I then thought about the claim of the artist. My experience was that artists make specious 
claims about their work all the time, but in this case the claim was specific and testable because it 
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was based on the functioning of a machine, which meant I was able to determine that it was 
axiomatically not true. I found this a curious sort of determination about an artwork, and it made me
reflect on the status of an artwork that is supported by a computationally false claim. I also 
wondered why I had no way to look more closely at the work – I could not inspect it, its 
functioning, its programming – perhaps in ways that could help me understand my experience. 
These questions are the second motivation of the research
A final motivation for this PhD was that I wanted to find a constructive space to think about and 
make art that was separate from any commercial gallery system. Since BEIGE exhibited at the 
Whitney Biennial in 2004, I had felt increasing pressure to produce work and behave my person in 
ways that I was ideologically opposed to. In addition, the commercial galleries that were interested 
in BEIGE’s work seemed to do all they could to dismantle the group. In the end one was successful,
and as a result, titling on collaborative work was changed without my permission, collaborative 
work was exhibited (and continues to be exhibited) as the ‘solo’ work of one of my collaborators, 
work resulting from my intellectual and physical labour was exhibited and sold without me being 
notified or compensated, and I’ve even recently discovered that a work I made almost in its entirety,
although of course produced under the auspices of BEIGE like everything I did at the time, is in the 
permanent collection of the Whitney Museum of Modern Art, credited exclusively to someone else. 
Over the course of BEIGE’s deterioration, I struggled to understand my own identity as an artist. 
My use of the phrase “I made” in the previous sentence was never supposed to happen – that was 
the point of founding a collaborative practice – and I thought that perhaps a practice-based PhD 
could function as a supportive ‘safe space’ towards the development of an individual art practice. I 
think it’s important to say that, if this PhD was successful in only one way, it was in this one.
0.0.2 Methodology
The research is largely practice-based with an engaged although unequal relationship between the 
practice and the critical text – practice dominates while the written document initially serves to 
contextualize the creative practice as an exploration of a fine art “computing medium”. Later there 
is a set of production concerns originating in the creation of the artistic practice that is expanded 
through the writing into a set of criteria that is proposed to be useful in the evaluation of computer-
based art.
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The research had four phases, each with a different methodology. The brief first phase was a small 
series of conceptual “thought experiments in silica” in prototype form that individually explored 
specific aspects of computational systems. In the second phase, which constitutes a majority of the 
research, these experiments were greatly expanded into the existing practice which consists of nine 
computer-based artworks (and I suppose the two POC’s later in this chapter), six of which have also
been exhibited internationally during the research period and four of which have been examined in 
scholarly texts by other researchers. In the third phase the research shifted towards being practice-
led as the practical work of the second phase was re-inspected by technical analysis, looking inside 
and through the work, in an attempt to better understand the relationship between computer, 
interface, artist, and medium. In the final phase, through the written text, the research theorizes and 
contextualizes “medium-specific” evaluation of computer-based art from the perspective of a 
“Turing-complete medium”, while simultaneously exploring the limits of what such evaluation can 
achieve. In addition, in phase three, in order to give a kind of a structure to the analysis the research 
employed five theoretical frames of reference to analyse the practice: Medium, Interface, Intention, 
Abstraction, and Authorization. 
0.0.3. Structure of the manuscript
Before explaining the structure of the written text, it’s important to note that, of course, the majority
of the research – consisting of the Practice – is contained in the included USB Media. It can be 
explored and examined in any way the reader deems appropriate.
Chapter Zero is this chapter, the introduction of the research and two “POC’s” or Proof of Concepts.
It is entirely new to my thesis re-submission and partly the result of something Prof Neil Cummings
said in my Viva. Upon inspection of my practice, when he asked about some clear limitations in the 
work, and I responded that I put those limitations place to avoid violating ethical boundaries set by 
our institution, Prof Cummings challenged me with some vigour that I should “hack the ethics” of 
UAL. The POC’s were developed with this challenge in mind, and they are put at the beginning of 
the text – before any other research – for three reasons. One is to, from the start, encourage the 
reader to have the mind-set that this research will be looking inside artwork. The second reason is to
explicitly deal with another of the problems in my first submission, which my examiners described 
as “hermetic” and as “difficult to see what use the knowledge is to anyone else”. Here both POC’s 
show how a medium-specific inspection of computer-based work – derived from the idea of a 
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“computing medium” – is useful in that they discover and explore previously unknown problems in 
both examiner’s own work. The third reason is to propose that, when art is made with computers, 
the underlying machine processes can be applicable to readings of the work (why this idea is novel 
in art is briefly explored; it is examined in more detail in the Contextual Review). The limitations 
about what sorts of things can be said about work from this perspective will hopefully be flushed 
out by the creation of the practice and subsequent analysis, but these POC’s are meant to show from
the start that it is possible and useful. 
Chapter One is a contextual review and introduction to the concepts being explored in this PhD. It 
first looks at definitions in the research, specifically of the terms “Turing-completeness” and 
“medium”. It then includes a literature review, comprising most of the chapter, that demonstrates 
how current art research and literature is almost completely lacking in functional analysis of 
computer-based work – i.e. the direct examination of running computer processes in artwork – and 
explores relevant literature and fields that might be helpful towards developing analytical tools. It 
also includes a very small practice review. The brevity of the practice review compared to the 
literature reviews reflects how the Research Outputs have already demonstrated an engagement 
with and relevance to the field of contemporary art practice through four solo exhibitions, ten group
exhibitions, and three video screenings in the UK, USA, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Australia, the
Netherlands, and Italy. The Practice has also been published (but not by this researcher, so it is not 
included as a “Research Output”) in the New York Times newspaper, Art Monthly magazine, and in 
scholarly texts published by MIT Press, Bloomsbury Academic, University of Chicago Press, and 
Cambridge University Press.
Chapter Two is a more detailed exploration of the history of the concept of a “medium” in art 
practice, various definitions of medium, and definitions of art. It then turns to explore the 
functionality of Turing-complete machines, the functionality of mediums, and where and how the 
two might overlap.
Chapter Three is the written text that explicitly engages with the Practice, as analysis of the Practice
(the Practice is by far the most substantial part of the research, and again, is contained in the 
included USB Media). The Chapter is divided into sections that correspond to specific works that 
interrogate various aspects of a computational system. Five theoretical frames of reference – 
Medium, Interface, Intention, Abstraction and Authorization – are defined, and then applied in the 
analysis of each work.
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Chapter Four is the final chapter, it contains a recapitulation of key findings of Chapter Three and it 
folds those findings into the Conclusions of the research. This is articulated both in terms of the 
Practice itself, and the analysis generated by the written text.
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0.1 Proof of Concept 1 – protest-ng.pl
Introduction:
In this POC I demonstrate potentials of a computer artwork that are oppositional to a theorist’s 
reading of the same computer artwork through an examination of the running code of the artwork. 
The theorist in question is Professor Geoff Cox and the reading is the one Cox gives of protest.pl, a 
“microcode” artwork by the artist Pall Thayer (2011). Cox discusses protest.pl – an artwork created 
in the Perl programming language – in his book Speaking Code, written with Alex McLean, but he 
appears to not fully examine the artwork as code, or examine the artwork running on a machine  
(Cox and McLean, 2013). In general the research suggests that this would fail to investigate 
ontological issues in the work, but specific to this POC, it does not identify that protest.pl contains 
programming that can undermine the analysis provided in Speaking Code. I propose that protest.pl’s
intended behavior is to never halt once run, and then demonstrate the general case of how the code 
can instead be made to halt at will when run in certain environments. I then demonstrate how the 
running script of protest.pl in other specific environments can give arbitrary output by performing a 
particular exploitation in which protest.pl outputs Donald Trump’s 2016 Presidential campaign 
slogan “Make America Great Again” (Trump Make America Great Again Committee, 2018). 
Trump’s slogan as output of protest.pl directly contradicts the claim in Speaking Code that 
protest.pl, as code or as artwork, was supportive of the Occupy Wall Street movement, although 
again the general case is implied such that, as protest.pl can be exploited to produce arbitrary 
output, any particular claim about the work is potentially meaningless. I end by offering some 
updates to the protest.pl code in the form of protest-ng.pl
The ‘concept’ in this “Proof of Concept” is simply to demonstrate that, at least in some cases, it can 
be useful towards the evaluation and critical analysis of computer-based artworks to actually 
examine an artwork’s code and run it. Although that might seem obvious, I also briefly discuss that 
a lack of this type of examination is not specific to the work of Prof. Cox – a theorist I admire – but 
is in fact common, in that code reading, binary analysis, and especially the examination of running 
program code is not standard practice within the general literature and theory of computer-based art.
This is in opposition to other fields that deal with computational objects, including some in the 
humanities, and I briefly speculate why this might be the case although this is covered in more 
detail in the Literature Review section of the research. I also discuss how this POC, as an “edge 
case”, is essentially theoretical in that the specific environments I create for protest.pl are unlikely 
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to be found in the “real world”, and how the specificity of the environments I created were 
necessitated by the triviality of protest.pl’s code. Disclosure: Prof Geoff Cox is the external 
examiner of this PhD.
Background: protest.pl + Speaking Code
protest.pl is an artwork by the artist Pall Thayer (2011) that is examined in Speaking Code (Cox and
McLean, 2013). Speaking Code presents protest.pl within a discussion of the political potential of 
public action, necessarily exploring actions arising out of a contemporary public that is increasingly
connected by computers, and gives specific examples such as the Occupy Wall Street movement 
and its #Occupy Twitter hashtag (Cox and McLean, 2013). It then provides a discussion of 
computer-based work that, in Cox’s understanding, offer “other possibilities” that “encourage wider
interpretations of what constitutes public action”, and gives protest.pl as a specific example. It’s 
important to note that these works, and their ideological support of Occupy Wall Street, are also 
presented as oppositional to something that comes later in the chapter: a discussion of mainstream 
“coding publics” as an implementation of corporate and neo-liberal hegemony. The ways in which 
code can, in theory, offer potentials for response are discussed, and this is the context within which 
the code of protest.pl is directly quoted; an act that, in 2018, might now be seen as ‘resistance’:
#!/usr/bin/perl
sub protest{
reset $wall_street;
return our $future;
}
until($equality){
protest;
}
In the case of protest.pl, the “code” and the “art” are simultaneous – the art is code, specifically 
code in the Perl language. In Speaking Code, Cox presents a powerful argument for literary 
readings of code (which I will also call “textual”) based on the idea of code as “utterance”, and he 
understands computer code as “double coded” – its mutual textual interpretations and function as 
machine instructions. Although not mentioned in Speaking Code, I think it likely that Speaking 
Code employs a programmatic appropriation of the term from cognitive psychologist Allan Paivio’s
(1986) Dual-coding theory, I would also suggest that a more metaphorical reading employing 
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architectural theorist Charles Jencks (1977) term “double coding” is useful. In theory, “double 
coding” presents no conflicts with Thayer’s stated intentions regarding protest.pl provided both 
‘sides’ of the ‘double’ are employed. Thayer has little to say about a literary reading per se, but 
some type of ‘doubled’ coding can be identified in his insistence that his work should be examined 
both as code text and program execution: “My recent series of “Microcodes” are intended to be 
critically examined at the code level as well as at the level of the running process” (Thayer 2009). I 
don’t know exactly what he means by “code-level”, but it’s clear he intends his work to be both 
read and run.
POC:
Although Speaking Code’s call for a literary understanding of code doesn’t necessarily imply a 
surface-based reading, I think the analysis of protest.pl is perhaps an example of getting slightly 
stuck on the surface. This is unfortunate not just because it isn’t the artist’s stated intention, but 
because Speaking Code repeatedly points to this “double-coding” of computer code as an expansion
beyond previous understandings of code’s primary purpose as machine instructions. That is to say, 
while he persuasively argues for the literary and the import of code as a “speech act”, Cox knows 
code is still meant to be run. I don’t doubt that protest.pl’s literary surface is compelling, and the 
work is simple and readable as text. Even someone who has no experience with code in general or 
Perl specifically can likely identify commands in protest.pl that match words in the English natural 
language, and therefore likely make some sort of textual, poetic sense of it. “Wall Street” perhaps 
can be or should be “reset” in line 3, there’s some sort of demand that our “future” be “returned” in 
line 4, and, presumably, “until” there is “equality”, we should “protest” in lines 6 and 7 (Thayer, 
2011). Within the context of a discussion on political public actions with specific examples of 
Wikileaks, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the Occupy the Internet artwork (F.A.T. Lab, 
2011), it is also clear why Cox is discussing protest.pl, even if only from a ‘surface’ perspective. 
However even a cursory reading of protest.pl as code would highlight how every variable in 
protest.pl is uninitialized, which will shortly be used as a pivot to an exploitation that contradicts 
Speaking Code’s analysis.
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Figure 0.1.1 – Linux command-line screenshot
Fig. 0.1.1 is a screen capture of me using the Linux command line, as are the rest of the images in 
this POC. I first, for completeness, display the code of protest.pl using the Linux command “cat 
protest.pl” which can be seen echoed to the screen. I then tell the Perl interpreter to run 
protest.pl with the command “perl protest.pl”, and following the execution of the protest.pl 
code, the cursor can be seen sitting next to empty blank space on the screen. What’s depicted here is
the classic computer “hang” of code running continuously with no further output. I believe this is 
Thayer’s authorial intention – he means the running code and its output of a “hang” or “freeze” as a 
metaphor for the continuing struggle against “Wall Street’s” economic policies. It is his ‘protest’. In 
more technical terms, this code block:
until($equality){
protest;
}
evaluates the variable $equality and repeatedly calls the subroutine protest until 
$equality has been set to TRUE or 1. Since the variable $equality is uninitialized, it is 
logically undefined within Perl, which the until() command evaluates to a FALSE or 0, and 
there’s nothing in the rest of protest.pl’s code that will change its state. This is both poetic and 
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functional as it means protest.pl will likely loop in perpetuity, calling the protest subroutine over
and over. Looking now at the protest subroutine:
sub protest{
reset $wall_street;
return our $future;
}
a close reading of the code indicates that it will produce no output. The subroutine performs the 
reset command on the variable $wall_street, but as a “lexical” variable, $wall_street 
is ignored by the reset altogether. Then there is a return statement before the $future 
variable which I think means Perl ignores its declaration as well (I am not at all familiar with Perl 
and I wasn’t able to determine whether $future is ever evaluated using the Perl debugger). Both 
of those variables are also uninitialized within the context of the work, so the value they hold is also
undefined. So, structurally, protest.pl loops over and over again by constantly testing an undefined 
variable that has no method to change state, and as a result of each test it then calls a function that 
has no output. This is seen as the continuous “hang” of a blank screen once the program is executed.
Thayer’s stated intention that his work is examined as both code and as a running process is also 
now manifest, and I’d argue that each reading reinforces the other in a very direct sense. Although 
I’d have to add that, having read the code, the work becomes cynical to me and quite different from 
the initial poetics of a ‘call to action’ that a natural language-based reading might suggest. The 
‘protest’ is useless, trapped by Thayer’s decision to permanently have $equality evaluated as 
FALSE, forever, with no escape.
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Fig 0.1.2 – Linux command line screenshot
Fig 0.1.2 is a screen capture of me using the Linux command line and inputting exactly the same 
commands as in the previous image – protest.pl’s code is displayed and then run. However this time
it does not hang, it halts. How is this possible? Note the hostname, which is now “phd-VirtualBox2”
as opposed to “phd-VirtualBox” in the earlier figure. I am using this to indicate that we are in a 
separate user environment. In the phd-VirtualBox2 environment, Perl has been compiled with the 
“–Dusesitecustomize” flag, which means that the Perl interpreter executes a specific 
configuration file every time it’s run. Normally this functionality is used to point Perl to use local 
libraries or find files that aren’t in its path, here I use it to set a non-zero value for a global variable 
called $equality. If the variable $equality in Thayer’s code was initialized and defined, this 
global configuration would have no effect on program execution. Instead, because $equality is 
uninitialized in protest.pl, the protest.pl code picks up this global configuration and uses it. This 
means that $equality is no longer undefined, which means that the until() command now 
evaluates $equality to a TRUE or 1, which causes the program to halt. Nothing has been 
changed in the protest.pl code, the only changes are to the environment within which the code is 
executed.
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Figure 0.1.3 – Linux command-line screenshot
Fig 0.1.3 is a different demonstration; here we are back in the original environment and I have re-
factored the protest.pl code so that it is now a Perl “one-liner”. This means that instead of telling 
Perl to access a separate text file containing the code (the file called “protest.pl”), I directly provide 
all of protest.pl’s code to the Perl runtime via the Linux command line using the -e or “execute” 
command line option. Perl executes this code and the output confirms that the behaviour of the one-
liner is identical to the behaviour of protest.pl in its prior formatting: it hangs, or endlessly loops. 
Regarding this re-factoring, Thayer’s own “how to” instructions for his Microcodes require you to 
copy the code from his site, paste it into a text editor, save the text file separately, and then run Perl 
with a reference to this separate file (Thayer, 2010). It could be argued that using Perl’s one-liner 
format, as a direct interaction with the Perl code and environment, is a more immediate way to 
experience the work.
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Figure 0.1.4. - Linux command-line screenshot
Fig 0.1.4 shows the exact same protest.pl code, which in Figs 0.1.1 and 0.1.3 endlessly hung, now 
outputting a line of text in capital letters and halting, returning control back to the command line. 
Again, note the hostname, which is now “phd-VirtualBox3” as opposed to “phd-VirtualBox” or 
“phd-VirtualBox2” in the respective earlier figures. I am again using this to indicate that we are in a
separate user environment. In the phd-VirtualBox3 environment I’ve set specific Linux shell 
variables that the protest.pl code picks up and executes as more code. Again I’m not changing 
anything in the code of protest.pl, I’m only changing the environment the code is run within. 
Protest.pl, like all Perl programs, is meant to be run on any machine and in any environment that 
has a Perl interpreter, and Perl is ideally meant to give identical output in each. The key variable I 
set was: 
wall_street=”exec ‘echo MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN’”
which substitutes the appearance of the $wall_street variable with Perl code that, once 
interpreted by the Perl runtime, will print a famous text to the screen.
The immediate effect is that, instead of a poetic relationship with the ongoing struggle of Occupy 
Wall Street and its goals of reducing corporate influence in government, nationalized education and 
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universal healthcare, protest.pl instead displays the slogan of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential 
campaign. This is a striking difference – we probably don't need reminding that in his first 100 days
as President, Trump enacted policies completely at odds with Occupy by lowering corporate tax 
rates (Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 2017), doubling the estate tax threshold (Ebeling, 2017), withdrawing 
from the Paris Climate Agreement (Chakraborty, 2017), and promoting his campaign promises to 
eliminate the Department of Education and the Environmental Protection Agency (Jerde, 2015). 
This is of course in addition to infamous Trump episodes such as being recorded on tape bragging 
about sexual assault (Farhi, 2016), repeatedly describing African countries as "shitholes" in a 
meeting that the UN branded as "racist" (Embury-Dennis, 2018), and hiring Steve Bannon as his 
campaign CEO after Bannon had equated the Occupy Wall Street participants with Nazi 
brownshirts (Kaczynski, 2017). Suddenly, Speaking Code’s specific positioning of protest.pl within 
an expanded public politics, especially one oppositional to corporate hegemony, doesn’t make quite 
as much sense. 
Using shell variable substitution in the second demonstration is a ‘sleight of hand’ compared to the 
first demonstration because I am employing features separate from Perl to achieve the exploitation. 
Such a scenario is unlikely to be found in the ‘real world’, to the extreme that ‘defending’ against an
‘attacker’ who can manipulate shell variables using the particular type of quoting demonstrated here
is pointless. However in this context I think it’s an illustrative example. One part of the context is 
that, as a dynamically-typed scripting language with automatic memory management, Perl takes 
care of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of any underlying computing machine, and protest.pl is such a trivial 
program that there weren’t a lot of ways I could manipulate it – especially as someone who is a 
complete novice at Perl. A more important part of the context is that, in spite of any 
textual/literary/semiotic ‘meaning’, because the variables of protest.pl are uninitialized, they don’t 
functionally ‘mean’ anything. They are empty references, only too happy to be filled. Exploiting 
protest.pl to display Trump's slogan then becomes a crass but hopefully effective demonstration that
as a running program protest.pl can likely, in theory, do just about anything – including something 
completely opposite of its reading in Speaking Code. 
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Fig 0.1.5 – Linux command-line screenshot
Figure 0.1.5 demonstrates the issue more clearly. When Perl is given code with the -W or “show 
Warnings” command line argument, the Perl runtime prioritizes warnings about any code's 
projected behavior. When given protest.pl with the –W argument, the Perl runtime complains and 
refuses to execute the code due to the implications of uninitialized variables. This issue is explained
in more detail by the US National Cybersecurity FFRDC’s Common Weakness Enumerations 455 
through 457 (MITRE, 2018).
CONCLUSIONS:
In response to my exploitation of protest.pl, I propose the following additions to the protest.pl code, 
presented below as protest-ng.pl (Protest Next Generation) in Fig 0.1.6. In technical terms I locally 
define all variables with constants and I add two basic checks meant to enforce safe programming 
practices. The local definitions keep the variables from being manipulated in more environments, 
especially environments in which global configurations in Perl or other Perl modules might have 
otherwise contaminated named variables from protest.pl, although I think this also has the 
unfortunate effect of somewhat shifting or ‘pinning down’ the code's poetic readings. However, the 
hope is that Cox-style surface/literary readings of this work will find the shifts tolerable, while as a 
whole the described machine itself is safer to run, and as a running program it stays more in 
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alignment with both its authorial intent and textual-poetic potential: the ‘protest’ of protest.pl is now
even more hopeless than before, and for better or worse, no Capitalist Sharks will die in protest-
ng.pl. Thayer is likely aware of these basic Perl features that I’ve implemented in protest-ng.pl, and 
I would speculate that he didn’t include them in protest.pl for aesthetic reasons, specifically those 
that might speak to Donald Knuth’s (1983) concept of code “elegance”. I think Thayer’s aesthetic 
concerns are indicated by the conciseness of protest.pl, and just to compare, my additions double 
the size of the code without really changing anything that it ‘does’ - it endlessly hangs just as 
before, it just always does so in a larger number of environments. However, I would add that if 
there’s once thing I’ve learned from this first excursion into the language, it’s that anyone who is 
concerned about the elegance of their code really shouldn’t be messing with Perl anyway.
Fig 0.1.6 – Linux command-line screenshot
The larger point of this POC is about the critique of functioning machines in a case where, as code, 
an artwork is a proposal for a functioning machine (Reas, 2016). I think it's safe to assume that 
protest.pl was never understood as running in a security-aware environment by its author, but it 
was, by Thayer’s own declaration, meant to be run. It is code, i.e. it is instructions to run a machine,
and in this case a functioning machine which Thayer says is critical to his intention of how 
viewer/participants are to experience the work. I think the question can be asked – why were 
protest.pl’s alternative potentials not picked up in the analysis in Speaking Code?
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Perhaps it’s because the potentials were noticed and deemed to be inconsequential. Regardless, I 
would also suggest that there’s a more relevant question of scope. Protest.pl, as code, consists of 
just a few lines that execute a trivial program. It’s also a minor part of a single portion of Speaking 
Code’s overall argument. Even if these potentials weren’t noticed, this POC is, at best, a marginal 
intervention into a minor work taking up a small part of a comprehensive and persuasive analysis of
code as political speech. 
But let me, to borrow a phrase from Speaking Code, “hint at another possibility”, and before I do 
that, let me make an observation: there is no evidence that Cox can write code, at least not in any 
robust capacity. In the work I’ve read (Cox 2006, 2009, 2013, 2014) there’s a lot of code, some of it
published nowhere else, and all of it written by other people, usually Adrian Ward or Alex McLean 
(save a few small examples in “Antithesis” that are written “with the assistance” of Adrian Ward). 
That Speaking Code is a remarkable and collaborative output that is valuable here is not disputed, in
fact parts of this thesis will rely on arguments drawn directly from Speaking Code, and it is noted 
that a lack of demonstrable evidence of competence in writing code is standard among digital art 
researchers. It is also noted that not a single example of a close code reading exists, not just in 
Speaking Code where we find protest.pl and which would likely have spotted the potentialities that 
I later identified, and not just in all of Cox's published work; it is, in fact, normative in the field. As 
examined further in the Literature Review, close code readings of art are rare and in-memory 
examinations of the running processes of computer-based art do not happen.
So the possibility I mean to hint at and the reason for pointing all this out, and in doing so I want to 
specifically turn from Prof Cox and look at the larger field of art theory, is to explicitly invite the 
question of: why would (or perhaps how can) researchers who don't write code, read code? This 
invites some follow-on questions: whether researchers who can't read code can fully evaluate the 
functioning of code, and whether researchers who can’t fully evaluate the functioning of code can 
fully evaluate art that is composed of functioning code, or put more simply, runs on a computer? 
There are a lot of assumptions here, and it’s a discursive point that I make not to disparage any 
researcher but rather to propose the usefulness of this research.
Lastly, let me mention that I don’t consider myself particularly skilled in writing (and therefore 
reading) code either and this practice-based research is likely unable to give a complete answer. 
Compared to my peers who code professionally, I’m borderline useless, and I have only piecemeal 
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20-year old training from University in coding – one introductory course on Lisp programming, one
introductory course on digital electronics where I needed to code in a machine language, and a few 
tutored years of programming generative academic music in MAX (before it was MAX/MSP), 
Supercollider and CSound. But even with my limited skill set, reading Speaking Code and coming 
across protest.pl for the first time, I immediately clocked that protest.pl’s variables were 
uninitialized and therefore the work likely contained actionable potentials that I did not see explored
in the book. That it was coded in a scripting language like Perl, and that I had no previous 
experience with Perl, meant that the potentials I demonstrated leaned towards the theoretical in 
application. If protest.pl was instead coded in C or an assembly language and Thayer left variables 
uninitialized, especially if it wasn’t a trivial program, this POC would be much more entertaining. 
So while I am not a code writing or reading specialist, I am enough attuned to the identification and 
application of alternative computational potentials that this POC was able to provide new critique to
a (computer-based) artwork. It is critique that I would argue is, in a quite direct sense, “medium-
specific” to an artwork that occupies a ‘Turing-complete medium’. That is also where I mean to 
situate both the practice and text of this research: to create art that explores the idea of Turing-
completeness as a medium, and to attempt an understanding of the limits of what one can say about 
computer-based art when considering Turing-completeness as a medium.
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0.2 Proof of Concept 2 – d███████7
NOTICE:
The research for this POC unexpectedly discovered likely PII (Personally Identifiable Information). 
Any and all instances of PII or similar information discovered in the research have been destroyed, 
and in its presentation here have been obfuscated.
Introduction:
In this POC I show how the integrity of online artwork can be called into question due to specific 
computational choices made in the construction of the work. I further demonstrate an example of 
how the technical implementation of a computer-based project directly contradicts the conceptual 
underpinning of the project. I then offer solutions, although all solutions are likely already well 
known. The projects examined are neilcummings.com and culturesofresilience.org. Disclosure: Prof
Neil Cummings is the internal examiner of this PhD
The ‘concept’ in this “Proof of Concept” is twofold. First, to propose to the reader that there are 
aspects which may be useful in the understanding or evaluation of work that are ‘beneath the 
surface’, so to speak, of how computer-based work is typically read. Second, to propose that, while 
a focus on “medium” has a stigma as a modernist obsession that is perhaps deserved, medium-
specific analysis in computer-based work can be utilized in an expansive fashion, allowing types of 
evaluation which are novel and valuable. 
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND:
Hashing:
Contemporary operating systems avoid storing passwords in “plaintext”, IE unencrypted. They do 
this by “hashing” the password through a non-reversible mathematical function that generates a 
fixed-length number unique to a specific and arbitrarily long plaintext input (Schneier et all, 2010). 
They then store this number – the “hash” – and use it as a comparison to future authentications. 
When a computer user enters their password at a login screen, the OS hashes it, compares it to a 
stored hash, and if the hashes match they are authenticated. In this way hashes are fundamentally 
metadata, as they are data about a plaintext rather than the plaintext itself. The obvious reason for 
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hashing is to avoid having instances of a user’s plaintext credentials lying around, accessible to 
anyone who might use a given computer.
Cracking:
Password “cracking” is the process of testing hashes against known plaintexts. Take a given 
plaintext, run it through the hashing algorithm, and if the number that comes out is the same as the 
hash that’s being tested for, then the plaintext is correct for that hash.
UAL:
Universities, like other large institutions, tend to use a standard “managed” system of user 
authentication. In managed systems such as those that macOS and Windows natively provide, when 
logging onto any computer for the first time, a user’s password is hashed and tested against a 
centrally stored hash (Microsoft, 2009). In most cases a local copy of the hash is then also stored on
the managed machine to be used for future authentications, and this local hash may be accessible by
a variety of means. For example, while on some machines this local copy of a user’s hash is only 
readable by the “root” user, or other user with similar privileges, this only refers to “root” within the
context of the locally installed operating system. One way of examining local hashes which is 
trivial, legal, and consistent with UAL’s computer usage guidelines would be to simply boot a 
machine into an alternative operating system.
POC:
UAL IT Guidelines ban anyone associated with UAL from discussing UAL IT “security measures” 
(UAL IT Terms of Use, 2017) and threatens any member of the UAL community with various 
punitive measures for doing do. So of course this POC won’t do that. However, I can say that after 
13 years of working in UK higher education, my experience has been that University computers 
tend to store local hashes for a very long time, sometimes years, and I’ve observed public 
computers at multiple institutions that contained hundreds of user hashes. As a result, at UAL I use 
a complex password that is specific to my UAL account. Aside from generally being good practice, 
I do this because of the potential for account compromise in a system where over 22,000 students 
and staff can access every hash that’s created every time I use a UAL public computer. Although 
this might sound like poor network design, UAL’s system is reflective of real challenges regarding 
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secure computing within an institutional context of shared resources, and in my experience it is no 
different to computer networks at other UK universities such as the RCA, UCL and Goldsmiths.
The Computer Misuse Act (1990) prohibits “unauthorized” computer access although it gives no 
definition of “unauthorized”. The wording of the CMA has been criticized by legal experts and 
privacy rights advocates for both its vagueness and its lack of application in bringing prosecutions, 
(MacEwan, 2008) but for the purposes of this POC it prohibits “accessing” remote computers by, 
for example, attempting to log into an account for which one does not have “authorization” as a way
of testing the strength of plaintext passwords. So I visited the Chelsea College of Art and located a 
public computer with a locally stored and publicly accessible copy of Prof Neil Cummings hash (in 
this instance, “public” only includes members of the UAL community, not members of the general 
public who would likely be denied entry to UAL facilities – I acquire truly public hashes of Prof 
Cummings from the Internet later in this POC). 
The computer I located on my visit to Chelsea was manufactured by Apple Inc, who’s OS X or 
macOS operating system uses a cryptographically sound and CPU intensive hashing algorithm 
called SHA512-PBKDF. The images below show Prof Cummings macOS hash being transformed 
into a format that can be imported into the Hashcat (Hashcat, 2017) program for testing:
Fig 0.2.1 – initial step of extracting hash information from ncummings.plist, data obfuscated
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Fig 0.2.2 – further extraction of Prof Cummings UAL hash, data obfuscated
Please note the “iteration” section in Fig 0.2.2. This indicates that the plaintext going in was hashed 
by Apple’s OS not just once but with 54,347 rounds of the SHA-512-PBKDF function. As SHA-
512-PBKDF is already a CPU intensive function, 54,347 rounds of it makes guessing plaintexts 
extremely slow, so slow that any reasonable password would take months to years to fully test. For 
a specific number: a 54,347-round SHA-512-PBKDF hash derived from a plaintext consisting of an
eight letter ‘word’ not found in the dictionary appended to one numerical digit and one non-letter 
symbol (example: “ph00caux9*”) would take my computer roughly 81 years to test all possible 
matching plaintexts in a “brute-force” fashion. With this in mind, and knowing the industry-
standard password requirements of UAL (UAL, 2017), I tested the macOS hash, fully expecting that
my computer would not be able to find a matching plaintext within my lifetime.
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Fig 0.2.3 – test results of Prof Cummings UAL hash, password obfuscated
Contrary to my expectation, a plaintext was matched in 7 seconds. In this case, I did not need to 
attempt a “brute-force” test of the hash, I just started with a basic “dictionary” test of the 5,000 most
commonly used English words according to BYU’s “Corpus of Contemporary American English” 
(Brigham Young University, 2017), with some transformation rules applied to each of them such as 
appending numbers and changing lowercase letters to capital letters. The match was found in such a
short time because of the extreme ‘weakness’ of the chosen plaintext – one very common English 
word appended by one number.
The POC will now shift focus to an inspection of the “open source” Firefox browser (Mozilla, 
2018). Like most browsers, Firefox allows a user to store authentication credentials for Internet 
resources – a typical example is that the browser will store a user’s email password so the user isn’t 
required to type it in every time they want to login to their email account. However, browsers do not
hash user credentials because they need to return the plaintext credential to a website that is asking 
for it – a browser delivering gmail.com the numerical hash of a user’s credentials will not 
authenticate them, Gmail wants plaintext credentials (which Google then hashes and compares to a 
hash that has been previously stored on its servers). In order to do this safely, browsers typically 
encrypt plaintext credentials; encryption is different than hashing in the sense that encryption is 
reversible and a user retrieves the plaintext of encrypted information by knowing an encryption key 
that is separate from the plaintext (whereas there is no key for a hash). One of the unique 
characteristics of Firefox is that, unlike other major browsers such as Chrome, Edge or Safari, 
Firefox passwords are de facto unencrypted because Firefox ‘encryption’ of plaintexts is done with 
a known and accessible encryption key located in a file called “key3.db” (Gunyedas, 2009). This is 
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why, when running the Firefox software, to display stored credentials a user simply clicks a “Show 
passwords” button in the GUI, whereas all other major browsers require a user to input an 
encryption key first – the other browsers need it to decrypt the stored information (in practice the 
encryption key is usually the same as a user’s login password). One might think that even if the 
location of this encryption key is known, it might be difficult to access. However, it’s often the case 
that Universities – again, like any large institution that has sizeable computing resources to manage 
– use the same installation media for software across their computers. In practice this means that, 
for users of those managed machines, the key3.db encryption keys that are generated for different 
users on the same machine are almost always identical (they are often identical even for different 
users on different managed machines as well). This is to say that, by default, any UAL user on any 
UAL computer probably has access to the Firefox encryption key of any other past user of that 
computer. If a user wanted to actually encrypt their credentials in Firefox with a key that only they 
knew (which is generally the point of encryption), they would have to configure the “master 
password” option from within a Firefox sub-menu that is not selected by default (Mozilla, 2017). I 
ran a quick test for these de facto unencrypted credentials on the public computer at Chelsea, again 
just as a formality and not expecting that any information would be left publicly accessible by any 
user. This is what was returned (see following page):
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Fig 0.2.4 – partial listing, all passwords are obfuscated, usernames which are not publicly
available or trivially discoverable are obfuscated
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While it appears that Firefox was used to store credentials, what’s worrying is the specific choice to 
not use encryption in combination with the specific choice to use Firefox’s cloud syncing system. 
This meant that when Prof Cummings logged in, all his credentials were downloaded from “the 
cloud” and stored locally, unencrypted, and in this instance on a public computer where they were 
available for months. A cursory inspection of the approximately 50 plaintexts for sites including 
Google, Amazon, webitrent (UAL’s payroll self-service), Skype and British Airways indicated all 
were trivially recoverable and repeatedly shared amongst each other. This seems opposed to all 
general knowledge of computing practice along with specific guidance from the UK government 
(GOV.UK, 2015), the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 2017) and UAL 
(UAL Password FAQ, 2017) to never use weak passwords and never use the same password in 
different contexts. In respect of the tests on the macOS hash, the credentials for UAL services also 
appear to be in violation of UAL’s own specific password requirements (UAL Password FAQ, 
2017), although I would have to argue that as UAL’s system appears to have still allowed the 
credentials to be used, it’s a “requirement” without any apparent enforcement capability. 
Regardless, this type of repeated usage of weak, shared credentials is explicitly described as 
“insecure behaviour” by the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC, 2017). In respect of these 
findings, let me briefly mention that Prof Cummings writes and theorizes on matters relating to 
surveillance and privacy, and in September of 2017 delivered a paper entitled “On Sovereignty: 
Internet Surveillance and Struggles for Privacy”, which “explores the necessity, in an environment 
of state and commercial surveillance, of struggles for privacy, thinking about encryption, openness 
and misuse” (Informed Matters, 2017). While to some this might suggest theorization that is far 
removed from any ‘material’ understanding of practice or real-world implementation, I rather 
believe that Cummings accurately theorized aspects of this exact type of research years ago: “It is 
from the virtual that the hacker produces ever-new expressions of the actual. To the hacker, what is 
represented as being real is always partial, limited, perhaps even false.” (Cummings, 2009)
The POC will now turn to its main focus using three of the sites from the above listing. The reason 
being that the three directly relate to projects that move within contexts of art production and 
distribution: neilcummings.com, culturesofresilience.org, and easyspace.com
- neilcummings.com is a website that appears to run the Drupal content management software. It 
contains text, images, links to moving image work, and various other documentation, all apparently 
produced or collected by Neil Cummings and mostly presented in the form of a “blog”. A WHOIS 
lookup listed Neil Cummings as the Registrant and Administrator of “neilcummings.com”.
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- culturesofresilience.org is the online presence of a large, collaborative UAL project “the goal of 
which has been to build a ‘multiple vision’ on the role of culture in creating resilient systems”. It 
uses “art and design communities” that “deal with the issue of social and personal resilience” 
(Cultures of Resilience 2017). Neil Cummings is listed as a member of the “Cultures of Resilience 
Group” and was also listed by a WHOIS lookup as the Registrant and Administrator of the domain 
name “culturesofresilience.org”.
- easyspace.com is the website of a company that provides domain name registration and web 
hosting services. Easyspace claims to be one of the oldest and largest companies of its kind in the 
UK (Easyspace, 2017) and they likely host millions of sites and domain names. It is the domain 
name registrar for both neilcummings.com and culturesofresilience.org
The same plaintext credentials appear to be used for authentication to all three sites, a plaintext that 
is composed of two short and very common English words followed by a common two digit 
number. Working backwards I re-created a hash of this plaintext, and again tested the hash against a 
list of the 5,000 most common English words with transformations. Of course, there was no match. 
I then ran a “combinator” test (Hashcat, 2015) with the same list, in which the words in the list are 
first combined with each other before being transformed and tested against the hash, and a match 
was found in 13 seconds. This is an improvement of 187% on the time needed to match a plaintext 
against Prof Cumming’s UAL hash, which took 7 seconds, although this improvement is 
unfortunately marginal in real-world application and neither plaintext can be considered appropriate
for usage as authentication credentials in any way. The plaintext credential used for the three sites 
above also appears to have been used for authentication to 14 other sites including Google, Vimeo, 
Amazon, Twitter and Dropbox.
When this pattern of insecure behaviour was actualized in an art practice, it created what this POC 
will call a “Vulnerable Online Artwork”. That is, online work that, through negligence in its 
construction, is vulnerable to manipulation, destruction, or other sorts of interaction by third-parties 
that it is reasonable to understand as not the authorial intention of the work’s creators or 
distributors. Analysis of the above credentials suggests neilcummings.com and 
culturesofresilience.org are both Vulnerable Online Artworks. In the specific case of 
culturesofresilience.org, this vulnerability in construction is a direct contradiction of the terms of 
the work, as the website, one component of the Cultures of Resilience project, is unequivocally not 
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resilient in its current form. To illustrate this case, consider the image below – an artistic re-creation 
of the easyspace.com domain name administration page for Prof Cummings account, depicting the 
view that a hypothetical third-party would have after exploiting its credential vulnerability so that 
the culturesofresilience.org site is one click away from being permanently transferred to parties 
unknown:
Fig 0.2.5 – the culturesofresilience.org website one click away from being sent into the abyss, as a
result of being notably un-resilient (Artist’s impression)
These Vulnerable Online Artworks may, I believe, provide an example of “security through 
obscurity” as, like most online artworks, they are likely low-traffic and therefore more difficult to 
“monetize”. As a result, I think it’s likely that they are of little interest to many third-parties, and if 
they have not been acted on by third-parties, it is likely because no third party has cared to examine 
them. The problem here is that, once someone does care, even if only as part of the extremely niche 
research of this PhD, vulnerabilities in online work can easily be discovered if the work is 
constructed with little regard to privacy and security-awareness. Perhaps it is the case that 
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Vulnerable Online Artworks are a common occurrence, but even so, what is novel is research which
looks at work in this way: I am unaware of a single theorization or examination of computer-based 
art through a lens of cybersecurity practice in the entire literature of computer-based art, and from 
the computational perspective of a “Turing-complete medium” of art, such an examination would 
seem legitimate, perhaps even obvious.
Finally, let me show how these Vulnerable Online Artworks can be examined by the wider public at 
large, and not just a member of the UAL community. In 2012 Dropbox, Inc, a file hosting service, 
suffered a severe data breach that led to approximately 68 million username and hash pairs being 
accessed. At the time, Dropbox did not disclose, and possibly did not know, the severity of the 
breach (Bott, 2012). The information apparently circulated privately for a few years before coming 
to light in August 2016 when it was posted publicly and security researcher Troy Hunt confirmed its
origins and legitimacy (Hunt, 2016). The information has been available to the public ever since, I 
downloaded the entire 5GB set from a Torrent link provided by the Abertay Ethical Hacking 
Society, a club of Abertay University students that meet under the auspices of the University of 
Abertay Dundee Students Association. On their “Data Dumps” page (Abertay Ethical Hacking 
Society, 2017) the Abertay EHS provides links to a number of public datasets stemming from 
breaches, including those from Dropbox, Ashley Madison (the “adult dating” site), LinkedIn, 
Myspace, and Patreon. Searching through the Dropbox information, which can be found at this 
“magnet” torrent address, as provided by the Abertay Ethical Hacking Society:
magnet:?xt=urn:btih:E1A1E35E65454A08CDE363CB5EE42FA56841A0E7&dn=dropbox.zip 
I located the following username and password hash combination:
neil@neilcummings.com:$2a$08$Wy7d5vJNkTOoWpvnRdh01u7gJEcAC42bV4W0DS0Vz1GzUUSyJnRWO
Unlike the previous hashes in the POC, I have not obfuscated this one because, at this point, it is 
truly public information (and not just accessible to a “public” consisting of roughly 22,000 people 
with access to UAL public computers). Huge numbers of hashes are also publicly available in this 
way: interested parties can visit a site such as https://hashes.org and freely access hundreds of 
millions of hashes, with new hashes being uploaded to the site every day and security enthusiasts 
competing to see who can match plaintexts to them (hashes.org, 2017). To be clear, I also found 
username and hash combinations in the Dropbox dataset for many people I know, including my 
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PhD supervisor, the head of my Department at Goldsmiths (along with 714 other goldsmiths 
students and staff), my gallerist, and my wife. This is precisely why there is so much advice about 
using “strong” passwords and not sharing passwords among accounts and services. As an aside, I 
will also note that I did not find my own username and hash combination in the Dropbox data. I 
wish I could say this was because of a moral stand I took against using the services of companies 
that have accused war criminals sitting on their Board of Directors (Cole 2014, Human Rights 
Watch 2015), but it’s really just the case that I never had a use for Dropbox.
The Dropbox hash used the bcrypt hashing function, introduced in 1999 by researchers Niels 
Provos and David Mazières (USENIX, 1999). Bcrypt is another strong cryptographic hash function 
that is slow to crack, even slower on my computer than 54,347 rounds of SHA-512-PBKDF, which 
is probably why it’s now standard issue in a number of operating systems including OpenBSD. I 
made a short list of the plaintexts that were unexpectedly discovered earlier in this POC, and tested 
them against this bcrypt hash:
Fig 0.2.6. - test results of Prof Cummings Dropbox hash, password obfuscated
A plaintext was matched instantly. More to the point, the plaintext which matched the Dropbox hash
– and remember, this is a hash that I freely downloaded from the Internet, not one stored locally on 
a UAL public computer – was the same as the weak plaintext credential (two very short and 
common English words plus a common two digit number) for the Vulnerable Online Artworks. 
Additionally, it matches the redacted credential from Figure 0.2.4 that appears to be currently used 
for Dropbox. 
Before the POC moves to its next section, an “Evaluative Proposal”, I want to make one more point.
Anyone who could bring to bear such a comprehensive range of the administrative account 
credentials of another person would be able to leverage their use in ways that are unpleasant to 
imagine. As such it would be, in a purely technological sense, a trivial exercise to go further in 
raising the stakes of this POC, using it to demonstrate just how ‘badly’ these sorts of scenarios can 
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go in the “real world”. So while this POC can be seen as a legitimate response to an examiner’s 
challenge to “hack the ethics” of our institution for the benefit of the research, and while it perhaps 
uses unorthodox methods, it still respects normative ethical boundaries. In fact, one of the ethical 
‘hacks’ this POC seeks to activate is that by its own discussion in the thesis, and considering that 
the examiner in question is one of only two other people who will initially read this re-submission 
and has the ability to require further amendments or block publication altogether, the POC serves as
an ethical and effective private disclosure of existing and previously unrecognized vulnerabilities 
and risks (while also proving useful as an example of a medium-specific critique located in the 
processes of Turing-complete machines). 
Evaluative Proposal:
Is this type of negligence or these types of vulnerabilities ever material to an evaluation of work? 
Let me propose some ways to think through the question using two hypothetical cases, each 
modeled on the real-world examples above.
Case 1, modeled on neilcummings.com
Consider a hypothetical, Vulnerable Online Artwork which is published without disclosing (or 
perhaps even knowledge of) an obvious vulnerability. The artwork is a website and it is offered for 
sale using artist Rafael Rozendaal’s “Art Website Sales Contract” (Rozendaal 2014). The work is 
also subject to a severe credential vulnerability in that the website/artwork’s admin password, as 
configured by the artist, is “password”; “password” is often thought of as the most commonly used 
(and therefore most easily guessed) credential, although in 2014, by one measure, it fell into second 
place when it was overtaken by “123456” (Brodkin, 2014). Now consider how an institution might 
wish to evaluate the work before a potential acquisition. If this hypothetical work is acquired and 
then subsequently wiped from the Internet by parties unknown in an instance if iconoclasm, were 
the negligence in the work’s construction revealed, it’s easy to imagine that the artist could be held 
liable – this is the reason that the evolving market of Cyber insurance often includes negligence 
coverage (Hiscox, 2017), and the larger market of Technology insurance offers “errors and 
omissions” policies (IRMI, 2017). We can also imagine other destructive situations; perhaps the 
artwork is instead taken offline by a third party and only offered to be made available again after the
institution pays a fee. More interesting might be a case where an artwork is manipulated, added to 
the institutional archive, and years later the institution is unable to attest to the work’s authenticity 
because the work is inconsistent with archival documentation or source files. There are a huge 
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number of other possible scenarios, most of them are likely beyond the limited imagination of this 
researcher. However, whatever scenario is followed, identification of the vulnerability could be 
useful as a component of evaluating the work as ‘fit for purpose’ from the perspective of the 
institution’s remit.
Case 2, modeled on culturesofresilience.org:
Consider a hypothetical, Vulnerable Online Artwork which claims to activate or support a social 
function or engagement, and also has an admin password of “password”. As a result the work is 
used by third-parties as a repository for the distribution of content which contravenes the Religious 
and Racial Hatred Act of 2006 – a common activity for hacked sites these days (NBC 2014, 10TV 
2016). Perhaps it’s even done in a way that is not always noticeable to the artist or 
viewer/participants in a related “art world” and so this third-party practice continues for some time. 
In this hypothetical scenario, all experience of the work is contingent upon the work’s own terms of 
its social engagement, which are also the terms that would seemingly underpin any evaluation. 
Whether that sort of evaluation might employ Nicolas Bourriaud’s “Relational Aesthetics” 
(Bourriaud et al, 1998), or Claire Bishop’s (2012) understanding of an ethics of production, or any 
other evaluative strategy, for example Jen Delos Reyes’ (2014) notion that the aesthetic evaluation 
of “socially engaged” art can only be “determined on a case by case and emergent basis”, it seems 
unlikely any could be employed in a way that would allow the distribution of hate speech through 
the production of the work to escape scrutiny. This hypothetical case gives us the opportunity to 
consider a hypothetical “art world” that experienced the piece as “art” and that may not have 
experienced the work as hate speech. If their experience was privileged over the experience of hate 
crime using the exact same means, materials, infrastructure and (alleged) medium of the work, it 
would at the very least imply a major challenge to any ethical evaluation of socially engaged art, 
especially within something like Ranciere’s “ethical regime of art” in his “politics of esthetics”, 
which proposes the evaluation of images in relationship to a function of their utility to society 
(Ranciere, 2004). The case also gives us the opportunity to consider what sort of ethics might have 
been employed (or should have been employed) in a decision which activates negligence or obvious
“insecure behavior” in the production of art, especially that which is public and social, like virtually
all art that exists online.
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Conclusions:
The POC defines Vulnerable Online Artwork and demonstrates the likely existence of at least two 
cases. The two cases are vulnerable due what appears to be a pattern of “insecure behaviour” in the 
artist’s day-to-day computing practices which has manifested as negligence in the construction of 
online work. A specific and obvious vulnerability is analyzed and associated with two projects – 
neilcummings.com and culturesofresilience.org. It is shown that, at least in these cases, disregarding
the role of basic computer and network protocols in a given artwork can put the integrity of the 
work (and possibly the artist themselves) at risk.
The POC does not suggest that examination for vulnerabilities is necessarily useful for aesthetic 
evaluation, rather it’s proposed that any evaluation depends on the terms of the work. Two 
hypothetical models of artworks are given, based on the research of the POC, that show how the 
identification of vulnerabilities in artwork may be useful for specific types of evaluation. It is also 
implied that online artworks run on ‘universal’ machines that are general, re-programmable, and 
public by design. When an artist activates one of these machines in their work, what sort of 
‘responsibility’ they have to either themselves, their work, or to the public affected by the actions of
those machines, is left as a thought exercise to the reader.
Finally I propose the relationship of this POC to the practice contained in the research, in that the 
practice explores computational systems and will also help towards developing a vocabulary for 
looking ‘inside’ and ‘beneath the surface’ of computer-based work, which the POC demonstrates is 
useful for evaluation. Furthermore it is proposed that the idea of a ‘Turing-complete medium’ is an 
appropriate vehicle through which computational processes and their effects in artwork, and other 
related concerns, can be explored.
SOLUTIONS:
The common solutions to issues examined in the specific case of this POC at the time of writing 
are:
1. Only use strong passwords and follow UAL password guidance when using UAL systems
2. Use 2FA (2-factor authentication) wherever possible, and consider shifting resources away from 
infrastructure that does not support 2FA such as easyspace.com
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3. Do not use the Firefox browser on a shared computer unless a “master password” is also used to 
encrypt the Firefox keyfile – also with a strong and unique password
4. Do not store sensitive information on any UAL public computer
Furthermore, while this POC cannot publicly discuss any findings that might support the following 
anecdotal observation, I would suggest avoiding storing sensitive information on all UAL 
computers in general, and not just UAL computers in “public” areas. This includes UAL servers and
UAL’s Microsoft-based cloud services, including email.
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Chapter 1: Contextual Review
1.0 Introduction
This chapter introduces the key concepts of the research, first through a definition of terms, and 
then through a contextual review that focuses on relevant literature with a short overview of 
computer-based art practice (the relevance of the research Practice to the field of Contemporary Art 
has already been demonstrated through the Research Outputs and Introduction).
1.1 Three Definitions
I will start with some definitions, first of Turing-completeness, then of medium. Although in my 
title art, computers and intentionality are an appositive, some definitions will come into play later in
the research, especially concerning intentionality. Turing-completeness is much easier to define than
medium so I begin with it.
1.1.1 Definition 1: Turing-completeness
Turing-completeness is a reference to ideas developed by British mathematician Alan Turing in the 
1930’s. Turing was interested in the notion of “computability” – what sorts of problems could and 
could not be computed, or described as an algorithm. Before Turing’s work (and Alonzo Church’s 
“lambda calculus”, devised independently of Turing at roughly the same time to answer the same 
problem), there was no formal definition of an “algorithm”. Mathematicians simply relied on an 
intuitive concept of what an algorithm was, even when devising and solving for algorithms of 
arbitrary complexity. In his seminal 1936 paper "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to 
the Entscheidungsproblem" (Turing, 1936), Turing presented the “a (automatic)-machine”, a 
theoretical machine that manipulates symbols on a paper tape of an arbitrary length. Turing showed 
that an a-machine can be designed to provide the answer to any computable problem; his machines 
being a formal definition of an algorithm or “mechanical procedure”.
A special class of machine, called U (universal) machines by Turing, could further simulate any a-
machine. In other words, Turing asserted that if a U-machine couldn’t solve a problem, there was no
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algorithm possible for that problem. Turing’s assertion about the U-machine cannot be proven, but it
has not been disproved and is widely supported (Petzold 2008, Tourlakis 2012). By the 1950’s, 
Turing’s a-machines and U-machines were being called “Turing machines”, and his U-machine 
specifically a “Universal Turing Machine” (Shannon, 1956). The term “Turing-complete” then, in 
the field of computability theory, refers to any formal system which can simulate (and be simulated 
by) a Universal Turing Machine. In this research, the term is employed in a more practical, popular 
and also more ‘colloquial’ usage, meaning any real-world computing device which can 
approximately simulate a Universal Turing Machine. This colloquial usage of Turing’s thesis has 
been observed to hold with all known real-world computers although with one caveat: no known 
real-world computers have “tape”, which we can consider as equivalent to storage capacity, of an 
arbitrary length, hence the word “approximate” that appears in the definition I give.
This caveat is important, but it does not undermine computational universality for us in practice. 
While a Universal Turing Machine can simulate any computer, a given computer can not exactly 
simulate a Universal Turing Machine simply because a UTM's arbitrary storage capacity may need 
to be infinitely large – a hypothetical and, in all likelihood, impossible design. In practice the real 
effects of Turing's UTM's are everywhere: I'm typing right now on a ThinkPad T510 laptop that has 
an “emulator” program (Virtualbox, 2015) which will computationally simulate my 30 year old 
Atari 800 computer's hardware as software. It will of course run all my old Atari’s software too, and
the use of the term “emulator” to describe these sorts of programs – which are usually, but 
importantly not always, simulators – also points to a general confusion between the computer 
science terminology of “emulation” and “simulation” that has also infected art writing about 
computers (this will be covered later when the Literature Reviews discusses “hybridity”). Likewise 
the Atari 800 can in theory run an “emulator” program for my Thinkpad, although this would be a 
giant pain to produce. Recently developed software for antique 8-bit home computers like the Atari 
800 and Commodore 64 by a continuing hobbyist community has allowed those machines to 
perform functions unimaginable at the time they were manufactured: connect to WiFi networks, run
a GUI, and communicate over TCP/IP to my ThinkPad (Commodore 64 Wi-Fi, 2015). Clearly it's 
not that 8-bit machines were ever fundamentally incapable of those things, it's that the algorithms to
do them didn't exist in the 1980's. Indeed, a main reason someone might want to connect their Atari 
800 to a Wi-Fi network is simply to show that they can. So while our computing machines with 
their finite amounts of storage are only approximations of a Universal Turing Machine, they are 
very close ones and equivalent in practice.
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“...the personal computers we use nowadays are built around silicon microprocessors that are in 
effect universal computers on a chip...” (M. Davis, 2000)
The reason why I’m interested in Turing's idea – that any UTM-equivalent machine can simulate 
any other, and hence any real-world computer can simulate any other – is that it provides a single 
definition for all computers. Since that definition is based on a notion of computational equivalence,
it suggests that the entire set of computers can be thought of as ontologically identical. They can all 
perfectly simulate each other, so they can be considered the same. This is handy if you’d like to 
argue that two computers which might appear to be vastly different, or used in seemingly different 
ways in artworks, are in fact instances of one medium, which this research does.
It’s worth mentioning that the title of this PhD could very well have been “Computers as medium” 
but in my opinion the term “computer” is simply too vague. By using “Turing-complete”, I’m able 
to reference a more formal definition that describes any computer and has withstood over 70 years 
of scrutiny. One issue I have with recent fine art research that deals with contemporary technologies
is the amount of inaccurate usage of formal terminology. Pieter Adriaans and Johan van Bentham 
provide an example of this when describe the term “information” as a “high frequency and low-
content phrase that permeates our ordinary language without attracting much attention, since its 
meaning has long eroded” (Adriaans/van Bentham, 2008). I would add “computer”, “digital”, and 
“media” to that category without question, especially in art writing. It goes without saying that 
contemporary art relies on subjective interpretations of work, and I find myself almost conditioned 
to look for diagonal connections and multiple meanings when discussing art. As writing about 
computers provides an opportunity for an art theory to engage in a relationship with logical truth, as
embodied in a Turing-complete medium, it would be a shame to waste it on a poor understanding of
the concepts involved or sloppy usage of terminology borrowed from other disciplines. I will also 
note here that I hold a music degree and not a computer science degree so I am also borrowing 
terms and concepts from disciplines in which I have little to no formal training (for example I 
would consider myself an “advanced enthusiast” of Turing's work rather than an “expert”), however
for the reasons mentioned I will be as strict as I possibly can with my usage of these terms and 
concepts.
As much as Turing-completeness is a constructive definition, used to link and include every known 
real world computer regardless of possibly disparate appearances/outputs, it is also a limiting bound
of what is considered in this research. There are many machines which are not Turing-complete, 
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and as a result this research has little to say about them. Limited classes of Finite-state machines, 
for example Deterministic Finite Automatons (DFA), are machines that, while able to do things like 
compute certain mathematical problems, do not meet the definition of Turing-completeness. A 
cheap calculator is a real-world example of one of these, and electronic artworks which are limited 
types of finite-state machines, such as Robert Rauschenberg’s collaborations with engineer Billy 
Kluver from the mid-1960’s (Rauschenberg and Kluver, 1966), will be excluded from 
consideration.
Lastly I would like to mention Alan Turing, as using “Turing-completeness” in the title of the 
research foregrounds his name and work, and this is done with purpose. His is a fascinating story, 
touching on social issues as well as his remarkable contributions to knowledge. Turing was a highly
influential thinker and his ideas were foundational to both the development of computer science and
the creation of the modern computer. His cryptanalysis work at Bletchley Park during World War II 
cracked German communication codes, and according to some estimates sped up the end of the war 
by two years (Copeland, 2004). His “Turing test” was the first proposal for how to discern possible 
intelligence in a machine, giving credence to an entire field that we now call artificial intelligence. 
Sadly, later in his life Turing was convicted of the “gross indecency” of “homosexual acts”, stripped
of all his security clearances, and given a choice between prison time or “treatment” with female 
hormones. He chose the latter, and two years later was dead from cyanide poisoning. An inquest 
determined his cause of death to be suicide, and biographer Andrew Hodges believes he killed 
himself by eating a cyanide-laced apple, re-enacting a scene from Disney’s Snow White and the 
Seven Dwarfs (Hodges, 2014). Since starting this PhD, Turing's life and work has thankfully risen 
in the public consciousness. In 2009, then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown issued a public apology 
for Turing’s “appalling” treatment and recognized the enormous importance of his life and work 
(Brown, 2009). In 2014, Turing's work at Bletchley Park was dramatized in The Imitation Game, 
which was nominated for 8 Academy Awards, winning one, and 9 BAFTA awards (The Imitation 
Game, 2014).
1.1.2 Definition 2: Medium
The meaning of the term medium, as both a theoretical concept and in common usage, is ambiguous
at best. The OED has multiple definitions of the term, and definitions of its plural form “media” are 
qualitatively different from those of the singular. Morris Weitz defines “medium” as the material in 
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which a work of art is embodied, and gives Aristotle as the first who “in a systematic way, referred 
to this material element in art as the medium” (Weitz, 1959). However we have a problem straight 
away: the passages of Aristotle’s Poetics that Weitz is referencing aren’t always translated as such. 
Consider these translations of the last sentence of Poetics I:
“These elements of difference in the above arts I term the means of their imitation.” (Bywater, 
1909)
“These differences then in the various arts I call the means of representation.” (Vahlen 1885/Fyfe 
1926)
“Such, then, are the differences of the arts with respect to the medium of imitation.” (Butcher, 1902)
In any case, it seems that Weitz must have been using Butcher’s translation of Poetics, and that the 
same Ancient Greek word/phrase that Butcher translates as “medium”, others translate roughly as 
“means”. An equivalence of medium with means, two terms that have distinct OED definitions, 
certainly demonstrates an ambiguous usage of medium. An ironic illustration of this ambiguity is 
revealed in that the first two translations above do not have a single usage of the word “medium” in 
the entire translated texts, but as electronic documents themselves, they contained repeated usages 
of the word “medium” in the licenses which were appended to them: “Despite these efforts, Project 
Gutenberg-tm electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain 
"Defects,"...” (Project Gutenberg License, 2014)
Worth considering is that the word “medium”, introduced into the English language in 1589 
(Miriam Webster Dictionary, 1989), was simply borrowed from Latin where it was the neuter form 
of the adjective “medius” meaning “middle”. This was its initial meaning as well: “something lying 
in a middle or intermediate position”. Webster’s then gives 1595 as a date by which it had already 
developed a new meaning, one of “effecting or conveying something”, and with this I think we can 
already see the beginnings of our divergent translations of Poetics roughly 300 years later.
What’s also important to take from Aristotle I think is the context of his discussion – he is 
examining the structural principles that he feels define and differentiate works of art. Whatever the 
Ancient Greek words that he actually used in Poetics, he made three distinct categories of 
differentiation: 1. the manner in which they are produced (also translated as “way”) 2. the objects 
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that they represent (all translations agree on this term) and 3. the medium/means. So, ignoring 
ambiguities momentarily, we can say that something which has been translated into English as 
“medium” has also been one of the foundational elements of the critical analysis of art ever since 
the invention of the critical analysis of art.
First published in 1766, Gotthold Lessing’s Laocoön is often referenced as being a foundational text
in the development of the contemporary usage of medium in art practice and criticism. In the 1873 
English translation I used (Frothingham, 1904) the word itself shows up seven times – five times as 
direct quotations in the original Latin, once in a footnote, and once in Chapter XI. I think these 
usages, their context, and Lessing’s criticism are all very telling. The Latin usage is standard in a 
quote from Virgil’s Aeneid: “Bis medium amplexi…”, usually translated as “twice round his 
waist…” medium obviously means “middle”, literally the waist being the middle or midpoint of a 
human body. In Chapter XI the term is used to describe something more similar to “means”, or a 
mode of expression: “There are even cases where the artist deserves more credit for copying Nature 
through the medium of the poet's imitation than directly from herself.” And in the footnote Lessing 
uses medium to reference something material that lies between a viewer and a viewed object (while 
ridiculing the English poet/philosopher Alexander Pope): “In this passage Pope makes an entirely 
false use of the expression ‘aerial perspective,’ which, in fact, has nothing to do with the 
diminishing of the size according to the increased distance, but refers only to the change of color 
occasioned by the air or other medium through which the object is seen. A man capable of this 
blunder may justly be supposed ignorant of the whole subject.”
The second, material/spatial usage was well established by Lessing’s time: Isaac Newton used the 
term in a similar way in his Principia Mathematica (1687) when he described air and the theoretical 
“Aether” both as mediums through which light and sound could pass. Something I found interesting
was that Newton seems to use the Latin form “medii” to take on this newer English-derived usage 
rather than its original Latin meaning of “middle” as someone like Virgil used it (Principia 
Mathematica wasn’t translated from Newton’s Latin text until 1727).
Lessing’s first usage of the term in Chapter XI of Laocoön is very close, if not identical, to the 
Aristotelian one. Lessing’s purpose was also, like Aristotle's, a theorization of art practice. However
Lessing reaches beyond Aristotle’s structural analysis of art genre and proposes a critical framework
through which to evaluate artworks based on a relationship to this idea of medium (although, again, 
he doesn’t often use the word). The relationship he proposes is one of truth; that certain 
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means/mediums are more suited to a particular art, and that you can make better art by being true to 
your means/medium (Frothingham 1904).
The ideas in Laocoon now seem embryonic to one of the guiding principles that underlined 
Modernism in 20th century art practice, “medium-specificity”. Although Modernism itself 
comprised a wide array of associated cultural movements, we see a distillation of Lessing’s truth-to-
medium when Greenberg takes it up in his seminal article "Towards a New Laocoön” (Greenberg, 
1940). Greenberg defends what he calls medium-specificity in art and defines it in terms of 
“purity”; purity in an artwork means it being completely free of contamination by the influence of 
other media. He mostly discusses painting, and for him, abstract painting is a pinnacle of medium-
specificity as where else could it have come from but from an investigation of painting itself? 
Greenberg’s newer Laocoön has intensified Lessing’s argument for truth in a medium, adding the 
specific aesthetic criteria that Lessing’s truth is best reflected as purity. However, what is more 
relevant for us is Greenberg’s usage of the term medium: his is tied to material, but something more
along the lines of a self-evident identity in an artform, “It is by virtue of its medium that each art is 
unique and strictly itself” (Greenberg, 1940).
Medium-specific aesthetic goals are found all across the arts in the first half of the 20th century. 
Twenty years before Greenberg, Lev Kuleshov’s film concepts, subsequently developed by 
Eisenstein, led to the development of Soviet montage theory (Kuleshov, 1974). This theory argued 
for a type of medium specificity in film based around the idea that montage was the essence of film,
and a dedication in practice to this essence, usually by foregrounding montage in any work, 
produced a better cinematic experience. The clearly medium-specific idea of 
“Materialgerechtigkeit”, literally doing “truth to materials”, was a tenet the Bauhaus movement and 
of 20th-century Modern architecture (Naylor, 1985), and artists such as the sculptor Henry Moore 
espoused a “truth to material” in his own writing about his work (Read, 1934). In all of these 
examples we also find a definition of medium that remains closer to material, so much so that I’ve 
even seen Materialgerechtigkeit translated not as “truth to material” but as “justice to the medium” 
(Carroll, 2008).
However, it would be a mistake to believe that a definition of medium definitively coalesced thanks 
to this 20th century development of Lessing’s critique. Greenberg’s usage of the term is, as noted 
above, close to a material-based one, but it really did nothing to bound a definition. More 
importantly, definitions and usages of the term medium have grown more ambiguous ever since 
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thanks largely to two causes. One cause relates to ideas around “de-materialization” in art practice 
that accelerated from the middle of the 20th century, specifically in work that came out of 
Conceptual Art and Fluxus movements that often, explicitly, had no traditional material form 
(Lippard, 1997). The second cause of an increasingly ambiguous concept of medium was confusion 
between the term’s meanings in disciplines like communication theory, which were then imported 
back into art theory, most notably using the work of Marshall McLuhan. I will cover this cause in 
more detail shortly, it is also traced by Domenico Quaranta in “Beyond New Media Art” (Quaranta, 
2013). Perhaps even more important for this research is that at the same time of the emergence of 
Conceptual Art that Lippard documents, and only eight years after Weitz’s material-based definition
of medium is published, A. Michael Noll named the “digital computer” as his “creative medium” 
(Noll, 1967), and it’s likely that there are even earlier examples. 
All of these causes present challenges to definitions of medium that, like those of Weitz, Greenberg,
John Dewey (1958), Jerome Stolnitz (1960), and early film theorist Rudolf Arnheim (1957), rely on
some type of relationship to physical material. As a result, some definitions of medium shift away 
from a reliance on materiality in order to accommodate these challenges, although it’s important to 
note that many did not. David Joselit, writing in “After Art”, an influential 2013 book ostensibly 
about the fundamental changes that art itself is undergoing as a result of network technologies, 
plainly states: “In mediums a material substrate (such as paint on canvas) converges with an 
aesthetic tradition (such as painting).” (Joselit, 2013)
Returning to Marshall McLuhan as a cause of confusion: Media Theory and Communications 
Theory are two vastly different disciplines, the former being a wide-ranging humanities discipline 
that deals with the cultural effects and history of what is generally termed “mass media”, the latter 
being a much more scientific discipline that focuses on understanding the mechanics of 
communication itself. However they rely on similar definitions of medium, in that the definitions 
are based on the scientific usage of the term that we’ve seen employed since Newton (1687). 
Claude Shannon, with his “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” wrote an influential tool for
both fields. Shannon’s conception of the basic elements of communication was in 5 parts, all 
formally described: an information source, a transmitter, a channel, a receiver, and a destination. For
our purposes, we’re interested in the third part, the channel, which he defines as “3. The channel is 
merely the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter to receiver. It may be a pair of 
wires, a coaxial cable, a band of radio frequencies, a beam of light, etc.” (Shannon, 1948).
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Shannon’s ideas were formative not only for the field of Communication Theory, but also 
Information Theory. In addition to describing communication, Shannon defines information, and 
proves exactly how much of it can be sent through a channel with varying amounts of noise. Worth 
noting here is that while a formally described term, as “information” now became thanks to 
Shannon’s research, it still developed an independent popular usage. One of Shannon’s innovations 
was to separate information from any sort of ‘meaning’ in a message, allowing information to be 
strictly quantified, while “information” as the term is popularly understood today is often tied to a 
meaning or relevance of something. This is partly what Adriaans and van Bentham meant when 
they say the term’s “meaning has long eroded” in popular usage (Adriaans & van Bentham, 2008). 
As an aside, Shannon also invented the concept of a “bit” as the singular, smallest unit of 
information.
Now that Shannon had mathematically described what “communication” was, and used the term 
“medium” to specifically mean any channel of communication, cultural theorists freely used his 
term, often it seems as a way to suggest that their work had a scientific validity. The most well 
known example is certainly Marshall McLuhan, who when he famously described a light bulb as a 
potential medium (McLuhan, 1964), echoed Shannon’s “beam of light” as a potential channel. 
McLuhan’s basic theory was that various media themselves, like light bulbs but more importantly 
like “mass media” such as television, radio, comics and film, had much more of a cultural impact 
than whatever “content” they might carry. This is the basis of his notorious claim that “the medium 
is the message” (McLuhan, 1964). Whether McLuhan’s claim that the medium itself is more 
important than its content is debatable, but he was certainly correct in foregrounding the cultural 
effects of media as a subject of study. The main issue that’s important for this research, however, is 
his usage of the term medium. He gets extremely descriptive, writing about certain media as “hot” 
and others as “cool” based on his interpretations of how much effort people had to put into 
understanding the messages they contained. It perhaps goes against his claim that content doesn’t 
matter when he’s rating mediums based on how well we understand a given medium’s transmitted 
content. But regardless, I find these descriptors silly and I think he is able to get away with it at the 
time because his usage of medium has a tie to something with such a solid, mathematical 
foundation. It is simply unquestionable when he uses the term medium that a medium is a 
transmission channel, and thanks to Shannon we know exactly what a transmission channel is. 
Combining that with the fact that no one had really thought about transmission channels as shapers 
of culture the way McLuhan proposed, he’s allowed to say quite a lot.
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An important point here is that at the time McLuhan is writing, Greenberg is still writing. And in a 
fashion they both have perspectives that could be described as “medium-specific”. Although it’s 
only Greenberg who uses the term, as McLuhan puts the effects of a medium’s structural nature 
ahead of the content it carries, he is ‘specifying’ the medium in a particular way. However, their 
definitions of medium vary: Greenberg’s is more related, though not completely compliant with, a 
material, while McLuhan’s is certainly the mathematically defined transmission channel of any sort.
In the past 50 years, as art practice has taken on modes of production involving the technologies 
that drive mass media, and not just the physical forms that Greenberg was critiquing, these two 
definitions become have become entwined such that one can mean either, or any mixture of the two,
when using the term medium. This intertwining of usage between media theory, based on a 
transmission channel definition, and art theory, based on a material definition, is one of the reasons 
why usage of the term becomes confused, especially in “New Media” art theory. This could 
probably have been predicted, as if one is writing about art made using transmission channels, what 
definition of medium are you supposed to use?
Some more recent and explicit definitions of medium have taken up the challenge of reconciling the
issues at play. These definitions seek to incorporate a historical understanding of the term as relating
to physical material, and incorporate a Media Theory based “transmission channel” understanding, 
and incorporate a usefulness in describing art that is generally understood as ‘de-materialized’. 
They generally do it through one of two strategies, either redefining the notion of medium entirely 
or dispensing with the notion of medium and using other terminology.
Theorist David Davies provides an archetype example of the first strategy – an updated definition – 
with his concept of a "vehicular medium" (Davies, 2004), which he created specifically for such a 
purpose: "A work's vehicular medium is the kind of "stuff" that the artist manipulates. While this is 
sometimes called a work's 'physical medium', we need a term that can apply even when, as in the 
case of a musical work, a literary work or a work of conceptual art, it isn't obvious that it makes 
sense to think of its vehicle as something physical" (Davies, 2013). Davies also writes favorably of 
a definition of medium articulated by philosopher Dominic McIver Lopes which he quotes as: "a set
of practices for working with some materials, whether physical, as in sculpture, or symbolic, as in 
literature." (Davies, 2013). Both of these definitions also respond to the work of earlier theorists 
that attempted to tackle these issues, including Richard Wollheim who argued that any definition of 
medium needs to also take into account the “recalcitrance” of any medium inasmuch as it affects the
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creative process of any artist (Wollheim, 1980), and Joseph Margolis who argued for a 
differentiation between concepts of “physical medium” and “artistic medium” (Margolis, 1980).
The most widely recognized example of the second strategy – that of dispensing with the term 
“medium” – is likely the one put forth by Rosalind Krauss, who writes that contemporary cultural 
production exists in a “Post-medium condition”. Mary Ann Doane expands Krauss’ idea: “With the 
advent of digital media, photography, in particular, has seemingly lost its credibility as a trace of the
real, and it could be argued that the media in general face a certain crisis of legitimization.” (Doane,
2007). Doane then goes on to point out that, specifically regarding photography,  “…the digital 
offers an ease of manipulation and distance from any referential grounding that seems to threaten 
the immediacy and certainty of referentiality we have come to associate with photography…”
In “Two Moments from the Post-Medium Condition”, Krauss describes these ideas further when 
she uses the term “technical support” instead of medium to describe the work of artist Christian 
Marclay:  “…Marclay’s prey goes deeper into the nature of his own medium by meditating on 
synch sound itself as the “technical support” of cinema. I am using the term “technical support” 
here as a way of warding off the unwanted positivism of the term “medium” which, in most readers’
minds, refers to the specific material support for a traditional aesthetic genre, reducing the idea of 
medium to what Michael Fried complains of as the basis of the “literalism” of the art he rejects…
[and]…the version of modernist “medium specificity” articulated by Greenberg.”
Krauss then goes on to defend her term “technical support” further: “’Technical support’ has the 
virtue of acknowledging the recent obsolescence of most traditional aesthetic mediums (such as oil 
on canvas, fresco, and many sculptural materials, including cast bronze or welded metal), while it 
also welcomes the layered mechanisms of new technologies that make a simple, unitary 
identification of the work’s physical support impossible (is the “support” of film the celluloid strip, 
the screen, the splices of the edited footage, the projector’s beam of light, the circular reels?).” 
(Krauss, 2006).
What Krauss puts forth and Doane further describes is this: that the actuality of digital simulation 
and emulation implies that a material medium does not exist for artwork produced using digital 
means. Or simply speaking, because we can make an infinite number of perfect copies, digital 
artifacts aren’t ‘real’. Krauss argues for the term “technical support” for just this reason. However, 
while it seems obvious that Krauss wouldn’t be interested in discovering where this simulation 
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originates, as an essential property of Turing-machines, she easily notices some of its effects on 
larger cultural forms. But instead of refuting the existence of any contemporary medium, in the 
sense that if a digital photograph isn’t a photograph it then has no ties to any sort of material, this 
PhD proposes that it’s useful to consider that Turing-machines themselves are a medium through 
which artists are working, perhaps even unaware.
David Joselit also uses the strategy of developing his own terminology. Joselit, referencing Bruno 
Latour’s concept of the “assemblage” (Latour, 2005), prefers his term “format” in relation to any 
description of digital content – art included – and denies that digital work even has a medium. For 
him, mediums are unable to describe digital artifacts because they “lead to objects, and thus 
reification”, whereas “formats” are “dynamic mechanisms for aggregating content”. This is based 
on his analysis that the production of content is not relevant anymore, instead suggesting “what now
matters most…is [content’s] retrieval in intelligent patterns” (Joselit 2013). It perhaps goes without 
saying that this is clearly an analysis from the cultural ‘surface’ of computer network-enabled image
sharing and production, and not based on any sort of analysis of the underlying computational 
means of production of any “format”. The development of terminologies such as Krauss’ “technical 
support” or Joselit’s “format” can be appealing, and can at the very least be locally applied, but they
are nowhere close to being universally accepted, mostly seeing use in their respective author’s own 
output.
So, as philosopher Jacques Ranciere puts it, “the notion of medium has nothing clear about it” 
(McNamara and Ross, 2007). The question must now be asked, what’s the point? Why would this 
research even bother with the term? The simple answer is: far from being a late-modernist 
obsession, the term is still utilized all the time, especially in the theorization of computer-based art. 
While this might seem obvious – anyone involved in computer-based art will recognize it – it’s 
worth emphasising. The best specific example is perhaps to consider “A Companion to Digital Art”,
edited by Christiane Paul (2016), which is arguably the most current textbook survey of computing 
practices within the field of art, containing essays by established theorists such as Paul herself, Olga
Goriunova, Oliver Grau, Lev Manovich, Matthew Fuller, Erkki Huhtamo, Mary Flanagan, Edward 
Shanken, and Sarah Cook. The word “medium” appears in the book 91 times and is not contested 
(or defined) in a single instance. 
47
1.1.3 Definition 3: Turing-completeness as Medium
In investigating Turing-completeness as a medium for art production, it will be helpful to define 
some of the issues involved with even suggesting that a computer can fulfill the possible functions 
of a hypothetical medium, based on the varied understandings of the term. I will touch on some of 
them here, an in-depth exploration of “medium functionality” and an analysis of its overlap with the
potential of Turing-complete machines will have to wait for Chapter Two.
Three issues immediately arise when the claim of Turing-completeness as medium is made. The 
first is that, by insisting on an equivalence with medium, one might dismiss an analysis of artworks 
from the perspective that the computer functions in other ways, which some artists explicitly do 
when describing how computers function in their work. An early example – making computer-based
artwork in the 1970’s and 1980’s, Chris Crabtree declared the computer as categorically not a 
medium in his work (Crabtree, 1982). The second is that logic, the basic formal schema of all 
computing machines, seems immaterial – or at least not tied to a specific material. This 
immateriality of logic points to a parallel between Conceptual Art and, for lack of a better term, 
“Computer Art” in that they share in the de-materialization of the art object: art as idea, art as 
instructions (Lippard, 1997), art as code (Tamblyn, 1990). This is different from what we might 
think of as traditional art mediums and can hopefully be reconciled with some appropriate definition
of medium. The third is the effect of emulation/simulation, in that by definition Turing-complete 
machines and some of the software that they run can perfectly simulate each other, so would this 
constitute a continuous medium between various hardware and various software, or does there need 
to be some differentiation?
Perl is My Medium is an interview that Alex Galloway conducted with the artist Lisa Jevbratt about 
her computer-based art practice (Galloway, 2001), and it provides an entry point for exploring the 
difficulties in pinning down medium in reference to computers. The title is a quotation from 
Jevbratt during the interview; she claims that the programming language Perl is the medium of her 
work. For those relying on a relationship to physical material as a qualifier of a medium, there’s the 
obvious problem in that Perl, as a formal language, has no obvious physical material associated 
with it. It is a set of conceptual symbols combined with a set of rules that are specific to the 
symbols. So what would David Joselit say to Jevbratt’s claim that Perl is her medium? That she’s a 
liar? For me, Jevbratt’s quote highlights a different set of issues: simply that we don’t really know 
what she means. How does Jevbratt use Perl? Does her work exist solely within Perl? Does one 
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have to understand Perl to understand the work? And is Perl even capable of functioning as a 
medium?
There are a couple of corollaries to consider as well. If Perl is a medium, then software in general, 
although perhaps not necessarily all software, can be a medium. Furthermore, if Perl is a medium 
then all formal programming languages must also a mediums as all Turing-complete formal 
languages are computationally equivalent: it would be ridiculous to accept Perl as a medium while 
suggesting that C or BASIC is not. But is this Turing-complete language-medium distinct from a 
larger notion of a computer or Turing-complete machine-medium?
A possible line of inquiry for this PhD is then: if a particular software is a medium, is it a medium 
unique and separate from the computing machine on which it’s run? For some software the second 
part of the question is already given since the software is not Turing-complete. Adobe Photoshop is 
an example of such software: if it is in a fact a medium, it is also necessarily different from the 
Turing-complete medium I am investigating, and as it’s not Turing-complete I would have to 
suggest that it is distinct from a Turing-complete machine. But for software that is Turing-complete,
in that the software gives access to enough of the memory and functions of the computing machine 
to make it able to simulate a Universal Turing Machine (Perl is an example), then the second part of
the question has a particular importance.
Interestingly enough, in the same interview where she states Perl as her medium, Jevbratt also states
that the entire “system” is the artwork and specifically “not the output, not the visual screen, and not
the code” (Galloway, 2001). I’m loathe to suggest that what an artist says is their art actually isn’t, 
however I think it goes without saying that many artists using computers could equally identify 
output, visual screen, or code (and specifically not the system) as their artwork. What I’m not loath 
to suggest, however, is that when using a computing machine to make art, the definitions of all parts
of the work, including the medium, can appear highly dependent on a claim of an artist. For 
example, and limiting our view to medium, artists using computers in their practice have claimed 
that a Turing-complete software/programming language like Perl (Galloway, 2001), a non-Turing-
complete application software like Microsoft’s Powerpoint (Byrne, 2003), or various output devices
of the computer and specifically not the computer itself (Crabtree, 1982), among other things, are 
the respectively mediums of their work. All three of the artists just mentioned make screen-based 
visual work using computers that are computationally identical. How can their mediums be so 
different?
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Lisa Jevbratt’s interview is also helpful in introducing the idea of a “system” to this research, in that
no one actually uses a theoretical Universal Turing Machine in their art practice, we use various 
implemented Turing-complete “systems” that Turing’s theoretical machine can describe. She is 
clear that the system for her is the art and Perl, as a part of the system, is the medium, which is also 
helpful as it would allow an examination of whether claiming that the “system” is the artwork is 
consistent with claiming that Perl is the medium. That is to say, how is Perl functioning, and how is 
the system functioning, and are the claims of medium and art, respectively, accurate for those 
functions? I think it’s entirely possible that the medium in this case would include not just Jevbratt’s
intention/claim that the Perl programming language is her medium, but also things entirely outside 
her scope such as where Perl resides in the hierarchy of software abstraction layers, the Operating 
System of the machine running Perl, the authorial intentions of the authors of that Operating 
System, the interface to that operating system and so forth. What it also suggests to me is that 
regardless of how one carves up a computer, if one is defining the totality of the system as the art in 
itself or the medium of the art, or if just a specific part of the system or the code is the art in itself or
the medium of the art, or if art and medium are one and the same in a computer-based practice, a 
major factor, perhaps the major factor, is where to draw both the limits of the system and the limits 
of its component parts. If code is your medium, does your medium only include the code you wrote,
or also code you didn’t write that interacts with your code and gives it the ability to ‘do’ what it 
‘does’ – for example, the operating system kernels that enable a Perl runtime to execute Pall 
Thayer’s Microcodes (Thayer, 2009)?
I’ve briefly covered some of the issues I see revolving around the proposition of Turing-
completeness as a medium. I would also suggest that I have shown a number of inconsistencies in 
how artists currently deal with the concept of medium in their computer-based practices. Simply 
put, through the lens of a “Turing-complete medium”, artists variously claim that things which are 
computationally the same, Turing-complete machines in this case, are different. As a result, I would 
suggest that the idea of a Turing-complete medium may be able to demonstrate a set of machines 
which function as an artwork’s medium even when an artist might claim that they don't. This will be
examined more closely in Chapter 2. I believe that, we know what a computer is (see Definition 1 
above), we know something about what a medium is, and we can therefore probe where there are 
overlaps and where there aren’t. I also believe that contemporary art, with or without computers, is 
an incredibly varied, multi-layered, fluid set of practices and related activities. Therefore this 
inquiry, and any understanding that might come from an articulation of a “Turing-complete 
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medium”, and especially the development of the practice, is meant to support and assist current 
understandings of computer-based art, not replace them.
1.2 Literature
To conclude this chapter I will discuss relevant literature, keeping in mind that, as Christiane Paul 
writes, marshaling any sort of singular text on “digital art” (Paul’s term) is an impossibility - “It is 
inconceivable to cover all the histories, expressions, and implications of digital art in one volume” 
(Paul, 2016). This literature review attempts nothing of the sort – in effect it can only be seen as a 
short overview meant to place the practice. My main argument in this overview is that the existing 
literature of “digital art”, or “New Media” art, as most art literature involving computers has been 
called since the 1990s, has little to say about any exploration of a Turing-complete medium. It 
appears to me that most researchers have neither the desire, nor the technical ability (perhaps as a 
result of not having the desire), to explore practice as this research will do. As a result I need to 
draw on work outside the field, sometimes outside the field of art entirely.
Most of the literature examined here is utilized as points of departure – as in, this research is 
escaping from it – and contestation. Before I do that, I want to mention literature that is completely 
consonant with this research (aside from the work of Alan Turing). That is the work of the artist and
writer Brian Reffin Smith. I came across Smith almost 20 years ago as I was researching 
Artists/Computers/Art, a now-obscure exhibition of Canadian computer-based art staged at the 
Canadian High Commission in London in 1982. He was involved in producing the exhibition while 
he was a Tutor in Computing at the Royal College of Art (Smith, 1982) back when the rise of 
second-wave cybernetics as an academic discipline hadn’t imploded and had even trickled down to 
art colleges. Smith’s writing about computers was informed by art practice, to the point, irreverent, 
and his ideas on computers as “representation processors” as opposed to “information processors” 
(Smith, 1984) gave me a new way of thinking through my own practice. I even directly echoed his 
idea of the computer as a “representation processor” in one of the first public interviews I gave 
about my work (Lussenhop, 2001). Although less active in the field now, Smith still pops up 
occasionally in the art/computer literature – for example, he wrote a chapter in Charlie Gere’s 
history of early British computer art “White Heat Cold Logic” (Gere, 2009).
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A couple of years into this PhD I contacted Smith, wanting to inform him of my research, inquire 
about his current ideas of computation as a “representational” process, and learn if his ideas had 
evolved from his writing in the 1980’s. What I received in reply from him was an email that, while 
initially appearing to be in English, actually employed English words in the construction of some 
sort of meta-language that I was completely unfamiliar with. After spending considerable effort 
parsing this reply, what I understood from it was that Smith wasn’t interested in discussing anything
about computers or my research, and only wanted to tell me about his new work in the field of 
“Zombie Pataphysics”. Unfortunately this research has limited engagement with the Pataphysical, 
save for one small reference later in this chapter, so instead let me provide some ‘highlights’ from 
Brian Reffin Smith’s relatively recent “43 Dodgy Statements on Computer Art” (Smith, 2010). They
are not rigorous but they are helpful in framing some of the thematic inquiries of the research:
“6. Most participative art is deeply authoritarian.”
“10. In an ideal world, New Media institutions would employ at least one non-technological artist.”
“13. Self-imposed formal requirements are not inhibitive of expression.”
“18. Just as everyone has a novel inside them, many believe they have an artwork. The purpose of a 
good art school is to seek out these people and stop them.”
“28. There is no “normal” computer art, in the Kuhnian sense. It is in constant revolution, hence 
constantly evading scrutiny.”
“43. Never throw away any computer or peripheral equipment that is more than 15 years old. You 
may well come to need it.”
Current research mostly defines the computer non-explicitly as a type of “hybrid” media device or 
some sort of “multimedia” machine in an art context. In a typical case, Mary Flanagan devoted one 
sentence of her PhD dissertation on feminist gaming to the nature of the medium that held the work 
she was studying, describing the computer as a “hybrid media” that contains many other, 
presumably more static, media. (Flanagan, 2005). I will return to whether the concept of “hybridity”
is even accurate in this context, for the meantime what’s more important is that, as this section will 
discuss, it’s representative of the state of current discourse which mostly ignores questions about 
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what computers ‘are’ and instead focuses intently on what they can ‘do’. Hence, while there has 
been a surge in the number of critical and theoretical texts about computers in the arts, especially 
since the “New Media” dawn of the early 90s, few if any have been truly medium-centric 
investigations of how the computer functions in art practice. Writing in 2006, one year after 
Flanagan, Noah Wardrip-Fruin summed it up:
“If we were to take a survey of writings about digital work by those in the arts and humanities thus 
far, and attempt to determine what aspect of digital systems is most interesting, we would first find 
that detailed commentaries on system operations are thus far extremely rare. What we have, instead,
are mostly passing comments about the processes of digital systems, with most attention focused on
the aspects of works that are more like traditional, fixed media.” (Wardrip-Fruin, 2006)
Additionally, there is a lack of canonical texts in the field. As Lev Manovich (2002) wrote over a 
decade ago, “…while other fields usually have certain critical / theoretical texts which are known to
everybody and which usually act as starting points for the new arguments and debates, digital art 
field has nothing of a kind. No critical text on digital art so far has achieved a familiarity status that 
can be compared with the status of the classic articles by Clement Greenberg and Rosalind Krauss 
(modern art), or Andre Bazin and Laura Mulvey (film)”. I believe this is still true today, and is 
partly a result of topical fragmentation within the literature, in the sense that when authors and 
scholars write about and critique only the surface elements of digital art – as Wardrip-Fruin (2006) 
suggests they overwhelmingly do – they contribute to a quickly changing knowledge-base 
temporarily focused on whatever style of digital art happens to be in vogue at the time. 
Since most of the literature does not interrogate functional aspects of the computer, I also draw on 
research done outside of the realm of art practice but which is specifically attuned to the functional 
issues of the computer and digital representation. A benefit to this approach is that, since the 
functional aspects of Turing-complete machines do not change and are equivalent (Turing, 1936), 
any critical analysis based on such features should be applicable to any work made with any Turing-
complete computing machine, which at the time of this writing means every work ever made on a 
computer to date. Another benefit was stated by George Kubler over fifty years ago, which I think is
even more appropriate today, as he reflected on the passage of objects and works of art through 
time: "We are discovering little by little all over again that what a thing means is not more important
than what it is;" (Kubler, 1962).
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The main strands of literature I consider: those from the fields of Mathematics and Computer 
Science, typified by Alan Turing, those from the field of New Media (art) theory and criticism, 
probably typified by Lev Manovich, those from the field of Philosophy, including the recent and 
very helpful branch known as Philosophy of Information, coined by Luciano Floridi, and a fourth 
strand of literature from a more recent group of related humanities fields that could be described as 
“Turing-informed”: Media Archaeology and Software Studies.
The literature from the first strand is focused around Alan Turing and his aforementioned paper "On
Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem". In it, Turing described a 
hypothetical machine that could calculate the answer to any mathematical problem, provided that 
the problem could be formalized as an algorithm. He actually described a number of calculating 
machines, although one machine in particular stands out – this machine is called a Universal Turing 
Machine (UTM). The UTM was shown to be equivalent to all other calculating machines in that it 
could simulate them. If the opposite were also true – that the arbitrary calculating machine could 
simulate a UTM – then the calculating machine would be considered Turing-complete. In essence, 
Turing-completeness refers to any calculating machine, or what we nowadays might call a 
"computer", which is able to calculate any computable function, and as a result, simulate a UTM 
(Turing, 1936).
“Turing’s “analysis” is a remarkable piece of applied philosophy in which, beginning with a human 
being carrying out a computation, he proceeds by a process of elimination of irrelevant details, 
through a sequence of simplifications, to an end result which is the familiar model consisting of a 
finite state device operating on a one-way infinite linear tape.” (M. Davis, 1982)
Although the basic idea behind a computer – that of controlling a calculating machine's operations 
by the use of coded instructions stored in a "memory" – was formalized by Alan Turing in the mid 
1930's, the groundwork for his idea had been laid long before. This groundwork becomes obvious 
when one again looks at the circumstances of Turing's paper: in 1936, digital computers as we know
them today did not exist. It's a widely quoted point that in Turing's paper a "computer" isn't even a 
machine, it's a hypothetical human who carries out calculations within the Turing machine 
paradigm, which is itself composed of materials familiar to anyone who's ever taken an algebra 
class – paper, pencil, rules. What becomes clear, then, is that Turing machines are really logic 
machines, and as a result, so are today's computers. They are physical implementations of abstract 
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logical thought, their "...circuits embody[ing] the distilled insights of logicians...developed over 
centuries." (M. Davis, 2000)
Martin Davis (2000) lays out this development: from Leibniz’s dream of a “universal language” that
led him to invent his calculus in 1675 (Newton also laid claim to inventing the mathematics behind 
it, although it’s Leibniz’s notation that is still used even today), through Boole’s creation of an 
algebraic logic which showed that logical thought could be described and developed 
mathematically, through the mathematical logicians of the early 20th century – Frege, Hilbert and 
Russel among them – who strove to create complete and consistent proofs for every type of 
axiomatic symbol system, through Godel who proved in 1931 (and shredded decades of the 
logicians’ work) the astonishing theorem that arithmetic itself was incomplete and could not always 
be proven, finally arriving at Turing and the theoretical machines he developed to investigate the 
limits of computable numbers.
After Turing there is a rush to extend all of these theoretical symbol manipulating machines into 
actual symbol manipulating machines. Turing’s stored-program computing was implemented in the 
US by John von Neumann and by Max Newman in the UK. The first electronic stored-program 
computer was developed at Manchester University and ran its first program on 21 June, 1948; 
earlier computing machines like the British Colossus (1943) and the American ENIAC (1945) did 
not have a memory with which to store programs (Copeland, 2004). By the early 1950s, 
commercially developed electronic stored-program computers were available, among them the 
British Ferranti Mark I (Turing himself wrote the programming manual), the LEO computers, and 
the American UNIVAC. IBM’s first mass produced computer, the IBM 701, came in 1953. By this 
time, Turing’s original paper had effectively created the field now known as “computer science”, 
although Turing had himself become more interested in what later became known as “artificial 
intelligence”:
“The original question, ‘Can machines think?’ I believe to be too meaningless to deserve discussion.
Nevertheless I believe that at the end of the century the use of the words and general educated 
opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without 
expecting to be contradicted.” (Turing, 1950).
I mentioned the work of Lev Manovich as typical of current New Media theory and criticism. This 
is for two reasons: one is that he’s written one of the only widely accepted textbooks on the subject, 
55
The Language of New Media (2001), and secondly, because he specializes in the surface-based 
critique that Wardrip-Fruin describes. In The Language of New Media, Manovich attempts to 
"...analyze the language of new media by placing it within the history of modern visual and media 
cultures" (Manovich, 2001). While this sounds like a plausible premise, Manovich seems to be 
obsessed by early 20th century Russian avant-garde film, and hence does any sort of functional 
analysis a disservice when he decides that "The theory and history of cinema serve as the key 
conceptual lens through which I look at new media." Something so sweeping as a real language of 
new media is then hemmed in as Manovich limits his book to "...the following topics: the parallels 
between cinema history and the history of new media, the identity of digital cinema, the relation 
between the language of multimedia and 19th-century pro-cinematic cultural forms, the function of 
screen, mobile camera and montage in new media as compared to cinema, [and] the historical ties 
between new media and avant-garde film."
Manovich is confident in his perspective but Kubler’s quote from earlier is also appropriate here – 
while something like a montage effect may or may not have an altered meaning in a digital video, 
it's certainly easy to see that ‘new media’, or any art made with computers, is ontologically not 
cinema. The weakness of a critique on new media art which is based on ideas about a cinematic 
screen is obvious when one considers that the screen is quite simply an arbitrary choice of output 
when making new media art. For example, Manovich attempts to refute the idea that, compared to 
“analog” images like traditional photographs, digital imagery can be copied without loss of quality. 
He claims that this is only true “in principle”, and that software and hardware which deal with 
digital images “rely uniformly” on “lossy” compression, a compression process that degrades image
quality (Manovich, 2001). This is a screen-based critique, probably using two images from 
Manovich’s mind, one of a high resolution created on a computer and one of low resolution which 
is distributed on the Internet. It gives Manovich two problems. The first is that if digital image 
distribution is examined structurally, he cannot escape the fact that computers make identical copies
of digital files regardless of resolution. Even if only “in principle”, that principle is still driving the 
distribution of lower resolution imagery. It’s also no different from the film photography against 
which he positions his claim: when a documentary photographer has a picture published in Time 
magazine, the version of that image distributed on magazine paper has a much lower resolution than
the one on film the photographer created. As a result, when Manovich uses this example to further 
claim that computer usage in contemporary society is characterized by “loss of data, degradation 
and noise”, he’s confusing what might appear to be visual noise to someone with screen-based 
aesthetics, with the rather un-noisy digital distribution of compressed imagery, and he forgets about 
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the noisy analog distribution of compressed imagery that was previously dominant in print. The 
second problem is that he also seems to have forgotten about something like the GIF, a lossless 
format developed in 1987, that was arguably the most popular format for image display on the 
Internet in 2001 when Manovich was writing. Entire online cultures, including more recent ones 
such as those that have developed on the sites dump.fm and giphy.com, are devoted to visually 
exploiting the GIF’s lossless compression in which no information is lost at all. These sorts of 
critiques become ironic if one considers that Manovich’s deep understanding of montage, which he 
uses as his critical lens for digital media, was theorized by artists like Kuleshov and Eisenstein who 
employed montage to try and ‘purify’ their chosen medium, not slather on ideas from previous 
media. 
Another perspective is put forth by J. David Bolter and Richard Grusin in Remediation: 
Understanding New Media (1999). They offer a critique of contemporary, electronic media based 
on the idea that there is a continuous exchange between new media and previous media effected by 
the dual, perhaps opposing concepts of “immediacy”, a tendency of media to assume a sort of 
purity, and “hypermediacy”, the inescapable proliferation of types of media thanks especially to 
digital technology. For them, remediation is “the formal logic by which new media refashion prior 
media forms”, similar to McLuhan’s statement that the content of every medium is an earlier 
medium (McLuhan, 1964). For example, they state that virtual reality is a remediation of the 
“subjective style” of film, and that older media occasionally “fights back”, giving as an example 
how television news programs now feature multiple frames in a remediation of a windowed 
computer screen.
There’s a lot of valuable analysis from Bolder and Grusin, and they provide many examples of how 
conventions of a given “medium” are interpreted or appropriated across other media. However 
what’s relevant to this research is that, once more, it’s taken as a given that we know what they 
mean when they say “medium”, and in all of these cases there is no attempt at explicitly defining 
what a medium is or was. There is reference to a new “digital medium” and “new media”, yet they 
give individual chapters to computer games, digital photography, digital art, and virtual reality, 
among others, that are each explicitly listed under headings of separate “media”, and they offer 
nothing to suggest whether their usage of the term indicates something more material (and how this 
meaning works with immaterial electronic technologies) or simply a transmission means or 
something else entirely. Their articulation of remediation also implies that these ‘new’ media are, in 
large part, defined by which earlier media they “remediate”. For example, “computer games” and 
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“virtual reality” are both described as remediating film and cinema, yet they are categorized as 
separate media – but surely they should be categorized as the same since they remediate the same 
older media, and according to Bolter and Grusin’s theory, that remediation defines what they ‘are’? 
As far as the concept of remediation goes, there seems to be a general lack of concern regarding 
ontology in computer-based art, so predictably all of Bolter and Grusin’s analyses of “new media” 
are carried about in the Manovich style – that is, from the surface, from the perspective of the 
screen. In one example they explore the idea of a video game such as Doom remediating cinema, 
allowing viewers to become participants in an interactive cinematic narrative (Bolter and Grusin, 
1999). That might be true, but I’d also think that had Eisenstein played Doom he would have been 
upset at the lack of montage and thought it a particularly bad film.
It’s appropriate here to also return to the concept of “hybridity”, briefly mentioned earlier with 
Mary Flanagan’s definition of a computing medium. The term originated in the science discipline of
biology, meaning the combination of qualities of two members of different “breeds”, and found 
popular usage in late 19th century racial theory (Young, 1995). In contemporary humanities, 
hybridity is now closely associated with its use in cultural theory, with a significant discourse 
around ideas of hybridity in post-colonial theory – principal examples are Stuart Hall’s 
understanding of a relationship between diaspora and “hybridity” in his articulation of Caribbean 
cultural identity (Hall, 1994) and Homi Bhabha’s notion of “hybridisation” as a continuing and 
ambiguous cultural response to colonial identity (Bhabha, 1994). In theory about digital art, notions 
of hybridity are generally articulated as perhaps the defining characteristic of a digital “medium” 
itself, as demonstrated by Flanagan’s (2005) terse description of the computer as a “hybrid media” 
or Christiane Paul’s (2016) statement that “…the hybridity of the digital medium makes it 
particularly challenging to develop a more or less unified aesthetic theory”, or Phaedra Shanbaum’s 
(2017) blanket statement “Digital media art is a hybrid medium”.
Although the term “hybrid” has found usage in relation to digital art – there is even a “hybrid art” 
category in the Prix Ars Electronica competition – it is not exclusively employed in respect of the 
digital. It had previously been used to theorize examples of art practice which incorporated more 
than one separate ‘medium’, for example a given installation which might incorporate both 
‘sculpture’ and ‘sound’. Writing in in the mid-1980s, Jerrold Levinson discusses the nature of 
“hybrid art forms”, asking “What exactly are hybrid art forms” and “when do we count an art form 
as hybrid” (Levinson, 1984). His conclusion is that hybridity in an artwork can only be located 
historically, and not structurally, through a view of the “development and origin” of the work in 
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relation to “real antecedents” located in prior art forms (Levinson, 1984). I mention Levinson’s 
analysis because I think this earlier notion of hybridity in art is the main causation of the computer 
being defined as a “hybrid” or “multi” medium in art practice – computers are observed to produce 
artwork that can be located in relationship to historical antecedents, therefore they must be a hybrid 
medium. Bolter and Grusin’s concept of “remediation” is also equivalent to the computer 
functioning as a “hybrid media”, as it is a surface observation of historical antecedents appearing in 
a computer-based work. There is, seemingly, also support for this understanding of the computer as 
a “hybrid” or “multi” media from the discipline of computer science – specifically Alan Kay’s 
conception of his Dynabook Personal Computer as a “metamedium” (Kay & Goldberg, 1977). 
Manovich in particular spends an entire chapter of “Software Takes Command” on locating Kay’s 
“metamedium” as foundational to all current “digital media” practices (Manovich, 2013).
I, however, want to point out another slippage of terminology between disciplines that undermines 
both the ‘hybrid’ definition of a computing medium in art and Manovich’s support of this 
understanding through Kay (it’s very similar to the slippage of the term “medium” between 
Shannon’s concept, McLuhan’s appropriation and its subsequent usage in art theory). Kay’s notion 
of his “Dynabook” computer as a “metamedium” intertwines with the Dynabook’s implementation 
of the Smalltalk programming language. The entire software stack of the Dynabook – what we 
would today call the “operating system”, “applications” and “interface” – was entirely written in 
Smalltalk, which Kay was developing both before and alongside the Dynabook during his tenure at 
XEROX Parc. Smalltalk was the most advanced implementation of Kay’s “object-oriented 
programming” (OOP) paradigm, and Kay’s singular insight that led to his development of OOP 
came through a realization of “computers as basic and universal units” that could enact a translation
of “biological” models of replication using an encapsulated form of programmable data that was 
recursively defined. Using Kay’s OOP paradigm, software, which to Kay is actually “little 
computers in the large”, is encapsulated as recursive and self-contained data “objects”, so that 
instead of having to repeatedly write specific and linear “data structures”, “procedures”, and 
“functions”, a programmer just needs to send a “message” to an encapsulated object and its code is 
put to use (Kay, 1993). Kay’s conception of OOP foregrounds encapsulation and recursion as 
defining computational structures, the DynaBook was a hardware vehicle for Kay’s OOP concepts, 
and Kay’s development of the Dynabook was brought about by a fusion of the power of his OOP 
paradigm with his interest in education and how children might use a “personal computer” (Kay 
1972, Kay & Goldberg 1977).
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“What then is a personal computer? One would hope that it would be both a medium for containing 
and expressing arbitrary symbolic notions, and also a collection of useful tools for manipulating 
these structures, with ways to add new tools to the repertoire”
(Kay, 1972) 
“...the ability to simulate the details of any descriptive model means that the computer, viewed as a 
medium, can be all other media...” (Kay & Goldberg, 1977)
“...Smalltalk is a recursion on the notion of a computer itself.” (Kay, 1993)
That is to say: Kay’s understanding of the Dynabook computer as a metamedium is derived from its
software and programming interface’s exclusive construction in and utilization of OOP, which is 
Kay’s expansive and recursive form of Turing’s computational simulation (Turing, 1936), and is 
therefore an ontological understanding. Flanagan, Paul, and Shaunbaum’s definition of the 
computer as hybrid media, Bolter & Grusin’s concept of “remediation”, and even Manovich’s 
understanding of Kay’s influence depend on outward observations of the surface of computational 
devices which appear as emulations of various media, and are therefore phenomenological 
understandings. Simulation and emulation are related but distinct concepts, and as separately 
ontological and phenomenological properties, respectively, one does not always follow from or 
support the other. Only simulation was ever described by Turing, and crucially for this research, 
only it is a foundational property and ability of a Universal Turing Machine. To put it plainly: while 
Kay’s understanding of the computer as a “metamedium” is supported by Turing, art theory 
understandings of the computer as a “hybrid medium” are not. In relation to this slippage of 
“hybridity” between its scientific origin and current use in art theory, it’s also worth noting that a 
contemporary biological determination of a “hybrid” organism cannot be conclusively made 
through outward observation, and it instead relies on microscopic or molecular analysis of a 
specimen’s genetic code (Silva et al 2012, Turchetto et al 2015, Qu et al 2018) - a useful analogy to 
a Universal Turing-machine that simulates any other by executing their program description, or 
computational code (Turing, 1936). 
Christine Tamblyn (1990) digs below the surface and points out a relationship between ‘code’ and 
‘idea’ in, as she calls it, “computer art”. She further describes some similarities to earlier systems of 
instruction based art – the work of Sol Lewitt and Alvin Lucier are obvious examples – and writes 
that the aims of artists who work with computers often "...dovetail with the aims of Conceptual 
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artists in the 1960s and 1970s...their work often examined the codification of language and image 
systems..." (Tamblyn, 1990). It’s also worth noting that her article, titled "Computer Art as 
Conceptual Art", opens by saying "Within the modest collection of critical writing that addresses 
computer art...", which as a statement about current critical writing, thankfully has much less truth 
to it now than it did in 1990.
Sean Cubitt has extensively theorized a “Digital Aesthetics” (1998, 2005, 2016), and his most 
recent articulation (2016) draws on a historical understanding of aesthetics through the work of 
philosopher Alain Badiou (2007). Cubitt situates aesthetics as an inherently temporal experience 
and provides some very helpful analysis, such as the idea that the “digital is not clean” (Cubitt, 
2016). This could be read in relation to the practice of “dirty new media” developed by artist Jon 
Cates (2017), although I prefer the blunt articulation of artist Daniel Keller. Speaking at the DLD12 
conference alongside curator Hans Ulrich Obrist, Keller opened his talk on the Ways Beyond the 
Internet panel by declaring, “Your animated GIFs run on burnt coal and your computers...they’re 
made by slaves.” (DLDconference, 2012)
This research is going to make a key departure from a particular understanding of the “unknowable”
that Cubitt develops in his Digital Aesthetics. Cubitt borrows N. Katherine Hayles observation that 
contemporary software can be so complex that “no living person understands the program in their 
totality” (Hales, 2008), and combines it with two studies on the limits of current data storage 
technology to arrive at a concept of “unknowable” as an inherent “quality” of “the digital” (Cubitt, 
2016). Here, Cubitt’s concept of ‘knowledge’ that is employed in his understanding of 
“unknowable” could be criticized as somewhat narrow, and I would suggest that it’s often more 
useful to view the idea of knowledge of a computer-based work in a completely oppositional (ie 
non-totalitarian) way. That is, to understand the work Cubitt calls “digital” as fundamentally 
‘knowable’: We (humans) can read source code – see POC 1 of this research – and decompile 
machine code. We can inspect memory registers, set breakpoints, and slow down clock cycles. We 
can crack hashes – see POC 2 of this research – and “Man in the Middle” encryption streams. In 
short, while we may not be able to know everything about a given computational system anymore, 
we can almost certainly, eventually, know anything about it, and we are therefore able to inspect 
any “digital” (Cubitt’s usage) element of an artwork. In particular, Cubitt’s concept of 
“unknowable” as a quality of all digital art does not hold for work created with certain types of 
digital media or machines – for example any of BEIGE’s Nintendo NES cartridge works. They are 
entirely knowable by his terms of totality because the systems are simple enough that a complete 
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comprehension of the entire code and any current computational state of a Nintendo NES with one 
of the cartridges running in it is possible. The machine simplicity of the Nintendo NES was one of 
the reasons I became interested in making/hacking art with them in the first place.
Beatrice Fazi and Matthew Fuller (2016) take a different approach in their development of a 
“Computational Aesthetics” that, like Cubitt, derive fundamental characteristics, but they focus on 
the “computational” and not the “digital”. They also argue for an expanded idea of aesthetics itself 
in that “the very notion of computational aesthetics for us goes well beyond a theory of “art made 
with computers,” and becomes an investigation of the more foundational and formative aspects of 
the reality of the computational itself.” Fazi and Fuller then present ten “aspects” of Computational 
Aesthetics that are more atomic in analysis than Cubitt’s Aesthetics of the Digital, as could be 
expected from theorists who seem more invested in a strict understanding of computational process.
This research fully supports their assertions in principle, and in purely anecdotal terms I have a 
strong affection for their essay (although I may be biased as they speak highly of my work in the 
section on “Universality”). Their Computational Aesthetics also bolsters this research in its call for 
“medium-specificity” and a claim for “the computational specificity of digital art”, although Fazi 
and Fuller employ quite sweeping terms for their definition of medium, defining computation as a 
medium “in so far as it actualized modes of being, levels and kinds of agency, and procedures of 
thought and configuration” (Fazi and Fuller, 2016). 
In fact, I could even say that not only does everything in Fazi and Fuller’s understanding of a 
Computational Aesthetics fall in complete alignment with everything produced in this research, but 
in theory, everything this research might conclude is already but a small subset of their 
“investigation of the more foundational and formative aspects of the reality of the computational 
itself”. However, none of their Computational Aesthetics is employed here. That Fazi and Fuller’s 
characteristics are applicable to every artwork covered in this research might seem useful, perhaps 
even crucial to the research, but it’s unfortunately not because they are applicable by definition, not 
in particular. That is, their ten characteristic aspects are really definitional aspects of any and all 
instances of computation anywhere, and would be obvious to anyone already familiar with Turing’s 
work. So while their inclusion of BEIGE’s Super Abstract (2000) as the example of their aspect of 
“Universality” is flattering, it is fundamentally arbitrary: every program, art or not, that runs on a 
computer exhibits this aspect. This research is an attempt at something quite different: to explore 
computational aspects through practice, the specifics of which are applicable to artworks in 
particular, and Fazi and Fuller’s “Computational Aesthetics” provide no ideas on how one might go 
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about doing something like that. Their “Ten Aspects” are also general and sometimes overlapping – 
I see many similarities between their characteristics of “Logical Equivalence” and “Universality”, 
especially when they invoke the same Turing paper (Turing, 1936) to justify both. I say this next 
point in jest, but so general is some of their analysis that there are literal overlaps between certain 
members of Fuller and Fazi’s “Ten Aspects of Computational Aesthetics” and certain chapter 
headings of the best-selling book “PC’s for Dummies” (Gookin, 2012). So I take Fazi and Fuller’s 
understanding of a Computational Aesthetics as extremely useful in the identification and indexing 
of computational processes in an artwork, especially for theorists/viewers/participants previously 
unaware of their importance, but I would advise that those processes might, currently, be 
aesthetically evaluated more robustly through other means. 
The next strand of literature I will discuss comes out of the related fields of Media Archaeology and
Software Studies. Antoinette Dekker (2014) describes “early” media archaeologists Bernhard 
Siegert and Errki Huhtamo as “hardware specialists” following “the a priori of the technical”, for 
instance in the “materiality” of technological apparatus like “circuit boards or fibre optic cables”. 
This is perhaps a simplistic description of, for example, Huhtamo’s (1997) own definition of his 
“media archeology”, but Dekker also observes researchers such as Siegfried Zielinski who 
promoted a higher import on the anthropological in relation to media and technology studies 
(Dekker 2014; Zielinski 2006). 
I want to make a personal observation that an examination of the technological or computational 
apparatus – if that’s what Dekker sees Huhtamo as making a claim for – addressed an evident need 
within Media Studies when I was in university at around the same time as the early development of 
Media Archaeology. There was an infamous “new media” introductory course at Oberlin in which 
students learned technologies like Macromedia Flash and Javascript, taught by a Professor who was
originally a specialist in cinema and other sorts of “screen studies” (which also was the name of the 
Department this course was being taught under). He had tenure, but he had to stay ‘relevant’ and so 
instead of lecturing on film theory, he ended up teaching these introductory courses on Flash 
programming and he was, to put it politely, not very skilled at it. A student could learn a lot chatting
to him about Bergson and Hitchcock, not so much about the technological protocols they were 
supposed to be engaging with. 
I’ve heard similar anecdotes from many colleagues that were in university at the same time, and it 
even had some influence on the development of my art practice. One of the points of making 
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artwork with antiquated computer systems and assembly language coding was to thumb my nose at 
a culture of late 90s “New Media” which seemed disconnected from the technologies it claimed to 
employ. I say this to make a point about Huhtamo’s work, in that the development of his idea of 
“Media Archaeology” has to be seen as an obvious response to the inability of “Media Studies”, 
based on an understanding of media as “mass media” stemming from the 1960’s (Peterson et al, 
1965), to be an effective framework for the understanding of computational systems that were 
affecting huge cultural shifts, especially from the 1990s. In retrospect it seems quite an indictment 
of the state of Media Studies at the time that my academic institution appeared to think that, because
some computers had screens attached to them, and film people knew about certain type of screens, 
that media computing should only be taught by film people.
The most pronounced parallel between this research and Media Archaeology and Software Studies 
is their shared interest in what Jussi Parikka calls a “new materialism” to digital media studies that 
Parikka believes has encouraged theorists to increasingly be “prepared to tackle what goes on in 
inside the machine” (Parikka, 2012). I’m personally more partial to the related argument of N. 
Katherine Hayles and Jessica Pressman when they state: “...without practice, theorizing is deprived 
of the hands-on experience to guide it and develop robust intuitions about the implications of digital
technologies.” (Hayles and Pressman, 2013). There are now many researchers who work in this way
and describe what they do as “Media Archaeology” or “Software Studies”. For example, Florian 
Cramer and Matthew Fuller (2008) classify five different “categories” in their topological analysis 
of the “interface”, and their categories are explicitly shaped by some understanding of the 
functioning of both general hardware and software systems. Nick Montfort (2008) provides an 
analysis of “obfuscated code” by relating the aesthetics of some types of code obfuscation practices 
to literary and artistic traditions, and he gives two code examples in different programming 
languages. Although, in typical form for these disciplines when applied to art practice, Montfort’s 
examples are limited to a single, trivial line of code in both cases.
Writing in 2011, Wardrip-Fruin (again to the rescue) suggests that, very much in line with this 
research, art theory in the “[digital media field]...must begin to grapple with the ideas embedded in 
its systems”. He specifically describes artists working with digital processes “..in ways that are 
invisible on the surface of their projects,” and makes the point that while in other fields these 
processes would be inspected, in art they rarely are (Wardrip-Fruin, 2011). He finishes by citing 
Media Archaeology and Software Studies as two areas which hold promise. I agree completely, but 
it is a promise that is only partially fulfilled in terms of its utility within this research for two 
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reasons. One, individual artworks are rarely examined in these fields, and two, when they are 
examined there is still little code reading and never any inspection of running machine processes. 
That is to say, and I cannot stress this enough, I have never, ever, not once, ever seen a theorist use a
disassembler to examine an artwork’s code, or use an interactive debugger to study the running in-
memory processes of an artwork, or engage in a binary analysis of an artwork’s code, or analyze 
compiled branch instructions in a digital artwork, or seen an examination of an online artwork using
protocol scanning and mapping techniques – and I could go on. Additionally, I have only once seen,
in a single and very special case which I will discuss in detail, a theorist produce a line-by-line code
commentary of any non-trivial artwork (or any artwork of more than about 15 lines of code) and use
binary analysis on an artwork’s graphics data. These are all standard techniques employed by many 
other fields that study software and computational systems, yet they are not employed in the field of
digital art theory, nor in the fields of Media Archaeology or Software Studies when researchers in 
those fields theorize art. To support this claim I would point to the complete writing I’ve come 
across of researchers such as Matthew Fuller, Olga Goriunova, Geoff Cox, Alexander Galloway, 
Christiane Paul, Jussi Parikka, Sean Cubitt, Lev Manovich, Annette Dekker, Philip Galanter, Olia 
Lialina, Charlie Gere, Sarah Cook, Oliver Grau, Erkki Huhtamo, and Katja Kwastek, among others.
 
Fig 1.1 – functional analysis, FinFisher surveillance software (Celik 2014)
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 Fig 1.2 – textual binary analysis, FinFisher surveillance software (Celik 2014)
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate two different types of ‘binary’ analysis which looks at code sections of
the FinFisher surveillance software (Celik, 2014). Both types are standard techniques used in 
various IT-related fields to analyze code and its functioning, and in this case are employed to 
examine the workings of surveillance software that appears to have been sold by the British 
company Gamma International Ltd to “repressive” regimes including Egypt, Bahrain, Ethiopia and 
Turkmenistan, where it was used to surveil political activists including some who were born or 
based in the UK itself (Marquis-Boire and Marczak 2012, Perlroth 2013, Privacy International 
2014). The software also appears to have been sold in sundry other forms to over 20 other countries,
including Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, Qatar, Serbia, the UAE, the USA and 
Vietnam, where its official use has not been disclosed or uncovered (Perlroth, 2013). For an 
example of ‘binary’ access to a much less threatening type of code, and a contrasting example of a 
ready and practical application of a computational perspective in the arts to what has been discussed
so far, Ben Fino-Radin (2016) demonstrated how he’s appropriated methods from the field of 
“digital forensics” by using the same low-level techniques to access and copy digital objects that 
forensic laboratories use to examine “criminal suspect’s hard drives” in his conservation work at the
Museum of Modern Art in New York. However it’s important to note two things: one is that the 
“digital forensics” field did not invent these techniques, Fino-Radin is in fact employing common 
computational processes and command line utilities such as the “dd” utility that was developed over
40 years ago as a standard part of Bell Labs’ UNIX operating system (McIlroy, 1987), the other is 
that Fino-Radin’s innovation is in applying these methods to the institutional capture and storage of 
artworks, not in their theorization or evaluation. In terms of a relationship to this research, it means 
that questions such as “What is this art?”, “What is this art supposed to do?”, and “What is actually 
happening when this art executes in the world?” and “What is the authorial intent embedded in this 
art?” likely have aspects to them that are not being completely explored.
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Wardrip-Fruin actually provides an example of these limitations himself. “Digital Media 
Archaeology: Interpreting Computational Processes” (Wardrip-Fruin, 2011) is an essay ostensibly 
about Christopher Strachey’s 1952 “Love letter generator” program, written for a “Manchester 
Mark I” computer (although I think Wardrip-Fruin has made a small error here: the Manchester 
Mark 1 was scrapped in 1950, replaced with an updated Ferranti Mark 1 in early 1951 
(digital60.org, 2008)). Wardrip-Fruin posits the work as “likely the first experiment with digital 
literature or digital art of any kind”, and notes that the entire program listing with fully documented 
notes is found in Oxford’s Bodleian library. We then get a reading of the work through a 
macroscopic analysis of the vocabulary “data” that the program’s presumed functioning 
manipulates, and a comparison of the presumed “process” of that functioning to two other works. In
doing so, Wardrip-Fruin (2011) argues that even breaking down the analysis of Strachey’s program 
into individualized examinations of “data” and “process” is novel in relation to existing research 
into Strachey’s work, and implies that this level of examination is also a novel approach within the 
study of digital art generally. What’s also important to note here is what we do not get – no actual 
publication or reading through of the program listing (i.e. code) in either machine or ‘source’ format
(I think it’s likely that the program listing is machine code), no specific commentary of any program
listing, nor any execution of the actual program or examination of machine memory. Perhaps 
Wardrip-Fruin can be excused for not attempting to re-create a running program for examination on 
a machine that was scrapped over 60 years ago, and it certainly is valuable to provide new analysis 
of Stachey’s historical work. However in doing so, I would have to point to the work of artist (and 
theorist) David Link, who did re-create a working version of the “Love letter generator” using 
Strachey’s program listing and a replicated Mark 1, as a fair bit more ‘archaeological’ (D. Link, 
2009). Link’s work might also lead one to wonder why similar examinations of contemporary 
computer-based art, for which the ability to run the work for the purposes of computational process-
inspection is trivial, seem to be rare? 
An example of where a more direct inspection of the code of a contemporary work might have 
benefited an artwork’s analysis is the one provided by Matthew Fuller regarding Heath Bunting’s 
cctv project on Bunting’s website irational.org in “Media Ecologies” (Fuller, 2005). Fuller is some 
kind of polyglot, poetically weaving the lyrics of niche UK garage songs with analysis from both 
greater and lesser known Post-structuralist and Marxist philosophers, combined with some 
understanding of computational processes and protocols, and he uses the full complement of these 
tools in a chapter spent riffing on Bunting’s work. Another way to examine Bunting’s online project
might have been to simply “crawl” the site, pull all its code - “HTTrack” is an open-source program
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that will do this very quickly (HTTrack, 2017) – and have a close look. So while Fuller (2005) 
accurately observes that much of cctv is generated by “CGI scripts”, he doesn’t see it as important 
to mention that the CGI interface to those scripts is completely un-authenticated. That is, the 
comments of users that he identifies as a key element of the work are likely “fake news”, to use a 
contemporary term. Instead of pulling the code and inspecting it, testing its inputs, or running an 
emulated version, Fuller’s inspection is analogous to gently browsing through the site and 
occasionally opening the “view source” tab without closely reading the code. The resulting analysis 
he provides sits somewhere between the technological and the poetic, and it’s great to read, but my 
point is that it, for the most part, avoids any sort of granular understanding of cctv even when Fuller
does dip into discussion of lower-level Internet protocols. Another example is when he asks “What 
counts as a component of the site?”, but uses the question only in a rhetorical sense, stating “If we 
were to draw up a table of the alterities and multiplications of medial drives, dynamics and 
compositions, and what they in turn connect to transduce, remodulate, and echo that are embedded 
in such a site, it would in truth, or with any luck, be infinite” before he’s off again into more riffage 
that, to its credit, does explore HTML style and provides a high-level view of TCP. However Fuller 
doesn’t attempt the obvious structural answer to his own question of what counts as a component of
the site, which again could easily be done by simply analysing the all the site’s components through 
its code – a rather finite, not “infinite”, task. And again, a program such as HTTrack (2017) can tell 
you exactly what “counts as a component of a site” in seconds, and even format it as very nice 
listing. I think that this sort of analysis would also, in Fuller’s words, “provide an opportunity to see
how these things roll” (Fuller, 2005). This is likely a stylistic decision on Fuller’s part, but I also 
think that Bunting’s work is generally the sort that would benefit from a granular inspection. When 
I saw Bunting give a talk at Goldsmiths, he repeatedly claimed evidence of direct interference in his
work by various “security services”, implying the federal security services of the UK (the domestic 
service MI5 specifically), and used this claim as a way to burnish the importance of his practice. 
That was a pretty interesting claim to me, but further inquiry only led to Bunting dodging my 
questions, providing no evidence, and eventually shifting his claim to that he’d “heard something” 
from a third party implying these “security services” had taken an interest in him. Further inquiry 
revealed he was not able to identify this third party, or what information they provided, or any effect
this alleged “interest” by MI5 had on his practice. Bunting’s evasiveness under inspection doesn’t 
mean his work is illegitimate, but rather it suggests that he is a provocateur and that his work may 
rely at some level on such a perception, which may not help an accurate understanding of how the 
computational aspects of his practice function. As I’ve discussed, the existence of an approximate 
Turing-machine, or code, or computational processes generally, in an artwork means that the 
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artwork can be tested against specific claims about the work’s functioning, which is likely of use 
when those claims are part of the artwork itself. Again, I propose that in this way the purpose of the 
research is not to ‘correct’ anything ‘wrong’ with Fuller’s analysis or with any of the fields 
discussed, it is simply to suggest that other ways of examining art practice are of value. The 
presentation of the practice in this research and the structure of its analysis are also constructed in a 
way that mostly avoid needing to utilize something like a debugger to look ‘inside’ an artwork, as 
instead the practice is examined and analysed through the eyes of its creator, using five frames of 
reference that will give a reasonably complete picture of the ‘inside’, and it is fully provided on the 
attached USB media in support of any other type of inspection.
I will now return to the single example of non-trivial code reading and binary examination of an 
artwork that I’ve found, and it initially comes out of the Software Studies subfield called “Critical 
Code studies”, or CCS. CCS is a subfield of Software Studies that was articulated by Mark Marino 
(2006) as methods by which researchers “can read and explicate code the way we might explicate a 
work of literature”. Marino also organizes the Critical Code Studies Working Group, the “major 
online think tank for Critical Code Studies” (CCSWG, 2018). However, speaking to two members 
of the CCSWG Kevin Driscoll and Patrick Lemieux, they could only identify one single reading of 
an artwork’s code in 10 years of the group’s existence: Lemieux’s instigation of a reading of the 
BEIGE work Mario Clouds (BEIGE, 2002) at the 2014 CCSWG, which he later expanded into a 
2017 video. This video is that single example of art-code examination that I mentioned previously, 
and Lemieux’s example illustrates my argument that 1. that close code reading and memory 
examination of computer-based art generally doesn’t happen, and 2, as I will demonstrate, the single
example of when it did happen produced valuable analysis.
That 2014 reading set Lemiuex off on the course of a multi-year research project to explore Mario 
Clouds, and Super Mario Brothers, in a variety of ways including through the creation of art 
practice, curating exhibitions, and writing a forthcoming book (Lemieux, 2018), culminating (so 
far) in his video essay “Everything but the Clouds” (Lemiuex, 2017). In “Everything but the 
Clouds” Lemiuex examines Mario Clouds using methods that include a close code reading of the 
work’s assembly source code and a binary analysis of the work’s graphics data, and he provides an 
extremely detailed account of the work. His main conclusion is that there is a discrepancy between 
the “art historical accounts and the technical operations” of the artwork, perpetrated mainly by Cory
Arcangel (who is now canonized as the author of the work) and institutions such as the Whitney 
Museum who have exhibited the work four times, in that they promote the work’s construction as 
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based on a process of “erasing” all other elements of Super Mario Brothers to leave only the clouds 
behind. Lemeiux suggests that this is really an attempt at raising the art-historical status of the work 
by giving it a direct relationship to previous art movements Pop Art and minimalist painting, and for
example to canonized artwork such as “Erased de Kooning Drawing” by Robert Rauschenberg 
(Rauschenberg, 1953). In Lemiuex’s analysis, this is false, as there “is no erasure” in the work, and 
he proves it by demonstrating how the code of Mario Clouds doesn’t erase anything at all, but rather
constructs the work’s imagery using elements of Super Mario Brothers graphics, mostly in ways 
that modify the graphics from their use in the Super Mario Brothers game itself – also raising 
questions about the work as an “authentic” response to the ‘real’ workings of Super Mario Brothers.
For example, he demonstrates how the clouds that appear in Mario Clouds never actually appear in 
such a “color...layout...or contour” in Super Mario Brothers. This also proves that as the clouds in 
Mario Clouds never appeared in the Super Mario Brothers game, they again cannot possibly be the 
result of any “erasure” of all the other elements of the game, regardless of what Arcangel or the 
Whitney might say about the work (Lemiuex, 2017).
Also remarkable about Lemiuex’s research is its relationship to my understanding of the same 
issues in the same work. First, I need to mention that BEIGE was a somewhat heterogeneous group 
in the sense that its outputs consisted of projects that might be instigated or promoted by any 
member, sometimes in ways that other members might feel problematic. This is to say that I was 
well aware of inconsistencies in the construction and presentation of a number of BEIGE works, not
just in the reception of their computational aspects that I mentioned in the Introduction, and 
Lemiuex accurately identifies occurrences of both. Second is that I should mention that I am 
intimately familiar with the work. The hacking/re-programming of Nintendo NES cartridges was a 
solo artistic practice that I developed on my own while at university. I even agreed to stop making 
solo re-programmed game works and instead share my ideas and collaborate with Arcangel on them
under our BEIGE rubric at his request (this was a normal request in context, we had lived together 
and collaborated for years already). The code of Mario Clouds itself comes directly from a previous
BEIGE work that was a collaboration between Arcangel and myself, and I don’t credit the piece as 
Arcangel’s exclusively because the work was, like most BEIGE work, fundamentally collaborative, 
originally exhibited as our collective work and practice, and distributed via the BEIGE website 
(Cotter, 2003).
To that end, in 2007 I was involved in a discussion on the artist Tom Moody’s blog – a major node 
for online discussion of North American digital art in the 2000’s  – about Mario Clouds, and in 
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reply to another commenter, stated that it was a piece that “i don’t think you understand”, because 
unlike the commenter had claimed, “nothing is deleted and there is no removal” in the work. I 
argued that no elements of the game are “erased to reveal more blue sky, there are tiles of blue sky 
drawn to those locations on the screen” and further suggested they “should take a look for yourself 
sometime” as all the code has “been freely available at beigerecords.com/cory for 4 years now” 
(digitalmediatree.com, 2007). This understanding of Mario Clouds – that it is not a product of 
“erasure” but is in fact a construction, and that such an understanding contrasted with the now-
institutionalized promotion of the work – was even articulated in my initial application for this PhD 
research. It felt almost miraculous that ten years later and just in time for my PhD resubmission, 
another researcher finally did perform a functional analysis of a computer-based artwork’s code, 
and they happened to examine the exact same work. Lemiuex examined Mario Clouds, analysed the
same code, and independently arrived at the exact same conclusions I’d claimed that anyone who 
did examine the code would conclude, and then made a 19 minute video that popped up in my 
Facebook feed (!) detailing how Cory Arcangel, along with various galleries and institutions, 
promoted a false representation of the computational functioning of the work.
I now want to briefly mention the journal (and possible subfield) “Computational Culture” 
insomuch as, like Software Studies, it sounds like it might be useful here. For the same reasons as 
I’ve found in Software Studies and Media Archaeology, its promise is instead largely unfulfilled. 
Except, again, for one special and specific example, there is limited engagement with anything 
related to the understanding of a Turing-complete medium in art practice. That one example is 
Beatrice Fazi’s articulation of an “Incomputable Aesthetics” (Fazi, 2016), and I only mention it here
just to keep the fields in line. I will instead treat it, as best I can for such a complex work, within the
next branch of literature I examine and where Fazi’s work is truly situated – Philosophy.
The final strand of literature I want to mention is philosophy, although of course selectively. I’ve 
already mentioned the writing of everyone’s favorite common sense philosopher Aristotle in terms 
of the origination of our idea of medium. Contemporary philosophy has developed some ideas that 
we can use in thinking about a Turing-complete medium. The first is a recent branch called the 
Philosophy of Information, a term coined by Luciano Floridi (I should mention here that I’ve had 
the pleasure of collaborating with Mr. Floridi, as his philosophical writings got my attention). 
Philosophy of Information (POI) is an attempt at codifying all of the disparate philosophical 
enquiries that deal with information issues, including those in cybernetics, language, logic, and 
artificial intelligence, into one conceptual framework. The idea is that all of these things are dealing 
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with phenomena that are computational, so perhaps they can be unified. Floridi takes it further by 
proposing that every object is (or will be) in fact computational, hence we should develop an ethics 
that deals with computational objects (ed. Floridi, 2003). The relation to Turing-completeness, then,
is a desire for a well defined, across-the-board way of dealing with all things computational from a 
computational perspective combined with a “General Definition of Information”, or GDI (ed. 
Floridi, 2003). Although POI has said nothing about a potential Turing-complete art medium 
specifically, in any discussion of aesthetics within a POI view, Turing-completeness would be a well
understood concept and could be easily employed.
Aesthetics itself is of course an ancient philosophical inquiry, and in its recent history there have 
been attempts within it to deal with computer-based art (just to be clear, I situate the “Digital 
Aesthetics” and “Computational Aesthetics” of Cubitt and Fazi/Fuller, respectively, within recent 
developments of the media studies tradition). A recent and concerted attempt is Dominic McIver 
Lopes “A Philosophy of Computer Art” (Lopes, 2009). There are two points in Lopes book I want 
to mention which affect its use here. The first is that that there are issues with terminology in the 
work. He has a problematic definition of what he calls “computer art”: “An item is a computer art 
work just in case (1) it’s art, (2) it’s run on a computer, (3) it’s interactive, and (4) it’s interactive 
because it’s run on a computer”.
It seems bizarre straight away that he would only give something the label “computer art” if that 
artwork is interactive. This runs counter to common definitions of computer art: none of the early 
artworks in the computer art field, for example the prints made by Franke, Noll, Mohr and so forth 
(Franke, 1985), were interactive, even though at least Noll claimed that his medium was the 
computer. Lopes’s appears to arrived at his definition of computer art almost arbitrarily, as there’s 
not a persuasive claim in the book otherwise. It’s as if he picks five electronic artworks he really 
likes, writes a bit about them, they all happened to be interactive, and it seems he perhaps simply 
then decided that his definition of computer art needed to include interactivity.
Lopes tries to make up for this by differentiating between computer art and “digital art”, which he 
defines as: “An item is a work of digital art just in case (1) it’s art (2) made by computer or (3) 
made for display by computer (4) in a common, digital code”. Most of what is normally known as 
computer art, he would label digital art. However, being digital has nothing to do with computers; 
digital has to do exclusively with discrete representation, not in what form that representation 
resides. The abacus is an example of a digital device, although artwork made with it would not fit 
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Lopes’s definition of “digital art” as it is not made by for display by a computer. Although, Lopes 
also defines the abacus as a computer in the book, and I’m not sure that it is – it has no memory so 
it cannot be Turing-complete.
However, I certainly don’t mean to disregard all of Lopes work. Some of his ideas are selectively 
helpful in this research and this brings me to my second point about him. Worth a special mention is
perhaps the most remarkable definition of medium I’ve come across: “a technology is an artistic 
medium for a work just in case its use in the display or making of the work is relevant to its 
appreciation” (Lopes, 2009). That is as useful an insight as they come, and provides a definition 
that, while not perfect for my purposes, is singular yet can relate to both materials and transmission 
channels. In the next chapter we will examine it in more depth, along with philosophical work that 
is more directly related to this research, specifically that of Joseph Margolis and Timothy Binkley.
Lastly I will return to Beatrice Fazi’s “Incomputable Aesthetics” (Fazi, 2016). This is a complicated
(to me, anyway) work that develops the general idea of a “computational aesthetics” that she 
explored with Matthew Fuller (Fazi & Fuller, 2016) in that any such aesthetics would need to 
involve an idea of “being” with all things “computational”. Here she expands the work into a 
seemingly powerful philosophical argument, using Godel’s incompleteness theorem to analyze the 
very nature of a computational aesthetics, in that any mode of being as related to computational 
processes is also defined by the “incomputable”.
I doubt I’m able to grok Fazi’s thesis – likely in part because I’m barely able to grok Godel’s 
incompleteness theorems in their original form and need to rely on “Godel’s Proof”, the classic 
layman’s treatment of the subject by Nagel and Newman, first published in the 1950’s (Nagel and 
Newman, 2001). That is to say that while I can clearly see an overall relationship between Fazi’s 
work and this research’s claim for Turing-completeness as a medium, any analysis I can give of 
Fazi’s work is likely lacking. One specific and significant overlap I can find with this research is in 
her calls for a re-examination of current aesthetic practices through a re-reading of foundational 
texts relating to computation – in her case mostly Godel’s, but also Turing’s to a lesser extent. 
Another overlap with this research is her push for this re-reading in opposition to “Computational 
Idealism”, in that Computational Idealism as an aesthetic system promotes a literal understanding of
truth as beauty through computation and Fazi wants to smash it – I’ll spend a bit of time with this. 
Fazi gives the artist Jaromil’s work Fork Bomb (Jaromil, 2002) as an archetype of a work that 
succeeds within an aesthetics of Computational Idealism, relating such an aesthetics to Donald 
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Knuth’s (1983) articulation of “elegance”. I agree, but I would point out that the aesthetic systems 
employed in the wider world of “Contemporary Art” rarely use anything so simplistic as a literal 
understanding of ‘truth = beauty’ for criteria, and therefore they generally would already disregard 
any reading based on a Computational Idealism. I would propose, instead, that the use of an 
aesthetics founded in Computational Idealism is one reason why “New Media” art and the like have
historically existed through their limited worlds of festivals such as Transmediale and specialist 
galleries such as Bitforms in New York, which have a marginal relationship to wider 
“Contemporary Art” practices, venues, and viewer/participants. I think it’s also one of the reasons 
why the theory around such art also lives within its own, relatively limited, ‘art world’. 
Computational idealism is an approach that this research refuses as the basis for any aesthetic 
system of any meaning. Pointing out “problems” in POC1 and POC2 was done through medium-
specific computational means, but the ‘truth’ (or lack thereof) that the POCs explored had nothing 
to do with beauty in an object. Rather, the evaluative strategies of Contemporary Art, both because 
of and in spite of their metaphorical ‘incompleteness’, have already demonstrated the severe 
limitations of computational idealist aesthetics for decades, and they are part of any strategy that 
would be employed here, as this larger world of Contemporary Art is where most of the practice has
been published. Fazi’s rigorous treatment of Godel’s axiomatic incompleteness, used as her lens to 
critique “computational idealism”, is fascinating but functionally redundant here, and her 
declaration of an “Aesthetics of the Incomputable” is more of a call to engage with the computation 
happening all around us, constantly, in an almost sacred sense. One final, likely superficial, note: 
my understanding of Fazi’s Incomputable Aesthetics would likely be helped by its engagement with
related theories that are, frankly, much easier for a non-specialist to grok, such as Tarski’s 
undefinability theorem (which Godel also discovered on the way to incompleteness). My 
understanding would likely also be helped by an articulation that engaged with existing ideas of the 
‘incomputable’ in art-related fields, understood here as absurd or undefinable, such as Dada 
practices or Pataphysics.
1.3 Practice
There is an over 60 year history of art practice involving computers that has been extensively 
documented and theorized, if not always theorized in alignment with this research, and so practice 
will only be covered briefly. Cynthia Goodman’s “Digital Visions: Computers and Art” (1987), 
Anne Morgan Spalter’s “The Computer in the Visual Arts” (1998), Christiane Paul’s “Digital Art” 
(2008), Michael Rush’s “New Media in Art” (2005), Bruce Wands’ “Art of the Digital Age” (2007), 
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Stephen Wilson’s “Information Arts” (2003), Margot Lovejoy’s “Postmodern Currents: Art and 
Artists in the Age of Electronic Media” (1996) and Lauren Cornell and Ed Halters “Mass Effect: Art
and the Internet in the 21st Century” (2015) plus many others provide surveys of electronic and 
computer art at varying periods.
First, though, let me mention specific work that directly influenced elements of the Practice, such as
Takeshi Murata’s Monster Movie (2006), which I came across when we exhibited together at Vilma 
Gold Gallery in 2006. Let me also mention work that has been, more or less, influenced by the 
Practice – while the hacked Nintendo NES work in the research practice here is not one of the early 
BEIGE Nintendo works, it is very similar to that body of work, which was a direct influence on Jet 
Set Willy (JODI 2002), a video game work by artist duo JODI (as told to me by one-half of JODI, 
Dirk Paesmanns). 
So, a brief history: The earliest electronic art is generally credited to Ben Laposky, an American, 
who in 1950 took photographs of oscilloscope CRT patterns and called them “oscillons”. In 
Germany, Herbert Franke and Andreas Huebner were independently making similar oscilloscope 
based work in 1953. In 1957 Lejaren Hiller, working with Leonard Isaacson, finished “The Illiac 
Suite”, a musical work composed at the University of Illinois using one of the few digital electronic 
computers in existence. By 1960, John H. Whitney was using a self-modified analog computer, 
made from vintage World War Two anti-aircraft gun sight equipment, to create animations. By the 
mid 1960’s, electronic digital computers became available to many universities and research 
centers, and artists first started to gain access to them in (still small) numbers. Artists such as Lillian
Schwartz, A. Michael Noll, Manfred Mohr and Charles Csuri used these computers to make visual 
images, and composers like Max Mathews and James Tenney used them to write music. Computer 
based or assisted visual art at this time mostly consisted of images either photographed or filmed 
from a CRT screen, or drawn using a pen plotter – a computer controllable motor that would move 
an inked pen over a two dimensional surface.
Most of these artists also needed to collaborate with engineers in order to produce work; this was a 
pattern that would continue from the mid-1960’s through to the late 1970s. Histories of computer art
generally note this early period, a period of both needing to learn programming and having limited 
access to computers at all, as its own distinct phase. Lovejoy (1996) puts it from 1965 to 1975, 
Herbert Franke (1985) describes an “expansive” period from the late 1960’s onwards that followed 
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an “isolated” beginning period of computer art.
Starting in the late 1970s, two important things happened in the relationship between artists and 
computers. The first is that affordable “home computers” started to become available (the Steve 
Wozniak-designed Apple I went on sale in July 1976). Secondly, as processing power increased, 
computers were able to run Graphical User Interfaces in both their operating systems and their 
applications. This meant that technologies which made the computer accessible without 
programming knowledge such as electronic tablets and applications for “digital painting”, instead of
being confined to research laboratories, now became widespread and artists started to use them en 
masse. This brought about a wave of computer-based art starting in the 1980’s, continuing through 
to today, that used digital painting, appropriated imagery, three dimensional modeling, animation 
and related technologies, and could also through its ease-of-use facilitate an aesthetic of 
amateurism.
The only point I would like to make here is about the transition to GUI interfaces. Through the 
1960’s and 70’s, artists working with computers almost always had to learn something about how a 
computer itself worked, and this wasn’t looked upon as a bad thing since they were often drawn to 
computers due to an interest in computational processes in the first place. Perhaps since it was such 
new territory for art practice, they also often wrote about the effects of computing processes on their
artwork (Reichardt, 1971). The nature of computer processes, however, became less and less of a 
concern among artists in the 1980s when it seems that such concerns became subservient to interest 
in what computers could ‘do’, probably because to get computers to do something – anything – was 
so much easier with the advent of GUI interfaces. As a result, in my opinion, questions about what a
computer ‘is’ and how it functions in art practice, questions of what it means for an artwork to be 
made on a computer, questions of whether the computer is truly a medium, and how we might 
understand computer based art as related to the processes that support it, are all questions that were 
never properly answered and largely stopped being asked. 
76
Chapter 2: Medium Functionality
2.1 Introduction
The Contextual Review demonstrated how the term "medium" holds multiple meanings in art – 
usually either a material, a mode of production or a transmission channel – and how these multiple 
meanings create a unique type of confusion in the theorization of art practice. It also demonstrated 
that the computer has never been definitively shown to be an art medium even when certain artists 
claimed it as such, which happened very early on in the use of computers in art practice (Noll, 
1967). Likewise it also demonstrated that the computer is denied by other certain artists as being 
their medium when they make computer based art, also very early on (Crabtree, 1982).
The chapter will explore in more detail the history and usage of the term “medium” in art, taking 
into consideration how the Literature Review demonstrated how existing definitions have 
historically been problematic in the examination of computer-based art. It will include an extended 
look at the work of David Binkley, a philosopher who directly examined questions of a computing 
medium in the arts in the 1970's and 1980's. Although Binkley's conclusions now seem outdated, 
and possibly just wrong, his work is very useful here because thirty years on, Binkley’s work 
remains the most extensive (and possibly the only comprehensive) attempt at mapping computer 
functions to ideas of an art medium. The chapter will then attempt a new working definition of the 
term “medium” that can be applied to both the general understanding of the overall research and to 
the functioning of the practice specifically. Again I will often refer to any given general purpose 
computer as a "Turing-complete machine", with the understanding of the terms “computer” and the 
colloquial usage of “Turing-complete” as equivalent.
2.2 History of the term Medium in Two Parts: a Variety of Definitions, Unsuitable for this 
Research
Before the research looks at definitions of art mediums, I think it will be useful to first have a brief 
look at how “Art” has itself been defined. This is because I would ideally like any definition of a 
medium to escape the self-reflexive nature that current definitions of Art seem to contain, especially
those definitions that are variations of Dickie’s “Institutional Definition” (Dickie, 1974). The main 
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problem with self-reflexivity is that, while it can provide very fertile ground for argument, it could 
also limit the usefulness of a (self-reflexive) definition of medium as an evaluative tool – for 
example, when the authors of computer-based work variously claim that computers are, or are not, 
mediums in their work. The special nature of computers as embodiments of logical ‘truth’, which 
I’ve previously demonstrated can be used to test the functioning of work, especially against claims 
of an artist or art world, may not be of much use in examining claims of medium against a 
definition of medium which is reflexive to those claims.
2.2.1 Definitions of Art and their Influence
As explored in the Contextual Review, Material definitions of Art have repeatedly been challenged 
and re-evaluated, and from the middle of the 20th century the process accelerated to where the most
mainstream, working definition is the non-material one supplied by George Dickie (1974): that 
status as art is conferred on objects by an "Artworld". This is called the “Institutional definition”, 
and in relation to it, it's also worth remembering that in everyday usage the definition of an 
"Artworld" is fluid and can indicate only one person, the “Artist” (Dickie mentions the possibility 
of only one person conferring art status, but includes a few caveats in such cases). Although 
formalized by Dickie almost 45 years ago, the Institutional Definition has enjoyed widespread 
support ever since its introduction. Even later theories that don’t mention Dickie by name often 
produce compatible definitions, such as Pierre Bourdieu’s “Rules of Art” which was published in 
the 1990s and understands art in terms of its sociocultural conditions of production (Bourdieu, 
1996). Writing in 2013, Simon Fokt states in his defense of a modified version of the Institutional 
Definition that “The institutional definition of art...remains one of the most attractive and widely 
discussed theories in aesthetics” (Fokt, 2013). 
It used to be easier to tell what was art and what wasn't, mostly because of a stricter set of means 
and materials that were then employed in making Art. Plato's (1955 trans) historical definition relied
on imitation or representation, Croce's (1920) early 20th century definition relied on the concept of 
an "intuitive expression". These definitions did not hold in the face of works which were not 
imitative, representative, or expressions of any identifiable sort, yet were nonetheless seen as 
‘legitimate’ Art in the sense that an ‘art world’ created, exhibited, bought, sold, studied, preserved 
and wrote about them. The main reason for this – and I think the main reason Dickie's definition 
relies on an external entity to provide Art status for a work – is a result of huge changes in the 
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nature of contemporary art which happened in the 1960s and 1970s (remember that Dickie 
published his definition in 1974). In the face of the development of Fluxus, performance art, 
minimalist painting, video and conceptual art, it simply seemed untenable to define art in terms of 
particular materials, of types of expression, or really any inherent characteristic in the Artwork 
itself. As Joseph Kosuth argued, in reference to his hard-edged brand of conceptual art, the very 
idea of art had been led down an inevitable path to circularity:
"A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of the artist's intention, that is, he is saying 
that that particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of art. Thus, that it is art is true a 
priori." (Kosuth, 1969)
Dickie's reliance on an Artworld, external to any given work, to provide Art status to a given work 
is an attempt to escape these definition problems. It is also something I would consider a 
‘backwards-compatible’ definition of Art inasmuch as it likely continues to support the status of all 
previous Artworks. While there are numerous historical examples of the status of artworks being 
challenged at the time the works were made, I cannot think of a past artwork that, thanks to the 
Institutional Definition, I wouldn't be able to identify as art now.
Of course Dickie's definition isn't perfect, and it was immediately attacked for its circularity 
(Graves, 1997). The circularity is easy for a non-specialist to identify: just ask the question "What's 
an artist?". A general answer to the question is that all the term “artist” means in its current usage is 
that someone has at least once in their life to date called something 'art', and that in doing so they 
claim ownership of or responsibility for that art in some way (Thomasson, 2003). This leads us back
to “What's Art?” and then of course directly to the Institutional definition and "What's an 
Artworld?". Stephen Davies calls this the "Artworld relativity problem" and gives that "Any theory 
that makes arthood depend on historical reflexivity within a given Artworld, while allowing (as it 
should) that there are different Artworlds each with its own history, fails to complete its analysis 
satisfactorily, if it does not analyze the nature of Artworlds." (S. Davies, 1991). Needless to say, 
Davies adds that there is no comprehensive or non-reflexive definition of an “Artworld”. Richard 
Wollheim in particular attacked Dickie’s definition in an ingenious way that is also examined by 
Fokt: Wollheim says that the representatives of the Artworld either do or do not have actual reasons 
for deciding whether something is Art. If they do have reasons, then any correct theory of art should
discuss them. Yet if such a theory did discuss these reasons, it would now be a salient Theory of Art 
that is in direct conflict with the Institutional definition, as to be Art, an object no longer needs 
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institutional support. However, if the representatives of the Artworld don’t have reasons for 
deciding whether something is Art or not, this would raise questions of the entire Artworld, as any 
object’s status as Art would appear to be arbitrarily decided, and so why would anyone listen to 
such an Artworld about anything to do with Art? In Wollheim’s words, “If the theory takes one 
alternative, it forfeits its claim to be an Institutional theory of art: if it takes the other, it is hard to 
see how it is an Institutional theory of art” (Wollheim 1987, Fokt 2013).
Perhaps one can even make a relation between this reflexivity in an Art/Artworld definition and 
what Bertrand Russell discovered by his set theory antimony (Link, 2004): that there is no 
consistent schema by which you can comprehensively define the boundary of a set, for example the 
set of all things which are Artworks. “Any rule about set membership that itself mentions 
membership or non-membership falls into the trap of self-reference, and sooner or later generates 
antinomies at higher levels in the theory...Russell's statement that there is NO class that has as its 
members the classes that are not members of themselves is itself such a rule.” (Wilden, 1972). 
Regardless, members of the Artworld that I'm familiar with – this consists of my peer group at 
institutions such as Goldsmiths College and Seventeen Gallery – tend to all use some personal 
variation of the Institutional Definition. It gives the person who follows such a definition the ability 
to recognize as Art most of what they will ever be asked to recognize and appreciate as Art, which I 
think is likely Dickie's purpose. I've also observed that most contemporary artists see themselves as 
agents whose job it is to confer Art status (“Artworld of one” mode, again). This references the 
Joseph Kosuth model, and a more recent archetype example is the artist Tracey Emin with her oft-
quoted claim “It isn't art unless I say it's art” (Emin, 2002). So although the Institutional Definition 
might ideally seem to distribute the ability to define/create art amongst a network of various actors 
(viewer/participants, institutions, galleries, collectors, artists, critics, theorists), the reflexivity in the 
Institutional Definition’s concept of an “Artworld” is, ironically, easily exploited to do just the 
opposite. As Dickie conceded, an Artworld, by definition, may consist of only one person – so 
working within the Institutional Definition, Emin is theoretically quite correct to identify herself as 
a singular agent with Art-status-granting abilities. In practice this ability is explicitly demonstrated 
by the artist Cady Noland, who has a history of ‘disowning’ certain works she’s sold after they later 
appear at auction (Lucas, 2015), the result being in every case that the work was withdrawn. 
Lawsuits seeking compensation against Noland’s disowning of her own practice – in one case on 
the order of tens of millions of dollars – have also failed in every case, not because of any art 
theory, but because auction houses have language in their contracts that allows them to withdraw 
work for any number of vague reasons and courts have agreed (Buskirk, 2013). So although it 
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would seem that an Artworld which regularly trades in Noland’s works, normally buying and selling
them both independently of her and on her behalf for huge sums of money, would have sovereignty 
over its own valuations of works that have already been commodified by Noland and that she has 
no claim to ownership of, when Noland arbitrarily says the equivalent of “that’s not Art anymore” 
the same Artworld obeys her whim. 
So let's be clear that Graves, Davies and Wollheim are correct: in theory (and in practice) the 
Institutional Definition is circular. Yet the Institutional Definition, while being clearly problematic 
and still contentious, is useful, widespread, and still forms the basis of all other current, mainstream 
working definitions of Art (S. Davies, 2006). The resulting theory can be entertaining, much of it 
certainly worth reading, but for my purposes it's dangerous and I find myself wondering how a 
definition of an art medium will hold when previous definitions of art itself all fell and the major 
current definition is reflexive (if no definitions of medium will hold, I don't have much confidence 
in saying that Turing-completeness is a medium). For my purposes it's also important to recognize 
that there is a general tendency to appeal to whatever an artist says about their work as valid and 
true (Danto 2005, Maes 2010, Gover 2012) - Gover (2012) in particular articulates this when he 
describes how accepting the pronouncements of Artists about their work is a “widespread artworld 
practice” and points out that “[Arthur] Danto has made this a principle of his criticism”. In plainer 
terms: what is the point of using a ‘Turing-complete medium’ in the examination or evaluation of a 
computer-based work when the Artist might say “Sorry, that’s not a medium in my work”, and that’s
that. It's hard to argue against it when the ‘art world’ accepts the definitional tautologies of both Art 
and Artists (and itself). It also becomes a major problem for me when, like the examples I gave in 
the previous chapter, various artists who make similar work with computers have claimed that the 
computer both is and is not a medium, and it is something I would like to avoid.
So far this chapter has explored how current reflexive and tautological definitions of Art lead to 
genuine inconsistencies. In a sense this is not new information, especially as these inconsistencies, 
instead of causing their circularities to immediately be thrown out as they would be in many other 
disciplines, are seen as a part of Art's unique character as a field itself. I’ve also expressed that I’d 
like any definition of an art medium to, ideally, escape these issues. I will now demonstrate one way
this is possible through an understanding that a question of an Artwork's medium is a different type 
of question than that of an Artwork's definition, and it’s specifically a type of question that can 
avoid reflexivity. The specific difference is that when a question is asked such as "Is the computer a 
medium of this Artwork?", we are asking a functional question, and not a hierarchical or procedural 
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one, such as the question “Is this thing, which happened to involve a computer in its production, 
Art?”. The work is already understood as Art, now how does this Art 'work'? The answer is not 
about a status, whether conferred by an Artworld of one or an Artworld of many, but rather an 
observed property of the functioning of the Artwork in question. The answer also is, as discussed in 
the Literature Review, almost always a material, a mode of production or an information channel – 
again, all of which are observable and quantifiable properties, not conferred properties, of an 
Artwork. It’s important to note that there have also been proposals for “functional” definitions of 
Art, usually in an attempt to escape the Institutional Definition’s circularity. An example is Monroe 
Beardsley’s definition that artworks are objects created with the intention to afford an “aesthetic 
experience” (Beardsley, 1982), and Stephen Davies examines the relative unpopularity of this and 
other functional definitions compared to the “procedural” definitions of Art such as Dickie’s and 
those derived from it (S. Davies, 2006). In respect of this research, a functional question (and 
therefore a functional answer) may be more likely to succeed when it’s regarding an observed 
property of an Artwork, such as a medium, as opposed to when it’s regarding a hierarchical status, 
such as whether a particular object is Art or not.
2.2.2 Towards a New Definition of Medium, with Respect to Joseph Margolis, Timothy 
Binkley, and Previous Definitions
Functional or procedural definitions of art medium lead to the proposition that it's entirely possible 
for an Artist to claim that the medium of their work is X, but X itself is unverifiable – perhaps it's 
something that cannot be observed. Functional definitions, however, can also be used for direct 
testing and this leads to the possibility that a medium X is shown to be false – perhaps X is 
something we can observe, but it contradicts the artist's own claim of X. An example of an 
unverifiable claim for medium is the one given by the artist Florian Pumhosl when he says "My 
medium is the physical and historical space that I create using painting, architecture, film or 
photography." (Viliani, 2008). While a casual art enthusiast might simply say that Pumhosl seems 
pretentious, I would say that he attempts some kind of claim for a tautological meta-medium that 
cannot be verified other than taking Pumhosl's word for it. In case we want an example of what his 
"physical and historical space" actually looks like I provide one below, and as you'll see it looks a 
lot like painting:
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Fig 2.1 - Plakat (#1), 2007, Florian Pumhosl
As the research looks to define medium in a more useful way, a helpful tool is the definition offered
by Dominic McIver Lopes's from Chapter 1: “a technology is an artistic medium for a work just in 
case its use in the display or making of the work is relevant to its appreciation” (Lopes, 2009). This 
is quite an open definition and as a result it has the potential for some self-referentiality, but it ties 
the medium to a function – the function of its “use” being “relevant to [the work’s] appreciation”. 
Perhaps what one viewer/participant of work finds as relevant another does not, but at least we 
know in this case what a medium is supposed to ‘do’. Lopes (2009) also makes it completely clear 
that computers, along with many other technologies, can be mediums.
A completely different perspective, and one that this research will spend some time with, is given 
by Timothy Binkley (1988) who draws a proverbial line in the sand when he says “The computer is 
not a medium because it does not embody meanings in a physical substance according to cultural 
conventions”. Here we have a strict rejection of the computer's ability to ever be an Art medium in 
any circumstance, because it does not perform the functions that mediums perform. Again, we 
explicitly know what a medium is supposed to 'do'.  
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The first thing to note is Binkley's definition of “medium”, which he borrows from Joseph 
Margolis: “a medium is a cultural instrumentality manifested in a physical material” (Margolis, 
1984). This is a very a different sort of definition compared to Lopes's, and while it rests on the 
evaluation of observable properties, more important is the definition's inclusion of "physical 
material" as a qualifier. The qualifier of a material within a definition of medium is not unusual if 
we recall Morris Weitz's (1959) classic definition or David Joselit’s (2013) more contemporary 
definition from Chapter 1. It also means that Binkley could, theoretically, have cut the length of his 
definition in half and left it at "The computer is not a medium because it does not embody meanings
in a physical substance" - who cares about cultural conventions after that. However, Binkley’s 
definition clearly does not work here. As explored in the previous Chapter, any definition of 
medium dependent on a physical material is not suitable for entire genres of Contemporary Art, as 
many do not have easily identifiable physical materials (Lippard, 1972). Looking back to the two 
diverging meanings of the word medium – material and transmission channel – the problem stems 
from how transmission channels are may or may not be made of a physical material. If they were, 
we wouldn't have our two competing ideas about what a medium is supposed to be.
There are contemporary definitions of medium that responded to exactly this problem, and are 
specifically designed to allow for de-materiality in Artworks. David Davies’s (2004) definition of a 
“vehicular medium”, mentioned in the previous chapter, was created to do just such a thing, as was 
Lopes’s (2009) definition, and both of them would have that Binkley is wrong straight-away 
because of his dependence on physical materials. Binkley also makes no case for the existence of 
Art without a medium at all, which would be the obvious class of art within which all Computer Art 
would exist using his definition. But let's not throw his argument out just yet, because even after 
thirty years Binkley's work is some of the most detailed writing about and mapping of computer 
processes in relation to art experience in the literature. Let's accept, for the time being, Binkley's 
world of physically exclusive mediums and see where his writing about computers leads us.
Binkley will rely on an issue I raised in Chapter 1, which is that logic, the formal schema of 
computers, seems immaterial. Obviously, if Binkley can show that art made on computers is distinct
from any sort of physical material, then the computer cannot be the Art's medium (according to his 
definition of medium which embodies an idea of a physical material). But more subtly and 
importantly for us, what he's likely going to need to show is how computer art relates ontologically 
84
to logic. Only if all computer art is no more than logic, and therefore non-material, will his rejection
of computers as a medium hold.
Binkley attempts to demonstrate the immateriality of computer art by using the example of an 
image on a computer screen, and opposes it to a painted image when he states that “Presenting an 
image as a file of numbers in a frame buffer is fundamentally different from presenting it as colored
areas spread over a piece of canvas. A medium embodies its messages in an inseparable union of 
form and matter, but a computer encodes its information in an abstract sequence of bits with no 
intrinsic or favored physical manifestation” (Binkley, 1988). This is essentially the same as the 
Introduction's Print vs Play issue that I noticed as a teenager and then became a reason for this PhD:
“I could hit Button A and my work would be output as audio, or hit button B and it would be output 
visually. There didn’t seem to be much of a difference between the two...”. I used this issue to start 
an open line of inquiry, whereas Binkley uses it to explain his frustration with the behavior of 
computers in art practice.
Looking more carefully at his claim, Binkley doesn't show how computer “encoding” is equivalent 
to computer art. An image as a file of numbers in a "frame buffer" (a now-archaic term for video 
RAM) is very different from paint on canvas, but lots of things are different to paint on canvas that 
can still be called a medium. More importantly, a file of numbers in a frame buffer is not how 
images are typically “presented” as artwork. The numbers certainly exist in the frame buffer/RAM, 
but they are presented as images using light on a monitor through mechanical means, or printed as 
ink on paper, or whatever. In Binkley's thinking, only the final output is the art, IE it's a Print. 
However it would seem to me that the “stuff” that the artist works with – Davies's “vehicular 
medium” – isn't ink or print at all until the artists presses the PRINT button at the end.
Regardless, Binkley makes clear that much of how he reads a computer as (not) a medium hinges 
on an interpretation of what a computer is. If it can be shown that a computer is somehow separate 
from/more than/ontologically distinct from the logic that it uses, then Binkley's argument holds no 
weight. If it can't, then Binkley is arguably correct, although the issues I noted earlier still stand. 
Additionally, as logic is such a fundamental feature of computers, it's not just key to Binkley's 
arguments but likely key to all arguments about the status and medium of computer-based art.
A straight-forward way to take on this idea is through an examination of Turing's 1936 paper and 
the resulting definitions of computers which it allows. First, we need to see how Binkley's argument
85
depends on the idea that the maths behind what a computer is, and the ontological status of a 
computer, are the same. He clearly believes that a computer is its maths, stating "the “substance” of 
computer art are not physical objects but conceptual ones...What color is a number; how big is a 
bit? We know how cadmium yellow looks and smells, what the pitch of middle C sounds like, and 
how a word should be spoken or written...but a bit has no characteristic look, sound, or smell 
because it is a concept, not an object...", and “A bit is not something culturally formed the way 
painting, a paint stroke, or a style are...Numbers are concepts that don't inherently capture or reflect 
genres and styles the way a physical medium does...a bit is not inherently embodied in any medium:
it is the basis of a science, and not simply an art, of information.” (Binkley, 1988). This is a very 
specific claim about a computer and I'm not sure Turing would agree.
Turing machines are, after all, machines. In the 9th section of Turing's paper, we even have to take it
on faith that they work (Turing 1936), and his concept is always referred to as a "thesis" because it's
"much too amorphous a concept to be subjected to rigorous mathematical proof." (Petzold, 2008). I 
think this means that Turing Machines – and remember that they are simply hypothetical designs for
machines – are machines that 'do' maths, rather than 'are' maths. Turing has designed them 
specifically to write symbols on a paper tape, and he equates them to a human with a pencil, graph 
paper, and a basic, complete and discrete set of instructions on what to do with them. That is, they 
don't exist without those physical attributes. So while Binkley's claim that "a bit is not inherently 
embodied in any medium" is perhaps true, a computer certainly embodies bits in a medium, 
whatever physical substance(s) the computer is made from. Donna Haraway (1988) takes this idea 
to its logical conclusion in “Situated Knowledges” – by taking up a politics of location that argues 
for “the view from the body” and the “situated knowledges” of that body, she effectively argues for 
the location of information itself as ultimately in the material.
Binkley's understanding also leads us to a position where it's only the final output of a computer that
matters to any interpretation of computer-based or computer generated art. This is because Binkley 
does not care to take into account the type of computational processes that support the work, as to 
him the computer has nothing to do with the medium of the actual work. "...when (a computer is) 
co-present with media, the medium remains pure and simply gets its information from a new 
source. This is why the computer need not be present for each computer artwork: the computer did 
its work, the information was interfaced to and recorded on film or paint, and it can then be moved 
into the gallery without carrying the computer along." (Binkley, 1988). For Binkley the computer 
86
generates "information", that information is embodied in a medium through an interface (IE you 
print an image), and now we can evaluate the resulting work as a print. 
I would argue that Binkley’s position here is untenable, first because it fails to account for entire 
classes of art. Interactive installations like Lozano-Hemmer’s (mentioned in Chapter 1) that, while I
might personally regard them as inane, require a “present” computer (or computers) to function and 
simultaneously to be an integral part of the output from a viewer/participant’s perspective. This type
of work simply doesn't exist for Binkley. Second, because it makes no distinction between different 
processes in the construction of an artwork. We can see the paradoxical conclusion of this position 
with another thought experiment: if two diverging computational processes led to the creation of a 
visually identical print, Binkley would likely conclude that both prints are copies of the same 
Artwork (or perhaps one is a copy of the other, it’s difficult to say). I think there is no way to 
conclude both prints as identical artworks because the artistic gestures – what the artist is 
communicating and the way they do it – are not the same. 
This is useful in refining my initial 'two artists + one computer + similar work' thought experiment: 
there are now two artists working on the same computer who each make a work that is identical in 
virtually every way – say, an exactly similar sized red square, using the same color red, printed on 
the same type of paper, produced through exactly the same computational process. One way this 
could happen is by imagining a computer with a big button attached to it, and when anyone 
(including the two artists) presses the button, the computer prints an identical red square. Another 
way this could happen is that the two artists both use Adobe Photoshop. Either way, when the artists
are asked what medium their work is in, one says “computer”, the other says “print”. We can truly 
see crux of the issue: fundamentally, artists claiming the same or similar work is in different 
mediums really just means that they want different aspects of the work to be foregrounded, and they
likely want the work evaluated in different ways. This could be a legitimate request, and Kendall 
Walton explored it in his seminal essay “Categories of Art” when he gave four basic considerations 
for understanding an artwork's “category” (closely related to “medium”), the third one being the 
artist’s having intended or expected that the work be perceived under a specific category (Walton, 
1970). He also gives preference to this consideration, and says it can overrule the other three 
(examples of the others are considerations such as the work has a large number of features that are 
standard in a given category, or the work is a 'better' work when perceived under a particular 
category). I would argue that, as viewers or participants (or whatever), we are under no such 
obligation to privilege an artist's stated intention: we can choose to accept an artist's terms or not. 
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An example where we might want to privilege an artist's stated intention would be works where 
seemingly ridiculous claims of medium by an artist are in fact part of the (potential) aesthetic 
experience of the work: Michael Craig-Martin's An Oak Tree (1973) is an archetype example. 
Perhaps Pumhosl’s work from earlier in this chapter is another. Ai Weiwei’s statement that it is 
“very important to put myself in that condition”, the “condition” being the death pose of Alan 
Kurdi, a refugee Syrian toddler found drowned on a Greek beach that Weiwei recreated as himself 
on a Greek beach for a widely distributed photograph (Cafolla, 2016), is perhaps an example of 
where one might not want to privilege the statements of an artist about their work. 
So while it is clearly accepted practice to privilege artist intention, and often useful, I would suggest
that it is of course also legitimate to evaluate any aspect of an artwork. This includes aspects of a 
work that the artist might not even have considered, say for instance those that rely on computation 
in some way, especially when the artist doesn’t understand what that computation is doing. And 
while current definitions of Art appear, for the most part, procedural, a definition of art medium 
might better succeed as functional. And, finally, while there is a link to information and 
embodiment in a material, historical definitions of medium that relied on a physical material now 
appear inappropriate for the examination of many works of art, especially computer-based art. To 
wit, my definition of medium:
A medium of a work of art is any container of the work's informational content at any time during a
work's production.
A few things to note about this definition –
1. Here, “informational content” is as described by Luciano Floridi's GDI or “General 
Definition of Information” (ed. Floridi, 2003). What this means for my purposes is that both 
physical and conceptual vehicles have “informational content”, hence both paint and code 
(along with lots of other things) can be mediums. Margolis's, Binkley's, and other definitions
which rely on physicality are not equivalent.
2. Lopes's definition of “a technology is an artistic medium for a work just in case its use in the
display or making of the work is relevant to its appreciation” is not equivalent. His 
definition is also open to technologies that are not containers of an artwork’s informational 
content, but perhaps 'actors' on that content or on a work of art. In more general terms we 
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could say that Lopes' definition makes no distinction between “medium” and “tool”, 
whereas mine explicitly states that what we might normally think of as tools cannot be 
mediums because they are not “containers”.
3. Interfaces are also not containers.
4. David Davies's “vehicular medium” is equivalent in practice to this definition, but I think 
“informational content” is more useful than his term “stuff”.
5. There is clearly the possibility, in fact I’d suggest the likelihood, of having more than one 
medium in a work, especially when the work's informational content is transferred or 
distributed between containers in its production (i.e. the computer generates a print). In this 
way the definition also allows an appreciation of the history of a work’s production when we
look at a work's medium(s).
      6.  When “informational content” is transferred amongst containers in a work, that is not an 
example of Bolter and Grusin’s “remediation”. Remediation does not cover actual 
information transference, it is more a metaphorical appropriation of “style” or “genre”.
This is of course a loose and likely imperfect definition, but I propose that it is no less loose, and 
hopefully less imperfect, than existing definitions. It also holds to what I've identified as the 
backwards-compatibility characteristic of all definitions of medium. In addition, I believe it could 
be particularly useful in inspecting computer based art, and more importantly, this research now 
knows what it means when it says “medium”, specifically regarding Turing-completeness as being 
one.
2.3 On the Usage of the New Definition
The first thing to note about the New Definition is that it’s an overshoot, both for its application to 
the practice and in the written text of the research. Per note #4 above, Davis Davies’s concept of a 
“vehicular medium” is equivalent and was articulated over a decade ago (D. Davies, 2004). The 
reason for developing this chapter of the text was that it generated a deeper exploration of issues 
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around “medium”, and it was able to slightly tighten Davies’s concept with some alternative 
terminology that is hopefully more useful as a way to inspect computational aspects of artwork. 
Work that might have employed a computer for some small part of its production will still likely 
find critiques based on its Turing-complete medium relatively useless. However, for work such as 
the Practice of this research, which is deeply involved in exploring facets of Turing-complete 
systems, it helps to define a Turing-complete medium as legitimate for examination. And, if for 
some reason, this New Definition fails in some way, the research can likely fall back to Davies 
“vehicular medium” and not be too affected.
To inspect the medium of a wide variety of computer-based art, the research is also are aided by an 
unlikely source – a presentation given by Steve Traugott at the 2002 USENIX Large Installation 
System Administration conference (Traugott, 2002). Traugott is interested in writing programs that 
can safely and automatically update software for large-scale enterprise networks, often numbering 
thousands of machines. He shows, in his own words, “how a modern self-administered machine is 
equivalent to a Turing machine with several tapes, which is in turn equivalent to a single-tape 
Turing machine.” More importantly, Traugott provides a model, based on Turing-machines, for 
thinking about computers in a variety of different environments – static, networked, with and 
without user interaction. He describes how extensions of “tape” in the Turing-machine model can 
describe these machine varieties. For example “It is easy to imagine a Turing Machine that is 
connected to a network, and which is able to use the network to fetch data from tapes stored 
remotely, under program control. This is simply a case of a multiple-tape Turing machine, with one 
or more of the tapes at the other end of a network connection” and “...the system described in (8.29)
will loop infinitely...In practice, a human might detect and break this loop; to represent this 
interaction, we would need to add a fourth tape, representing the user detection and input data.” 
(Traugott, 2002).
It's important to remember that all of these “tapes”, while they have some theoretical equivalence as
instructions, in practice also potentially represent different embodiments of authorial intention. 
Each tape adds a new ‘voice’ to the potential actions that any machine, or piece of computer art, 
might take. While it might seem to not make any difference initially – a computer is still a computer
whether it's connected to a network or not – I think it's worth considering in more detail. Consider 
Figure 2.2 (Stallings, 2013) below, a "Functional view of the computer":
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We see four connected representations of "Data movement", a "Control mechanism", a "storage 
facility" and a "Data processing facility" - a simplified but accurate model of computer 
functionality. Now consider Figure 2.3 (Stallings, 2013) below, illustrating the four ways that data 
typically flows through the previous model:
This all works fine assuming we're dealing with a single computer that remains under the same 
initial control, even in a networked situation. For example, (a) of Figure 2.3 might be a computer 
acting as a network router – just moving data along. Figure (c) might be someone working with 
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Microsoft Word, loading a document off a hard drive, changing the font, and then saving a new 
copy to the same drive. However, in all these devices, the "movement" representation is often 
transparent, and the "control" representation is assumed to be static (a user at a computer). In many 
networked environments, this isn't the case. Network data isn't just moved, it often tries to execute 
or run on the machine. If successful, control can be removed from the computer user and placed in 
the hands of someone (or something) else. In this way the four ball model reverts to a three ball 
model, with the "movement" and "control" representations collapsing into each other where the 
network is the control and vice-versa. This type of relationship between a network and control is 
often described in a computer security context: “The fundamental problem is that letting foreign 
code run on your machine...from a security standpoint is like inviting a burglar into your house and 
then trying to watch him carefully so he cannot escape from the kitchen into the living room.” 
(Tanenbaum & Wetherall, 2013). However, I'm not necessarily referring to anything about security 
or "hacking". I simply mean to suggest that it is often assumed that the CPU is ‘controlled’ by the 
user in a singular fashion, whereas the connection of computers to networks complicates both that 
assumption and Tanenbaum’s functional model.
It’s therefore worth considering the implications of network-based complexity in computer 
artworks. Alan Turing (1936) showed that there is no solution to the "halting problem". That is, no 
algorithm can exist that will ever be able to decide that any given program will eventually stop 
(halt), or run in a loop forever. In practical terms this is an issue for people like Traugott in 
production environments because they can never be certain that a given software update won't make
corporate computers do things that the corporation wouldn't want them to do. What this means more
generally is that there's no systematic way to know, in all cases, the behaviour of a program – or a 
work of computer art – by looking at its code. While in many cases it's easy to inspect some 
program or source code and deductively see if it stops or runs in a loop, Turing showed that there is 
not a general method to do this. So ultimately, with even single computer outputs being 
unpredictable, imagine the outputs for network connected computers, with the incredible range of 
code/intention that can be placed in them. Does this increase in complexity give rise to a machine 
which is perceivably different, and capable of producing a different Art? Or is the Internet itself still
describable, somehow, as just a fantastically busy state-machine? The next two chapters will look at
these questions, first with “stand alone” or “one-tape” machine/artworks and then with networked 
or “multi-tape” machine/artworks.
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Chapter 3: The Practice
3.1 Introduction
This chapter contains the written analysis of the Practice and I invite the reader to explore the 
attached USB media for the presentation of the Practice itself. Nine works were constructed, each 
involved a computer (understood here as a Turing-complete machine) in its construction and 
specifically explored some aspect of that machine. This chapter will inspect Art made of and from 
both static and networked computers, with the understanding that they are approximately equivalent
to “single-tape” and “multi-tape” Universal Turing-machines (Traugott, 2002), respectively. Each 
analysis first provides a narrative description and then attempts to observe characteristics of the 
work through five frames of reference: Medium, Interface, Intention, Abstraction and Authorization.
The five analytical frames of reference, abbreviated MIIAA, are not intended to be exhaustive or 
exclusive. A researcher could certainly employ something like Beatrice Fazi and Matthew Fuller’s 
ten “aspects” of their “Computational Aesthetics” (Fazi and Fuller, 2016) as analytical frames of 
reference if they wished, and for example I present no ‘proof’ that MIIAA is ‘better’, regardless of 
my critique in the Contextual Review. MIIAA simply attempts to be reasonably comprehensive at 
exploring the Practice, and it is attuned to both larger themes in the work and more targeted 
computational properties of Turing-completeness that the Practice explores. It’s worth emphasizing 
that the research has these two threads: the creation of art practice which engages the 
computational, and the analysis of art practice which recognizes a Turing-complete medium and 
uses the concept to its benefit. These threads do not necessarily parallel each other in all ways, and 
up until this point in the written text, the analytical thread has been the locus, even while within the 
overall research it is subservient to the practice in both measure and prestige (the Practice has 
already been exhibited internationally and studied by other researchers, this writing has not). 
The text now shifts, as instead of providing an overview of the field or trying to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of a Turing-complete medium, it turns to analysis of the specific body of work created as
the research. Also, the socio-politcal and art historical contexts of the Practice are not the focus of 
analysis. If the reader is so inclined, I would refer them to other texts that investigate and 
contextualize some of the Practice in such a way, chief among them Carolyn Kane’s “Chromatic 
Algorithms : Synthetic Color, Computer Art, and Aesthetics after Code” (Kane, 2014) and Jihoon 
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Kim’s “Between Film, Video, and the Digital: Hybrid Moving Images in the Post-Media Age” 
(Kim, 2016). The focus here is on a more functional analysis of the computer in every artwork.
3.1.1. M.I.I.A.A.
(M) – Medium:
This is a relatively simple inspection as the entire research deals with a “Turing-complete medium”.
The research will first locate “Turing-completeness” in the work, potentially both in hardware and 
software, and confirm that it functions as a medium in the work. This is likely to be tautological as 
every work runs on or was made with a computer, and my definition of medium from the previous 
chapter – “A medium of a work of art is any container of the work's informational content at any 
time during a work's production” – is also almost definitional in respect of computational 
functioning. Once the “Turing-completeness” in the practice is located, how it appears to function – 
how digital information flows through or is processed – in the work is discussed. Other types of 
‘information’ in the work, especially that which might be processed by systems not proven to be 
computable (such as a human brain), are not necessarily analyzed. 
(I) - Interface:
Phaedra Shanbaum states that “interface” is “the term originally given by computer scientists to 
both the hardware and software embedded in a physical object that enables humans to use 
technology” (Shanbaum, 2017). Here I mean “interface” as a subset of this definition, perhaps best 
said as the software and/or programming interface on a computer that an artist utilized in the 
creation of the work. This is also analogous to the term “User Interface” that is employed in the 
industrial design field of HCI (Human-Computer Interaction), with the understanding that the only 
user is me, and in respect of the creation of the practice. My use of the term “interface” specifically 
does not mean what Shanbaum describes as the ways “Artists and scholars have creatively 
appropriated the term”. The purpose of Interface as one of the analytical frames of reference in this 
chapter is to, once Turing-completeness has been located in the work, allow consideration of issues 
such as the artist's interface to that Turing-completeness, whether the interface is Turing-complete 
itself, and how an interface’s properties in relation to Turing-completeness might have shaped the 
creation of the practice. 
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(I) - Intention:
Here I use “intention” to mean “authorial intention” in the tradition of literary criticism and 
philosophy, especially in relation to the revival of various forms and understandings of 
“Intentionalism” that have appeared over the last twenty years (Iseminger 1996, Carrol 2000, 
Levinson 2006, Gover 2012). The research is aided in this application to computational processes 
by the work of Geoff Cox, who argues in Speaking Code for literary readings of code via an 
understanding of code as “utterance” – a familiar term within literary criticism (Cox and McLean, 
2013). One reason for using this Intention as a frame of reference is thematic and stems from some 
of my oldest interests in computer-based art: while still an undergrad in the 1990’s I made the claim 
that “…’made with Macromedia’ gives Macromedia credit on a conceptual level to anything made 
with their software…” (P. Davis, 1999) in relation to artists using what was then known as 
Macromedia Director and Flash in the production of their work, and Macromedia’s “Made with 
Macromedia” logo requirements (adobe.com, 2006). 
A more specific and technical reason for this application of Intention as a frame of reference, and 
especially the idea of Intention as key in any analysis of computer-based art, can be found in a break
from one particular understanding articulated in Speaking Code: that code “says what it does and 
does what it says” (Cox and McLean, 2013). In many cases that is not accurate; code (and therefore 
computer-based art) easily “says what it does not do” and also “does not do what it says”, and 
‘Intention’ provides a lens for examination. For a specific example drawn from Speaking Code 
itself, consider the trivial program “hello-network.py” from the first chapter:
> hello-network.py
#!/usr/bin/python
# A script for greeting every server on the Internet.
import iptools, httplib
for ip in iptools.IpRangeList('0.0.0.0/0'):
try:
print "Greeting " + ip
cx = httplib.HTTPConnection("%s:80" % ip)
cx.request("POST", '/', "message=Hello+world!")
except:
pass
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Here the work and its author claim (or “utter”) that it is a “script for greeting every server on the 
Internet”. When executed, the code invokes Python’s iptools and httplib libraries to send 
HTTP requests to every address in the IPV4 range. This activity first needs to be given the benefit 
of the doubt, in that such a slow implementation of the traversing of the entire IPV4 range would 
likely take months, possibly much longer (for a much faster implementation of this idea, the 
MASSCAN (2018) program can scan the entire IPV4 range in under five minutes when provided 
enough bandwidth). More importantly, “every server on the Internet” is unfortunately not addressed
by IPV4, so the utterance of the work is ultimately false. One can easily think of servers sitting 
behind NATs or running as onion “hidden services” which are unreachable on the public Internet, 
but more obviously there is the entire IPV6 address range of the public Internet as well, whose 
theoretical address space dwarfs that of IPV4. loopsofzen.co.uk, redruler.ru, and ipv6.l.google.com 
are some of many tens of thousands (and possibly millions) of servers that would not be said 
“hello” to by hello-network.py. These servers are certainly on the public Internet, however 
they only use IPV6 for their addressing and this can be demonstrated by visiting them in any web 
browser and observing that their domains names are resolved by the IPV6 DNS protocol 
exclusively. Speaking Code therefore provides both an incredibly cogent argument for code as 
utterance, which I’m grateful to be able to employ, and examples of where a follow-on examination 
of literary “authorial intent” (which is not discussed in the book in this way) might be useful. So 
here I use intention to mean the “authorial intention” of an artist as understood within the 
framework of “Moderate Actual Intentionalism” (Gover, 2012), and the research can inspect a 
relationship between that intention and the actual computational processes that are activated by the 
work. 
(A) - Authorization:
I use the term “Authorization” to examine permissions, mostly legal but to some extent conceptual, 
relative to the computational processes in a work. This can include an examination of permissions 
governing the access to or usage of a computer in the work such as those pursuant to the UK’s 
Computer Misuse Act (1990), permissions governing the modification of code/instructions in a 
work such as those pursuant to various software EULAs or “End User License Agreements”, and 
permissions governing the copyright of any information being processed by a Turing-machine in the
work such as that pursuant to the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998).
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A) - Abstraction:
Here, “Abstraction” refers to the specific “level of abstraction” or “abstraction layer” of a computer 
system as utilized in computer science. The term has also been borrowed by philosophers that used 
the computing concept as a starting point (Floridi, 2003), and while it would be tempting to use the 
philosophical framework, I will stick with the original. Tanenbaum (1979) offers the now-standard 
five abstraction layer model of single computer architecture that the research will employ in its 
analysis of how art functions as or in a computing system. In our Abstraction analysis we will be 
looking to find at which abstraction layer the artwork 'lives'. 
Layer 5 - OS & Applications
Layer 4 - Kernel
Layer 3 - Assembler
Layer 2 - Firmware
Layer 1 - Hardware
Fig 3.1 – Abstraction Layer Model from Tanenbaum (1979)
Where possible, the research will also examine the nature of an artwork's Abstraction Layer(s) – 
whether the layer itself provides Turing-completeness and whether it is an interface from the artist's 
perspective.
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3.2 “N.O.S. (No Operating System)”
Fig 3.2 – a rather poor photo of N.O.S v.0.1 installed at the NEXT Fair, Chicago, 2008. It’s
unfortunately the only one I have.
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Fig 3.3 – screen capture of N.O.S. v 0.1 running in the Virtualbox x86 emulator
Narrative Description:
N.O.S (P. Davis, 2008) is an intervention into the modern day PC operating system, coded in 
assembly language. It is an exploration of access to the “hardware” of a contemporary PC and uses 
standard PC hardware architecture, and to produce it I learned x86 (PC) assembly and studied the 
low-level functionality of contemporary PCs (as of 2008). This included BIOS routines, hardware 
interrupts and the Master Boot Records of mass storage devices. These are the types of systems that 
work together when a computer “boots”, or is turned on, initializes its hardware, and looks for 
instructions to execute (Minasi, 2004). I learned that by situating my own instructions in very 
specific places, the computer will execute them, and only them, instead of the Operating System 
which is normally installed on its hard-drive.
The basic NOS code is a small piece of x86 assembly language that will execute from any 
computer’s “boot sector”, and which has a very limited functionality – hence the title of the work. 
In general, all the versions of N.O.S. that I've made do a similar thing: the computer will draw text 
characters to the screen and then loop forever with the text staying in place. The computer does not 
load a ‘real’ OS that would perform any of the functions that are normally expected of an OS. There
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is no GUI or command line, no Internet connectivity, and there aren't even any applications. There 
is just the text – usually white in color – on a black screen.
N.O.S. itself is included on the attached USB media. It is a file of compiled x86 machine code and 
can be transferred to a floppy disk or hard drive and run on a PC provided the PC’s hardware 
provides BIOS functionality, run inside a program such as Virtualbox or KVM/QEMU which 
provide x86 and BIOS virtualization, explored using the “hex editor” software that is also included 
on the attached USB media, or examined in any other way that the reader deems appropriate.
Medium:
The work is a set of machine code, compiled from x86 assembly code, that can be executed by a 
x86 CPU in combination with PC-compatible hardware. The x86 assembly language is Turing-
complete, and using the colloquial understanding of Turing-completeness, so is any x86 processor 
(Intel, 2014). Worth noting is that while the code/informational content is embedded and distributed
in a particular physical material (in this case a floppy disk), it would be difficult to consider that 
content as natively human-readable when embedded in any material, so the code must be activated 
by the machine to function. That is to say, neither the assembly source code or the compiled binary 
function on their own as a readable artwork. As the x86 CPU that the program is written for, and 
must be executed on, is an approximate Universal Turing Machine, the work clearly involves a 
Turing-complete medium. N.O.S. is perhaps a useful example of a work for a contemporary Turing-
complete medium, in that systems with x86 CPUs and BIOS compatible hardware are currently 
ubiquitous, come in a range of configurations which make no difference to the code, and are widely 
emulated.   
Abstraction:
N.O.S. lives at Layer 3 – Assembly – in Tanenbaum's Abstraction Layer Model. This is not 
necessarily because it was coded in an “assembly language”, but rather because the Assembly layer 
is the immediate layer ‘above’ the Firmware layer, and the compiled code of N.O.S interacts with 
the Firmware of a PC. In the case of modern PC's, the firmware is the BIOS, a hardware ROM chip 
that contains permanent programs that give access to low level functionality of the computer's other 
hardware (Minasi, 2004). In practical terms, N.O.S. interfaces directly with the BIOS to draw the 
text characters to the computer's screen just as the Abstraction Layer Model illustrates that Layer 3 
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interfaces with Layer 2. Although code that would implement the higher levels of the model (4, 5, 
etc) might exist on the hard-drive of a computer, they aren't part of N.O.S. because they aren't 
loaded into memory when N.O.S. executes in place of an installed operating system. That they don't
exist from N.O.S.'s perspective doesn't have any effect on the placement of N.O.S. in the 
Abstraction Layer Model. Of all of the Practice, N.O.S. perhaps holds a position that most closely 
matches a single layer in the Abstraction Layer Model.
Interface:
The work consists of compiled instructions coded for a x86 CPU and data that is processed by those
instructions. My interface to the CPU was, conceptually, x86 assembly language as it's the language
I used to create the work. My software interface was, more directly, a “terminal emulator” program 
into which I typed the assembly language code, saved it as a file, and compiled the assembly file 
into machine code using a x86 compiler. As x86 assembly is a Turing-complete language, my 
interface to the work – “the software and/or programming interface on a computer that an artist 
utilized in the creation of the work” – is by definition Turing-complete as well. 
Intention:
N.O.S. is written in x86 assembly language, which means that every individual code instruction I 
wrote is a mnemonic for a single machine-language instruction that the CPU executes. Using 
assembly language allows the code to embody an explicit sort of authorial intention in the sense that
I am able to say with confidence that the work involves only the code which I’ve written, nothing 
more and nothing less. There are no libraries, modules, API’s, operating systems calls or kernels, 
written by other parties, for this code to import, reference, or employ. There is also a “one to one” 
relationship between my specifications (the code) and the individual actions that the CPU executes 
in the “real world”. This contrasts with more common ways of using contemporary computers 
whereby the authorial intention of, say, a large software company like Adobe is embodied by 10 
million of lines of Adobe Photoshop code (Shustek, 2012), and the authorial intention of an even 
larger company like Apple is embodied by over 80 million lines of code of the macOS operating 
system (McCandless, 2013), which together might provide the interface and application employed 
by a user/artist for their computer-based work.
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N.O.S. also foregrounds questions about intention embedded in hardware vs. intention embedded in
software, and this is worth examining in some detail. It's a clear issue in the work because N.O.S. is 
the only work in the research that will rely on a direct and exclusive interface with the Abstraction 
Model Layer 2 – the firmware. Hardware is seemingly a ‘thing’ while software is seemingly 
‘instructions’, although certainly hardware is made by another hand and exists to be used in a 
certain way. The instructions of software might seem to communicate potentially more or multiple 
meanings by the simple fact that computers are re-programmable via software while the hardware is
normally static: computers ask for code and its authorial intention to be executed ON the hardware.
However, firmware can straddle the boundary between hardware and software, and this is certainly 
the case with N.O.S. Something like a PC's BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) is a good example 
here. When a modern PC is turned on, the BIOS takes control of the system and does something 
called a POST or “Power-On Self Test” (Minasi, 2004). It then passes control to code called a “boot
loader” which normally then passes control to the operating system (the way N.O.S. functions is by 
being placed at the normal location of the boot loader, so N.O.S. grabs control before anything else 
can). However, the BIOS is fundamentally also code, it just happens to be code held in a hardware 
ROM chip – much like the code that runs the Nintendo NES cartridge works. Modern BIOS chips 
can now even be “flashed” (re-programmed) and this is also true of much modern firmware. Rather 
than being discrete pieces of ‘fixed’ hardware such as a USB connector or a capacitor, BIOS chips 
are more like fixed pieces of software contained within a hardware shell. So while I might claim a 
more singular intentionality in the work as reflected by the close relationship between the code I 
created and the operations the CPU undertakes, that intentionality is also now potentially affected 
by the BIOS when the N.O.S. machine code uses BIOS routines. In other words, to examine 
intention in the work, in terms of what exactly the computer does as a system, not just as a x86 
CPU, I really must also look at the use of the BIOS as well. 
The code that has been “burned” into the BIOS is usually written by the manufacturer of the 
motherboard of whatever computer one uses, although traditionally there were companies who 
specialized in creating BIOS chips – Phoenix and AMI are the specialist BIOS producers I've come 
across most often. Even while there are a range of companies that might have produced a given 
BIOS, the BIOS code must fit to a published standard (BIOS Boot Specification, 1996) so that, for 
example, whenever a certain interrupt is triggered, the same thing happens to the machine 
regardless of what specific machine or BIOS it is. The development of these non-IBM but still PC-
compatible BIOS chips is also an interesting case of a “clean room” emulation, employed to escape 
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copyright restrictions. IBM owned the code of their proprietary BIOS chips, and in a famous 
example, Phoenix Technologies hired a team of engineers to study an IBM BIOS chip and write a 
natural language specification of its functioning. Phoenix then hired a separate team of engineers 
with no previous knowledge of the IBM BIOS to take that specification and create with new code 
something that would implement it. At the end of this process, they had their own BIOS code that 
completely emulated the IBM BIOS but was independently generated, and as a result it could be 
produced and sold commercially without the threat of copyright violations (Schwartz, 2001). 
All the issues of bugs and ‘un-intentional’ code appear to apply here: BIOSes can have subtle bugs 
and are almost never open-source. Luckily these bugs typically only surface when the BIOS deals 
with complicated Operating System interactions which of course I've entirely removed with N.O.S. 
This means that while I may not be certain what exact computer instructions the BIOS contains, I 
can be generally certain of what the system will do. That is to say, that N.O.S. will probably never 
crash or be put into an un-intended state. It will also probably never be hacked because there is no 
interface to any re-programmable functionality short of having physical access to the work itself. 
Authorization:
Authorization is, perhaps surprisingly, not much of an issue in this work. Even though the PC that 
runs N.O.S. appears to behave in a way that is dissimilar to most PCs, and it appears this way as a 
result of running very different code, there are no legal or copyright-related boundaries crossed in 
the work’s production or execution. This is mostly a result of IBM's decision in the early 1980s to 
publish the architecture of their personal computer designs, which the burgeoning home computer 
industry then accepted as a standard (BIOS Boot Specification, 1996). IBM’s idea behind this 
decision was to allow a software industry to flourish for IBM’s personal computer hardware, which 
would then cause more demand for their hardware. In the end it didn't exactly work out the way 
IBM had anticipated (Halfhill, 1986), but what it did do was provide an open framework for home 
computer development.
So while it's true that N.O.S. interrupts the 'normal' booting of a computer's operating system and 
removes almost all functionality from any computer that it's run on, those actions are all expressly 
authorized. That is, it’s within accepted practice to run whatever code you want on your PC-
compatible hardware thanks to the open design specification of IBM. IBM’s open hardware 
specification also contrasts with the tight control that a company like Nintendo holds over their 
hardware. By running any software at all on a Nintendo machine that isn’t licensed by Nintendo, a 
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user violates Nintendo’s copyright even though all Nintendo machines are, like all PC-compatibles, 
Turing-complete general purpose computers at their core. So, as the laptop shown in Figure 3.2 is 
my own PC-compatible machine, I am authorized to run any code on it, including N.O.S. As I also 
wrote the code and the code does not process any copyrighted material, there are no other copyright 
issues. There may have been a copyright issue if, for example, I had decided to reverse-engineer a 
particular PC's BIOS and modify its copyrighted code, but as N.O.S. sits by itself at Layer 3, on top 
of the firmware/BIOS and hardware, it's more or less 'anything goes'.
3.3 Compression Studies 
Narrative Description:
The Compression Studies are a series of single-channel video works, created by manipulating data 
in pre-existing video files that were sourced from Youtube and P2P networks. The sourced video 
files were already compressed by what are known as "lossy" video compression “codecs”,  
programs used to shrink a video file’s size by processing the video stream in a way which makes the
compression (and resulting data loss) tolerable to human perception. In this usage of standard 
codecs, the Compression Studies are explorations of the ‘software’ of a contemporary computing 
system. The compression codecs used in the Compression Studies all employed a “keyframing” 
system, in which a particular frame of video (called the keyframe) has information for every pixel 
in the image, and a number of subsequent frames (called delta frames) only have information for the
differences between them in respect of the keyframe (Noe, 2006). The frames in the video stream 
are usually a sequence of delta frames until the stream arrives at the next keyframe – the keyframe 
becomes a ‘reset’ of sorts. When I manipulated a keyframe, all the delta frames that referenced it 
then used this manipulated data without question, and therefore displayed new and different visual 
material when the video played. I also manipulated the video files by simply removing keyframes, 
which again made the delta frames display different material than their original encoding specified. 
In this case they displayed the difference between them and a frame that doesn't exist anymore 
(since I'd deleted it) as they look back to an earlier frame that the codec displays as the keyframe. 
The visual displays of these manipulated frames are the aesthetic effects I exploited in the work 
(Moody, 2009). The Compression Study works are included on the attached USB media. They can 
be viewed using any video playback software that can display AVI formatted video files.
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Fig 3.4 - Compression Study 1, Untitled Data Mashup (Davis and Ciocci, 2007), also known as
“umbrella zombie datamosh mistake”
Fig 3.4 is a still image taken from Compression Study 1, Untitled Data Mashup (Davis and Ciocci, 
2007), that shows an example of a “delta frame” displaying the difference between it and a frame 
that has been removed from the video stream. Previous visual material that would normally have 
been completely wiped from the video stream by a keyframe is still visible, and later delta frames in
the stream now use that material in the instantaneous generation of the current video stream 
imagery per the specification of the video codec. Compression Study 1 employs a keyframe-
removal technique to visually ‘fold’ back and forth between two separate sets of visual imagery, one
taken from the music video for the Rihanna song “Umbrella” (Rihanna, 2007), the other taken from 
the music from the music video for The Cranberries song “Zombie” (The Cranberries, 1994). As an 
aside, the posting of this work to Youtube in 2007 under the spontaneous title of “umbrella zombie 
datamosh mistake” inadvertently coined the term “datamoshing”, which became the definitive 
vernacular term for the intentional and creative application of these sorts of compression artifacts, 
although I also coined the relatively uninspired term “compression aesthetics” which is sometimes 
used to describe the same thing (Menkman, 2011). A similar example of a keyframe-removal 
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technique is given in the following image, taken from Compression Study 3, Superfreaks (P. Davis, 
2007).
Fig 3.5 – Still from Compression Study 3 - Superfreaks
Video compression is often based on temporal motion across a video stream’s frames. The reason 
for this is simple: consider a video stream in which nothing ‘happens’ and every frame is exactly the
same. The stream simply doesn’t need to describe all the information in every frame, it could in 
theory just describe the first frame and then encode every other frame with a single bit of 
information indicating that the content of the frame does not change from the previous one. This 
example would save a massive amount of data in a description of the video file, and is conceptually 
similar to many types of video compression, especially those that use keyframing systems. It means 
that a focus of the video codec’s computational power involves analysis and compression of motion 
across frames of a video stream, as motion generally is more difficult to compress than areas of the 
image that stay relatively still across sequential frames in the stream. This ends up being the reason 
why, when a keyframe is manipulated or deleted, the visual results will often suggest the ‘motion’ 
of what's going on across the delta frames as a sort of “flowing” of color and image of the supposed
keyframe (Moody 2009). There were other types of manipulations I also developed as well, one in 
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particular fed randomized data into specific frames of the video stream. This visually generated a 
series of seemingly random, free-flowing color blocks as the codec dealt with the randomized data 
in the same way it deals with video data in its normal structure.
Fig 3.6 – Compression Study 2 – Untitled fight thing (Davis 2007), using the technique of injecting
a keyframe with randomized data
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Fig 3.7, an example of another variation of randomized data injected into a keyframe, still image
from Compression Study 4 - Barney
One way to think of an uncompressed video is as a video in which every frame is a keyframe. There
are no delta frames, no reduction of the information that delta frames provide (i.e. no compression), 
hence deleting or manipulating any frame has no knock-on effect in this system. Video compression
codecs most often decide for themselves which frames are keyframes when they encode a file, and 
there can be file size economy benefits to having certain frames as keyframes in any given video 
file. Some codecs perform an analysis to find efficient keyframe locations as they compress, some 
just drop a keyframe in every X number of frames (DivX Max Keyframe Interval, 2007). What can 
be of interest to an artist is that there are different ways to conceptually approach working with 
these systems once you know how the keyframes work and where they can be placed. If you want 
you can just deal with those (key)frames where/as they are, as if you are using found footage. You 
can also re-encode a video and define for yourself where the keyframes are, perhaps with the 
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assumed purpose of then manipulating them once they are in place. This is a way to show your 
'hand' and is something I employed in the compression studies: I knew I wanted certain things to 
happen at certain times, and I re-encoded the videos with instructions for keyframes to be 
implemented at those times, with the intention to manipulate them later once in place. I also found it
interesting to shoot my own video with the keyframe structure conceptually shaping the footage – in
a sense imagining potential compression manipulations as I shot. The imagery can then become 
structured around future manipulations, and this is something I've experimented with but was not 
part of the Compression Studies series.
Medium:
All of the Compression Studies are fundamentally ‘flat’ sets of data, in that there are no 
‘instructions’ or executable code in the work. The work is a set of data I've modified from the set of 
data I started with, and that, following modification, is then read by an existing and unmodified 
program running on an approximate Universal Turing-machine. Considering the idea of an 
information “container” in the works, the information comprising the work is held in one place – 
the AVI format video files themselves that make up the Compression Studies. With the 
Compression Studies it makes sense that, while the specific file which contains informational 
content is the video data file, this informational content is, as with N.O.S., unreadable to a human 
without being acted upon by a specific program. Therefore, the computer must be activated in the 
work. When a computer with the requisite program is activated, it reads, stores and processes the 
data I've modified – again we can call this system a container of informational content. As we know,
any general-purpose computer is an approximate Universal Turing Machine, so at some level there 
is a Turing-complete medium in the work. 
Interface:
All of the manipulations of video file data were done inside a “hex editor” (HxD, 2015), a type of 
program that allows the editing of any part of any data in a file, regardless of the intended context of
the file. That is, whether a file is a “text file” with, for example, data mostly representing lecture 
notes, or a compiled executable file such as the one that would run Microsoft Word, or any other 
type of file, a Hex Editor will open it, display its “raw” data, and let a user change that data. Figure 
3.8 below shows a screen capture of the HxD hex editor with three files open: in one tab is the 
Windows “ntdlll.dll” file which contains the Windows NT kernel functions, in another tab is the 
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Explorer.exe executable program which is the Windows GUI file explorer, and in the top tab is 
“Hard Disk 1”, a representation of the underlying hard disk of the machine that has been opened as 
a ‘file’, giving direct access to its raw data.
Fig 3.8 - HxD Hex Editor, screenshot
Here, as the hex editor is the only application I used in the creation of the work, it’s fair to call the 
hex editor my interface to the machine. As the hex editor program itself is not Turing-complete – it 
has limited programmable instructions and no ‘memory’ – my interface in the Compression Studies 
generally is not Turing-complete. In addition, as the software/codec necessary for AVI file playback 
is somewhat of a 'black box' to me, it necessitated a 'trial-and-error' approach that the hex editor is 
suitable for. I would change a value in the video/data file, observe what happened when that data 
file was run through the AVI playback algorithm, note down my observations, and then repeat, 
eventually drawing out patterns of how a given codec visually interpreted certain data. While the 
hex editor application itself is limited in functionality, the trial-and-error method I used is also a set 
of instructions which, in theory, could have been automated. I am not capable of proving it 
(certainly other researchers might be), but it is interesting to consider that perhaps I acted the part of
a Turing-machine as I created the work. 
111
Intention:
The Compression Studies are constructed at a "high level" in respect of the Abstraction Layer 
Model which means that they are part of a system that fully includes a range of other technologies. 
The interventions into the video/data files also happen at this “high” level, as the hex editor is a 
program running in an application-layer GUI, and a particular work, Superfreaks (P. Davis, 2007) 
would be useful to look at due to its singular gesture: one particular type of data manipulation was 
made, in increasing frequency over time, to keyframes in a single video file originally downloaded 
from Youtube. What this meant in terms of process is that any authorial intention of mine that was 
embodied by the code of the resulting video file was limited to that which arose from actions of a 
single computational gesture X (the particular type of keyframe modification used in Superfreaks), 
at time Y, on top of the background of existing material Z (the existing Rick James video file). This 
repeated use of a single gesture X, the only used in Superfreaks, and which results in the same 
‘type’ of visual imagery, possibly allows a viewer to more linearly understand a relationship 
between computational interventions in the video stream and their visual expression compared to 
the other Compression Studies which use a variety of interventions/gestures.
However, the exact imagery seen in all the Compression Studies, Superfreaks included, is due to 
actions of the video codec which I do not exactly understand or ‘intend’ as I certainly am not its 
author. I'm aware of several different types of computational actions that create specific types of 
visual expressions by manipulating video file data, and I can create those actions at specific times in
given video streams. But I do not know exactly what imagery will arise out of a given manipulation 
of a given video stream until I see the resulting new stream played back, and even when I do see it, 
I don't always know exactly how or why a given pixel ended up moving or changing color the way 
that it did. This is what I referred to as the “black box” nature of the codec in the previous section 
on Interface. My intention here then possibly has a wider or more ‘macro’ sort of scope, in parallel 
with the high level of abstraction at which the Compression Studies operate. The relationship of my 
authorial intention to exact code that the computer executes it also nebulous – there are quite likely 
many other things going in the tens of millions of lines of code being executed by the average 
computer that plays back one of the Compression Studies – and this is in stark contrast to something
like N.O.S., or any of the Nintendo Hacks, where every pixel is specifically placed or turned on by 
a specific executable instruction that I've written ‘by hand’. 
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Level of Abstraction:
The Compression Studies all clearly live at Layer 5 – the OS/Application layer – in Tanenbaum's  
Model (Tanenbaum, 1979). The model is helpful in that we can use it to see how the work relies on 
all the layers below it to execute, but I think more detail is needed from the Model in this case. By 
lumping OS & Applications together into one layer it becomes hard to distinguish between them, 
and those two elements often comprise millions and millions of lines of code (they can be more 
complex than all of the underlying layers, and this wasn't necessarily the case in the late 70's when 
Tanenbaum developed his model). I will then make an addition to the model, Layer 5.1, which 
‘lives’ just above the Operating System and separates Applications from the Operating Systems that 
they run on (and which live at 5.0). 
Layer 5.1    Application <--> Codec
  |
  |
Layer 5.0 OS
Here our "application" is the video player, sharing information with the codec at Layer 5.1 (the 
codec is essentially an algorithm to display AVI format video files). The outputs of Layer 5.1 are 
then sent down to the Operating System at 5.0 which sends decoded and formatted data to the video
memory for display. I understand the Compression Studies as also living at Layer 5.1 in this 
amended model as they are provided as data input to and processed by the video player application. 
Also, as the Compression Studies consist of (video) data files and not executable instructions, they 
aren't tied to a particular architecture. The final data format of all of the studies was an AVI file 
viewable on any contemporary computer with a video player program and correct codec installed. 
It's worth remembering that these codecs are not developed or provided by me, they normally are 
part of the software of an assumed playback system, and both the production and playback of the 
work relies on them completely. 
Authorization:
There is no executable code in the piece, and the piece involves no proprietary reverse-engineering, 
so there are no authorization considerations of the data itself or usage of/access to a computer. There
are, however, copyright considerations in all of the Compression Studies as they all use preexisting 
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imagery and sound. For example: the music video for Rick James's (1981) hit single "Super Freak" 
is used in Compression Study #3, Superfreaks (P. Davis, 2007), and portions of Matthew Barney’s 
Cremaster cycle are used in Compression Study #4, Barney (P. Davis, 2007). I uploaded copies of 
all the Compression Studies to my Youtube account in 2009 and the Youtube ‘community’ (I use the
term ironically) had an issue with one of them. An attempt to view Superfreaks on Youtube 
currently displays a message that "This video contains content from UMG, who has blocked it on 
copyright grounds." (Youtube, 2015). Although I don't agree with UMG's implied position – that it 
does not find Superfreaks a case of fair use, although the source material I've appropriated has been 
significantly altered – I have not contested the copyright claim, mostly because UMG’s copyright 
claim has had no effect on Superfreaks being shown in any other venue aside from Youtube.
Fig 3.9 – excerpted artist notes used in the production of the Compression Studies, from Structures
Found: Structures Lost exhibition
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3.4 Untitled (2009)
Fig 3.10 – screen capture from Untitled (P. Davis 2009)
Narrative Description:
Untitled (P. Davis, 2009), as I offer it, is a unique Nintendo NES game cartridge that can be inserted
into any Nintendo NES to be run. It is an exploration of computer “re-programmability”, in the 
sense that the NES system as originally provided by Nintendo is, in both technical and legal senses, 
not designed to run user-created code. Yet, inside the NES is a CPU which can, of course, run any 
code one can get to it. Nintendo NES cartridges typically contain two ROM chips. One chip, called 
the “PRG-ROM”, contains the “program code” or the compiled binary code that ‘runs’ the game. 
The second chip, often called the “CHR-ROM” chip, contains the “graphics data”, mostly arranged 
in the form of 8×8 pixel “tiles” that are drawn to the screen as the backgrounds and characters of the
game by the code stored in the PRG-ROM (NES Reference Guide, 2015). In this work, the original 
PRG-ROM containing a game’s program code has been removed and replaced with a pin-
compatible EPROM chip that contains my own code for the artwork. The CHR-ROM containing 
115
the game’s graphics data, in this case that of the “Zelda 2: The Adventure of Link” NES game, has 
been left unmodified and this data will be used to generate the work’s imagery.
The imagery itself is an appropriation and modification of the “title screen” of the Zelda 2 game. In 
the original game, there are additional logos, scrolling text, and a soundtrack combined with the 
imagery of the sword and background, and they all disappear once a player presses the “START” 
button on an NES controller to commence gameplay. In Untitled, I’ve isolated the sword and 
surrounding imagery, and I display them silently on their own as a short loop with twinkling stars 
and moving water in the background. I did this by identifying the specific graphic data on the CHR-
ROM that the Zelda 2 game code was using to draw its title screen, and I wrote my own small 
program to do nothing but display that particular data, and so this modified version of the title 
screen is then the entire visual imagery of the work. As a result, there also is no Zelda 2 ‘game’ 
anymore, although the game’s code has itself has not been modified – it just has been discarded in 
the work entirely and replaced with code that is quite simple in comparison. Also when exhibiting 
the work I often date it as (2001/2009) - I have a huge amount of unfinished work and fragments of 
code from my previous practice as part of BEIGE, and this piece was created for the research in 
2009 starting from a code fragment that dated from 2001.
The work itself is included as a .NES format ‘image’, consisting of compiled 6502 code plus NES 
formatted graphics data, in a single file on the attached USB media. It can be run in one of the 
Nintendo NES “emulators” that are also provided on the attached USB media, it can be inspected in
the hex editor that is also provided on the attached USB media, or it can examined in any other way 
that the reader deems appropriate.
Medium:
There is an approximate Universal Turing Machine in this work: the Nintendo Entertainment 
System. The Nintendo’s 6502 CPU is Turing-complete (Cushman, 1975) in combination with the 
NES's system memory and the system provides a means for the CPU to store and retrieve 
information (NES Reference Guide, 2015). 
However, if the work is just the cartridge – i.e. the work is only the encoding of instructions that 
will never be executed by a NES (our Turing-complete machine) – then a Turing-machine might not
be a medium in the work, because it’s not really needed by any viewer/participant. Put another way, 
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if the program itself is privileged over the execution of the program, the necessity of a Turing-
machine as part of the work is an open question. It's certainly conceivable that an Artwork can 
consist of instructions on their own terms, Sol Lewitt's Wall Drawings come to mind as an obvious 
example (Lewitt, 1987). But Lewitt's work functions whether his instructions are executed or not. 
Even if his work is considered as a program for a biological Turing-machine (i.e. a human with 
some pencils), the instructions themselves are already readable to a general audience and seem to 
have meaning on their own terms as solely a textual proposition for a drawing. It would appear to 
not really matter if a biological Turing-machine executes the instructions or constructs the drawing 
when the instructions themselves can stand on their own. Likewise, when members of the 
contemporary art “world” exchange examples of Lewitt’s Wall Drawings, for example by selling 
one, actual ‘drawings’ do not change hands, what change hands are pieces of paper with the written 
instructions on them.
With Untitled, its machine instructions are not human-readable, partly because they exist as 
machine-code and partly because they are housed in ROM chips in a cartridge and not part of any 
display. This suggests that the NES, our Turing-machine, must be activated in the work. Once 
activated it appears to also perform the functions of reading code and graphics data off the cartridge
(I know that because I put them there!), and then storing and processing them until it is de-activated
(turned off). This fits the definition of a “container of informational content”, and as the NES 
system is Turing-complete, it functions (more or less tautologically at this point) as a Turing-
complete medium in the work. 
Interface:
Examining the artist's (i.e. my) interface to the construction of the work reveals a strong similarity 
to N.O.S. and the interfaced examined in it, namely, assembly language. The only major difference 
between the interface of N.O.S. and Untitled is that with N.O.S. the work consists of compiled 
instructions coded for a x86 CPU, whereas with Untitled the work consists of compiled instructions 
coded for a 6502 CPU. Just as with N.O.S. my interface was, more directly, a “terminal emulator” 
program into which I typed the assembly language code and compiled the assembly into the 
machine code which runs Untitled. And like x86 assembly language, 6502 assembly language is 
Turing-complete, therefore like N.O.S., Untitled was created using a Turing-complete interface.
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Intention:
In any of my or BEIGE’s Nintendo hacks, one could say that authorial intention is embedded in a 
‘direct’ way due to the use of low level programming. Regardless of whether the PRG-ROM, the 
CHR-ROM, or both are replaced and/or their contents modified, the new data that the original ROM
data is being replaced with is either machine code generated from assembly language or directly 
edited 8-bit graphics data. In all cases the artwork, as new program/data to be inserted into the 
Nintendo, is running “close to the metal" (i.e. with no operating system or other software in 
between). In the case of Untitled, as I've written my own code in assembly language, everything 
that a viewer/participant might see on the screen happens because I’ve created individual and 
specific machine instructions for it to happen on the screen – again, similar to the way the code of 
N.O.S. operates. This is something closer to a ‘singular’ example of authorial intention in the work, 
in that there is no other code, and therefore no other “speech acts”, involved in the production, 
exhibition or activation of the work.
The relationship between the instructions I’ve specified that the machine execute, and the 
instructions that it actually does execute, is a very close one. There are exactly zero machine 
instructions that the NES CPU executes that my code did not exactly and explicitly tell it to, and 
every instruction that it does execute, I specified in each instance by coding them individually using
single assembly language mnemonics. Any artist employing any higher-level programming 
language – Perl, Python, Javascript, C, whatever – or, for example, using any application running on
any operating system cannot claim this type of granular control over their own authorial intention as
embedded in their computer-based art (this includes elements of the Practice that were not created 
by coding directly in assembly or machine code, such as the Compression Studies). To put it simply,
art created in such a way triggers code to execute and computational processes to happen that the 
author(s) of the work did not particularly specify.
It’s also worth referring back to Sean Cubitt’s idea that all digital art is “unknowable” (Cubitt, 
2016), in that this work disproves the argument completely. The Nintendo NES with its 8-bit 6502 
CPU and maximum 2kb of RAM, combined with the simplicity of Untitled’s code, means the entire
computational system is easily “knowable”, in Cubitt’s totalitarian sense, by any human with the 
desire to “know” it. One trade-off here is, of course, that a relatively simple system which might 
disprove Cubitt’s argument, like a Nintendo NES running Untitled, is also one that can’t ‘do’ very 
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much on its ‘surface’ compared to many other contemporary digital media systems, such as an 
Apple MacBook Pro computer running a recent version of the macOS operating system.
Of course, this strict sort of intention can’t ‘control’ or ‘involve’ every phenomenon of the work, as 
there are many which are separate from any influence of the NES’s CPU. The Nintendo’s 6502 
CPU is, after all, a particular and constrained implementation of a machine, and not a model of all 
reality (as an aside, this sort of philosophical “unknowability” of a Nintendo work, or any work, 
does not fall under Cubitt’s definition; he deals with the concept strictly in the special context of 
digital media running code, pointing out how this is different to a concept of the “unknowable” that 
could be philosophically applied to anything). To examine a specific example located in Untitled, 
take the single pixel blue ‘star’ located to the furthest left of the screen. I coded instructions in 
assembly language to put a blue pixel exactly at that location, so it is very, very likely that the star 
appears is in exactly the place it does because I wanted it there, and the machine instructions I gave 
the NES CPU that deal with the placement of that star-pixel have been exactly specified in the code 
I authored. What may or may not be expressed by this authorial intention in the code are 
phenomena such as the exact tone of the blue coming off a CRT display connected to the NES, an 
occasional flickering of the CRT which might affect the pixel, or the maximum rate at which that 
pixel might blink as I make the stars ‘twinkle’ with the code – these are often determined by 
features that have no interaction with the execution of any code in the work. Some of these 
phenomena relate to the hardware particularization of the NES system, others relate to the 
particularization of, say, any given CRT monitor connected to the NES for display. I could certainly 
try to affect some of these particularizations by, for example, acquiring a less wonky monitor to use 
in the display of the work, and these sorts of aesthetic decisions might create changes to the 
experience of the work for any viewer/participant. However, while clearly of great importance, 
these sorts of ‘surface’ aesthetic decisions have little to do with the Turing-complete medium I’m 
investigating in the research.
Abstraction:
The abstraction layer at which Untitled lives would generally be considered "low level". Referring 
back to Tanenbaum's model (Tanenbaum, 1979), in a stock Nintendo NES there is no layer 5 and no
layer 4 (NES Reference Guide, 2015), and all Nintendo Hack works can be described as sitting at 
either Layer 3 or 2. Layer 3 could be argued because the code is generated from assembly language 
and therefore fits some of Layer 3's “assembler” definition. However, I would argue that an 
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understanding of the code as residing in Layer 2 is, in a sense, more ‘correct’ for two reasons: First, 
because the assembly-generated code speaks directly to the hardware at Layer 1 as there is no BIOS
or other stored-program firmware in the NES, and second, because the code is burned into a 
hardware ROM chip it fits the definition of “firmware” itself as a type of hardware object, and it 
arguably fulfills the role of firmware in the NES system.
Authorization:
As previously mentioned, Nintendo typically enforces tight control over the ability to run code on 
any of the hardware they produce. I am not licensed and therefore authorized by Nintendo to 
execute my own code on any Nintendo system, as Nintendo claims that only they and their 
approved licensees are allowed such a privilege (Nintendo DSi EULA, 2009). In addition, I have 
modified the Nintendo cartridge used in Untitled to make Nintendo's “lockout chip”, which is their 
technical means of keeping NES systems from executing such 'un-authorized' code, ineffective. 
This is likely illegal (DMCA, 1998). However, while Nintendo does generally fight homebrew 
development, the NES is an obsolete system, and the older a system becomes the less resources that
Nintendo typically tends to use in 'protecting' it. This means that the fact that my code is 
unauthorized does not generally threaten my person or the production of any art using a NES in 
relation to that authority. There is no practical way for Nintendo to keep my code from running on 
an NES system, and I would have to assume that it's not worth their time to challenge my actions 
through legal channels – this is also assuming Nintendo even know the work exists, which seems 
unlikely. In many instances of exhibiting hacked Nintendo works, I have only experienced one 
single case where an art institution wouldn't exhibit the work because of their understanding of 
authorization as an issue. Also, the fact this legal structure is in place is often part of the how I 
contextually present the work, in that I will include curatorial text which describes how the NES is a
proprietary system against which the artwork is, in part, a response.
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3.5 The Artbox (2012-2017)
Fig 3.11 – hardware Artbox
Narrative Description:
The Artbox is a small, portable computer running open source software which is designed to host 
Internet artworks, and specifically host Internet artworks that have been censored or are otherwise 
difficult to view. It was designed as a response to two artworks, one being the work Minds of 
Concern by Knowbotic Research (2002), and the other being Assembly, a 2010 piece by Jogging 
which was created for the Jstchillin (2010) curatorial project. In both cases, Internet based artworks 
were taken offline by Internet Service Providers against the wishes of an artist.
The Artbox is then meant as a roving anti-censorship installation for Internet based artworks. In its 
hardware version, the Artbox can connect to local Wifi networks on the move, allowing its hosted 
artworks access to the Internet and viewership to an Internet audience. This presents one possible 
solution to the problem of artworks being taken down by ISP's: if the artwork simply moves to a 
different network/ISP it can be back up quite quickly. In its more recent, virtualized software 
version, the Artbox functions as a TOR “Hidden service” that only receives inbound communication
through the TOR protocol. This allows the software version of the Artbox to automatically work 
behind most NAT connections (like those employed by residential broadband services), and to 
provide relative anonymity to whoever runs the Artbox.
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The Artbox is an artwork which serves a specific, rather utilitarian function – it's just a portable 
webserver – and it’s perhaps worth asking if there’s anything particular to this functioning from 
within the context of an art practice. In other words, is there something about contemporary art 
which can change the nature of what a webserver might be? In most cases the answer is likely no. In
the hosting of contemporary art, as opposed to any other non-art content, the Artbox does not 
differentiate itself in any way from the perspective of the technologies it uses. For example, a JPG 
image file that is exhibited as Art has the same technological structure as a JPG image file that is 
not Art. Likewise, the Artbox itself, as a functioning webserver which happens to be Art, has no 
structural differences to a webserver which is not Art. The technologies used in the Artbox can also 
be easily re-purposed to allow many types of content to evade censorship, including content that 
arguably should be censored – an example here would be text files that might be seen to be racially 
inflammatory per the UK Public Order Act (1986). In a sense, this wouldn't even be re-purposing 
from a technological perspective, it would be more like 're-intentioning' from the perspective of 
whoever would set up a copy of the technologies employed by the Artbox to host anything.
In its earlier hardware configuration, the Artbox is heavily influenced by a variety of “plug” 
computer projects, specifically David Darts’s Piratebox (Darts, 2013). Plug computers are miniature
form factor computers, usually all on a single board, low power, and occasionally small enough to 
fit inside a “wall wart” mains power socket. The Piratebox is a system consisting of a plug 
computer, a Wifi router, a battery, and system software designed to provide a localized Wifi network
for anonymous file sharing and messaging. The main technological difference between Darts’s 
Piratebox and the Artbox is their respective interactions with the Internet. Darts’s Piratebox stays 
off the Internet and is used for local communication only. The Artbox needs to be on the Internet as 
much as possible, and to that end I've customized software in order to allow it to pass information 
through some of the Wifi protections and “firewalls” that one routinely finds on networks (Comer, 
1995).
In its more recent, virtualized software configuration, the Artbox is influenced not so much by a 
specific project, but by a variety of tutorials and instructions regarding the usage of the TOR 
software that I studied and evaluated. This version of the Artbox runs as a virtual machine in the 
Virtualbox environment, and only communicates through a HTTP server set up to exclusively use 
TOR. This allows it to serve files using the HTTP protocol, but have that protocol routed through a 
network of other computers in a way that makes it difficult to attribute the source and destination of 
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any connection. That is, where the Artbox is located in terms of its IP address, and where anyone 
who connects to it is located in terms of their IP address, becomes much more difficult to determine.
The hardware Artbox runs on a version of Debian Linux (Debian, 2015) compiled specifically for 
the ARM CPU which is found in many small devices including plug computers and the Raspberry 
Pi (Raspberry Pi, 2015). The Artbox's hard drive is any compatible USB stick – this is the host drive
for the art – and the maximum size I've had functioning is 16gb. This is enough space to host many 
art projects, however as any sort of cumulative or long-term archive it's still relatively small. The 
current hardware Artbox uses an older Pogoplug computer (Pogoplug, 2012) as its base hardware, 
but as these are becoming difficult to source and Raspberry Pi prices continue to drop, future 
hardware iterations will likely run on the Pi. The aesthetic decisions taken with the Artbox are also 
intentionally limited – it's physical appearance closely resembles an unmodified Pogoplug. This was
to reinforce that the potential power of the Artbox isn't in what it physically looked like, but in what
it computes, although this could be argued for any computing machine. Having said all this, I’ve 
also stopped all work on the hardware Artbox since 2015 and switched to focusing on the software 
version exclusively. The software Artbox runs a virtualized and customized version of Ubuntu 
Linux. It doesn’t ‘look’ like much apart from a standard Ubuntu installation when run, and it has no 
specific hardware container – it will run on any machine that can run Virtualbox. It was created 
when I realized that the TOR protocol automatically routes information through NAT systems while
automatically providing decent protection from local ISPs
I would also like to say that, in my opinion, the Artbox in either hardware or software version is 
perhaps the ‘weakest’ work in the practice. It was created more as a ‘proof of concept’ in order to 
give the practice a vehicle to explore work that was actively connected to a Network. It’s not a work
that has been exhibited outside of the research, and I’m not sure that I would exhibit it in its current 
state. In fact, some of the work that the prototype version hosted contain more interesting 
explorations of MIIAA concepts than the Artbox itself.
The hardware Artbox is not included on the attached USB media, and is represented in the practice 
by photo documentation. The software Artbox is included on the USB media as an Ubuntu Linux 
virtual machine that can be run in the Virtualbox environment, and some of the more important 
configuration code is excerpted below.
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Fig 3.12 – Linux command-line screenshot of configuration notes for software Artbox
Medium:
In both hardware and software versions, the Artbox is activated by a Turing-complete CPU – a 
physical CPU designed by ARM in the hardware version, and a simulation of a x86 CPU in the 
software version which itself, as a virtual machine, can be run on a variety of CPUs. The 
“informational content” of the Artbox resides, in a powered-off state, on the hard drive (aka the 
Turing-machine “tape”) of both physical and software Artbox machines, and this content is not 
human-readable in this state in either case. Powering the Artbox on, this informational content 
becomes activated and spread throughout the machine, and unlike any of the Practice thus far, 
offered to a network.
As the Artbox is connected to a network, and again unlike the Practice up to this point, it can be 
considered analogous to a “multiple tape” Turing-machine, not a “single-tape” machine. Also, 
unlike any of the single-tape works, it is an Art repository that contains other Artworks which are to 
be considered on their own terms. The act of containing and sharing them is part of the Artbox, 
while the contained works themselves are best considered as conceptually distinct. An important 
question here is then: as this act of sharing other works over a network is part of the Artbox, is a 
network part of the Artbox's medium? Answering this question will likely require examination of 
the state of the Artbox with and without a functioning network connection, and the research will 
look more closely at this question in the conclusions after examining additional multiple-tape 
artworks.
124
Interface:
What was the artist's (my) interface to the Turing-machine identified as a medium in the work? In 
this case it's a complicated question, as the Turing-machine itself – the Artbox – relies on millions 
of lines of code, none of which I wrote, but some of which I had to configure using instructions in a 
“high level” programming language. Perhaps an easy answer to the question is that the artist’s 
interface to the work was Turing-complete, because much of this configuring happened with a 
command line “shell” program, specifically the Bash shell (GNU Bash, 2015), which is Turing-
complete. If I had wanted to write my own code to, for example, do the configuring for me, the 
Bash shell has that capability. However, for the most part I didn't, and I’m not sure that I ever used 
any aspect of the shell in a way that required its Turing-completeness. I typed some static 
commands into the shell that executed other programs, edited some files using a text editor, etc – 
although I did quite a lot of this to get the Artbox to function the way I wanted it to. So perhaps a 
more correct answer to the question of whether my interface was Turing-complete is “not usually”.
In a way this is true of most contemporary computing systems: anyone using a computer can in 
most cases find a Turing-complete interface to that computer if they choose to. In practice, this 
means that, for example, anyone using a macOS machine to run Adobe Illustrator can also open a 
terminal window which will give them access to things like a Turing-complete shell interface or the 
Python (Python, 2015) programming language. So, while a majority of contemporary human-
computer interactions might be done with programs that aren't Turing-complete, within most 
general-purpose computers a Turing-complete interface is often accessible somewhere in the 
background. This backgrounding of Turing-completeness was also one of the reasons for my early 
artwork’s use of obsolete 8-bit computers, because machines like the Atari 800xl and 
Commodore64, when booted, immediately displayed a command-line interface to the (Turing-
complete) BASIC programming language (P. Davis, 2001). That is, unlike contemporary personal 
computers, those machines provided a Turing-complete interface as the foreground of the user 
interface. 
Intention:
Locating my authorial intention in the computational processes of any Artbox is nebulous because 
of the huge amount of code, by many authors, that the work executes. In a nutshell, my intention is 
not directly or exclusively embedded by the code that runs the Artbox as the vast majority of the 
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code is not written by me (a quick back-of-a-napkin calculation put it at 99.9993%), and in all 
likelihood any Artbox is ‘doing’ things about which I have no idea. There is also no direct, ‘one to 
one’ relationship between logical processes I might specify in the code that I do author and any 
instructions that the CPU actually executes. This is in part because I author so little code in the 
work relative to the overall code the work executes, and in part because the code that I author is 
distant from any particular machine instruction: it consists of configuration files and shell scripts 
that are, at some point, either compiled or interpreted into machine code that I never specify myself.
In a more colloquial or loose sense of ‘intention’ there are of course numerous ways to describe an 
Artbox at a “high” level, and in such a way perhaps my artistic ‘intention’ is “for an Artbox to exist 
as a functioning, Internet-connected device that allows the distribution of other Artworks”, or 
something to that effect. The work can meet this description of ‘intention’, but in doing so, the work
still embodies a wide range of authorial intentions in the code it runs that are not mine and are 
extremely difficult to index. Thinking about the production of code in literal terms, the millions and 
millions of lines of code comprising the Linux system and applications that are running on the 
Artbox cannot have possibly been vetted in their entirety even by the people who wrote them 
(Cusumano, 2004), and my interface to this code is perhaps a configuration setting, or a “man page”
(Siever et al, 2009), if that. In practical terms, the Artbox therefore has technological capabilities 
which never even crossed my mind, yet are running as part of the system and the work: it has an 
email server, it has a printer driver running, it has ports open that I did not even think about, etc. So 
as far as I know, Artbox does the things I ‘want’, but perhaps a better description is that it does 
enough of what I want at a macro level to meet my higher-level functional goals as an Artwork. 
However, it’s difficult to be completely certain that it's also executing computational processes that 
I wouldn't want it to, and in particular, processes that might undermine the work itself in some way. 
In this analysis, the Artbox now seems more in alignment with Sean Cubitt’s understanding of 
digital art as “unknowable” compared to other elements of the practice (Cubitt, 2016).
Is the possibility that the Artbox might be executing computational processes that I don’t ‘want' it to
amplified by it being connected to a network? Simply put, yes. New code, and therefore new 
authorial intention, can be introduced into a computational system when that system is connected to 
a network, so the fact the Artbox is connected to the Internet means it's, in theory, available to be 
used in potentially alternative ways by a variety of code ‘authors’. One example would be through a
third-party’s exploitation of a software “bug”, or unintentional vulnerability, in the work. The 
standard way someone uses the Artbox is to view the Artworks in the Artbox repository, and this 
typically happens over a HTTP connection in a web browser. However, the Apache HTTP server 
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software (Apache, 2015) that is running in Linux also has a history of “bugs” just like any 
reasonably complex software program usually does. One particular bug that was discovered in the 
Apache code meant that if a carefully crafted HTTP packet was sent to any computer running 
Apache, the computer would crash (CVE-2004-0492, 2004). I would prefer that the Artbox not 
crash when it's alive on a network, yet I can't be entirely certain that the current version of Apache 
(or any of the other complex programs running on it) won't have a vulnerability of this type. In 
conclusion, while the jumping back and forth between the concepts of literary “authorial intention” 
as embedded in the Artbox’s code and a more colloquial sense of “overall” or “artistic” intention 
risks confusion in any analysis, in both articulations of the term it seems straightforward that ‘my’ 
intention in the work is less singular and more opaque because of the large amount of code that 
Artbox runs that I did not author, and because the Artbox is connected to the Internet.
Abstraction:
Identifying where the Artbox ‘lives’ in the Abstraction layer model is not a simple question, and it 
will certainly need to take into account the technical scope of the work in that it's an entire 
computing system, hardware (or hardware virtualized as software) included. I’ve already discussed 
that I didn't write the vast majority of the software included in the work, as it runs a version of the 
open-source operating system Linux. My actions in constructing the Artbox were 'macro' in the 
sense that, unlike the Nintendo hack Untitled, or the Compression Studies, there wasn't a singular 
piece of software or programming language that was a target of any intervention or construction. 
And unlike N.O.S., which is also a complete system, the Artbox has a huge amount of functionality, 
both directly related to the production of its functioning as an online art repository and tangential to 
that functioning, and I did relatively little programming to bring any of it about. What I did, in a 
technical sense, was select particular hardware (or emulated hardware), and install and configure a 
range of software to run on that hardware, including but not limited to software that provided the 
functionality I decided was necessarily in the work. As a result, the Artbox has software and 
hardware that operates in and through all levels of the Abstraction Layer model, and that were 
touched by the 'artist's hand' in a more or less equivalent and somewhat distant way.
I will propose three potential ways to look at a work like this in relation to the Abstraction Layer 
model. One is that the software operates at all layers, and I also very occasionally dipped into the 
lower layers with a configuration here or there, so we should consider the Artbox as a multi-layer 
work that lives across the Abstraction Layer Model. Another is that even though the software I 
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installed operates at all layers of the model, the interface I used for my actions was mostly at the 
highest possible layer – Layer 5. In installing and configuring the system, I was typically asked 
simple questions by installation applications running in Layer 5 such as “Do you want to install X 
software? Yes/No”. In this reading, the layer at which my ‘actions’ with running software in the 
construction of the work took place are privileged over any interpretation of where the software 
might ‘live’. The third way to look at the work is that an analysis of where the work sits in relation 
to the Abstraction Layer model makes no sense and should be ignored. Perhaps the software is 
working at all layers, perhaps not, but my actions are more about a context outside of the 
Abstraction Model: selecting hardware and running a program connected to a network, and the 
work's social engagement as a publicly accessible, networked machine. Ultimately, none of these 
three ways of looking at the work are contradictory, so I think we can have a combined 
understanding of where the work sits in the Abstraction Model in response to a multi-layered 
Artwork: the work lives across all the layers, vast majority of what I did in its construction was at 
Layer 5, and the Abstraction layer model is of limited use in this particular analysis.
Authorization:
Issues of authorization are deeply connected to the Artbox and are at the conceptual center of the 
work. The artworks that were hosted on the Artbox have been ‘un-authorized’ by various ISP's or 
platforms and removed from the Internet, and by using the Artbox to move the works to new ISP's 
and/or provide a hosting platform, the Artbox 're-authorizes' these works in making them available 
again to a viewer/participant with Internet access.
It's worth noting that there is nothing in the base system of the Artbox itself that creates any 
Authorization issues: it is open-source software running on generalized hardware. However, 
because of the complexity of that software and/or the network connection, it's clear that the Artbox 
could also be turned to purposes other than ones I might state as mine. A network connection, 
especially, would seem to always create this potential at some level, and any sort of potential 
intention coming from the network which created a new use for the Artbox (for example, to host 
other types of material besides Art) would at least nominally be an un-Authorized use of the Artbox 
in a definitional sense.
Perhaps it’s also worth considering the concept of “authorization” as articulated by one of the 
Artbox’s hosted works, a 2013 untitled artwork created by anonymous authors who called 
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themselves “Jiggawebz93”. The content of the work was a series of emails and documents between 
Rhizome (an NY-based arts organization), the Arts Council England (a non-departmental body of 
the UK government), and various third-parties, apparently accessed from the email account of 
Rhizome’s Executive Director, with commentary both about this content and the authors’ 
understanding of the work as “performance”. Links to the work were published initially to the social
media platform twitter.com, and Twitter quickly removed them and banned the account of the 
publisher (I downloaded the version distributed by the Artbox prototype from links provided in a 
series of later posts to the netbehaviour email list). The emails revealed evidence of fraud by 
Rhizome and collusion by the ACE, and the basic fraud uncovered by the work was this: that the 
ACE can, by law, only grant funding to arts organizations based in Europe, regardless of any UK 
location of a proposed project, and Rhizome is a corporation based in the USA. Both Rhizome and 
the ACE were aware of this, insofar as on that basis an initial grant application by Rhizome to the 
ACE was denied. The Executive Director of Rhizome then used a friend’s UK address, a third-party
UK bank account, and a small but fraudulent name change from “Rhizome Inc.” to “Rhizome Ltd.” 
on a subsequent grant application, with the knowledge and encouragement of her ACE “Liaison 
officer” and other members of ACE staff who were employed as freelancers by Rhizome, to apply 
again and this time Rhizome received £15,000 from the ACE. The money ostensibly went to 
support a London instance of Rhizome’s “7×7 Conference”, a for-profit, ticketed event at the 
Barbican that already had financial backing from a venture capital fund, and the profits from the 
event went back to Rhizome, Inc in the USA (Jiggawebz93, 2013) in direct contravention of ACE 
policy.
It’s not hard to understand why this work could be understood as “unauthorized” as its content 
likely violated Twitter’s “terms of service”. Clicking the links posted to Twitter would have 
downloaded content that included, names, email addresses, and ‘private’ correspondence between 
individuals that was admittedly accessed by the authors of the work through legally dubious means, 
and most any takedown of material from Twitter would have been accompanied by a “terms of 
service” violation notice to whoever “tweeted” it (twitter.com, 2018). What might be harder to 
understand is the speed at which Twitter removed it, apparently within hours of it being published, 
because the material seems to pale in comparison to content that, at the same time, Twitter allowed 
to flourish on their platform and was very slow to remove when flagged – namely accounts linked 
to the “terrorist” group ISIS. At the same time as this work was being removed from Twitter, ISIS-
linked accounts were regularly tweeting calls to and instructions for violence with impunity, 
famously including the video of the beheading of an American journalist with material imploring 
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Twitter followers to undertake similar actions (Koh and Albergotti, 2014). Twitter’s defense of its 
refusal to remove this material at the time – it started wide-ranging removal of ISIS linked accounts 
only in 2015 – was that as a platform it had a remit to protect “free speech” (Lumb, 2016). In the 
version of the work I downloaded, Jiggazwebz93 speculate that the reason their “free speech” was 
not protected by Twitter, while the “free speech” of Twitter users who repeatedly published 
beheading videos and directly threatened violence to specific persons was protected (even after 
being specifically flagged by Twitter users as abusive), might have had something to do with the 
fact that Twitter’s former CTO Greg Pass was a member of Rhizome’s Board (as of 2018 he’s now 
the Chair). In this way Jiggawebz93’s work likely functions as an example of the relationship 
between the concept of “authorization” and its application as political censorship, albeit one of a 
particularly corrupt and contemporary form, as enabled through the arbitrary enforcement of “terms 
of service” by the private, corporate governors of a networked ‘public’. This use of “authorization” 
is unfortunately becoming normative, and it and other forms of online political censorship have 
been extensively documented and theorized – the reader is encouraged to see Deibert (2008), 
Morozov (2011), MacKinnon (2012), and Hintz (2015), among others. 
3.6 0100101110101101.org Pentest (2012)
Narrative Description:
The word “pentest” is short for "penetration test", a practice employed by the IT Security field 
whereby computer systems are tested and analyzed for potential security vulnerabilities, often by 
simulating a malicious “attack” on the system (Agarwal & Singh, 2013). Every computer-based 
artwork, especially those that are networked or are situated on the Internet, could in theory also be 
examined through a similar IT security-based perspective simply because any digital object can be 
examined in such a way. However, it is not a common method for either artists, theorists, or 
viewer/participants to use in examining work. In fact, 0100101110101101.org Pentest and POC2 of 
this research are the only existing examples of “vulnerability examination of art practice as art 
practice” that I’m aware of.
0100101110101101.org is the website of the artists Eva and Franco Mattes (Mattes, 2015). They are
known for producing artworks that propose to test boundaries of public & private online 
information, such as exhibiting 10,000 images that they claimed to have ‘stolen’ from users of an 
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unnamed cloud service (Statter, 2012), and exhibiting copies of other artist's Internet artworks 
(Mattes, 1999). In a happy coincidence with some of this research, they claim that this latter work 
"started a heated debate on originality, authenticity and uniqueness of art on the internet that is still 
open..."
0100101110101101.org Pentest is then a text describing the findings of a “pentest” on the 
0100101110101101.org site. It shows from an IT security context the possible existence of security 
vulnerabilities in the 0100101110101101.org server/website, however in the context I'm trying to 
create, it can show the potential openings for the introduction of additional code, also understood as 
third-party authorial intention, into Mattes's online work. Mattes's work is clearly designed to use 
strategies of appropriation and collaboration that they alone control, and this isn't an unusual artistic
practice. While 0100101110101101.org Pentest uses the Mattes's work in a similar way to how they 
use other's work – the 0100101110101101.org site is simply analysed i.e. appropriated for content – 
the output of 0100101110101101.org Pentest suggests alternative avenues through which Mattes's 
work could also be employed.
www.0100101110101101.org
Number of vulnerabilities
High 2
Medium 19
Low 70
Apache HTTP Server Byte Range DoS
High Severity problem(s) 
found
Apache HTTP Server Byte Range DoS
Synopsis
The web server running on the remote host is affected by a denial of service vulnerability.
Fig 3.13 - 0100101110101101.org Pentest (excerpt)
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Aesthetically, 0100101110101101.org Pentest has one similarity to the Artbox in that it relies on the 
existing system(s) being used in the work for its visual language. In this case, the default output 
'formatting' of the software I used to do the pentest has been kept, hence the visual layout of tabbed 
rows of information with hi-visibility colored text on contrasting backgrounds in Fig 3.13. This is 
also something that could be readily shifted with the work: the final form of the piece is text, so it is
open to the potential manipulations and re-contextualizations which text itself, especially with its 
long history within art practice, allows (Vuk Cosic’s (1999) DEEP ASCII is one of my favorite 
examples of text reconfiguration in art practice). This is in comparison to a work like the hardware 
version of the Artbox – while there is also a likely smaller history of webservers within art practice 
to draw from, the Artbox's technical form as a piece of physical hardware makes it generally more 
difficult to visually modify from its 'default’ setting.
Hacking itself as an art practice has specific ties to early “net.art” of the 1990s and was also 
explored briefly in the New Media art scene of the early 2000s. In fact, a similar piece was carried 
out in 2002 by Knowbotic Research (Grammatikopoulou, 2010). Titled “Minds of Concern: 
Breaking News”, it consisted of an installation which allowed viewers to “port scan” the websites of
various NGO's, social organizations and political groups, examining them for security 
vulnerabilities. Exhibited at the New Museum in New York for the exhibition 
Open_Source_Art_Hack in 2002, it was shut down after a few days as demanded by the New 
Museum's ISP (Knowbotic Research, 2002). This is even after the artists modified their artwork 
specifically for the museum installation by limiting the number of scanned ports and obfuscating the
names of the organizations being scanned from viewers (Mirapaul, 2002). As could be expected, 
Knowbotic described their work in explicitly political terms: “By scanning the ports of the 
NGO's…we are trying to pinpoint the dilemma of NGOs and media artists having to protect an 
independent and progressive political and social practice through security measures which are 
constantly being tried, tested and attacked with ever new invasive tools.” (Knowbotic Research, 
2002). Where exactly did “hacking” sit as a potential art practice in all this? Quoted in the New 
York Times, Steve Dietz, artist and curator of Open_Source_Hack_Art attempted an explanation: 
“...[Open_Source_Hack_Art] was more nuanced than bringing cracking to the dull havens of a 
museum. Being bad and doing something illegal hold very little interest for me, but being tactical 
and creative hold a great deal.” (Mirapaul, 2002).
The 0100101110101101.org Pentest work itself is included as a .DOC data file on the attached USB
media. The file is in the Microsoft Word format and can be explored using any program which can 
132
interpret the format such as the open-source program LibreOffice or Microsoft’s Word program, or 
the file can be examined in any other way that the reader deems appropriate.
Medium:
The definition of medium defined in this research describes “informational content” in a way that is 
independent of how the information is stored. This allows for both computational (in the sense of 
electronic computer-based) and non-computational (in the sense of pigment) elements of a work to 
potentially function as mediums, because they both can hold information as per Floridi’s General 
Definition of Information (Floridi, 2003) Like all of the practice, 0100101110101101.org Pentest 
has computational and non-computational elements to it, and therefore the definition of any Turing-
complete medium can be examined within this larger informational context. Also, up until now, all 
elements of the practice required a functioning computer in the presentation of the work. Although a
computer was used in the production of the work, the work is unique among the practice as it does 
not necessarily require a functioning computer in its final display – it is text. If this text is printed, 
then 0100101110101101.org Pentest's information has been transferred from the “memory” of a 
computer and encoded/embedded/applied into another, non-computational (as far as is currently 
understood), material.
There were, however, a number of computers involved in the work, and the key one was arguably 
the computer that ran the vulnerability scanning software. Here a Turing-machine clearly needed to 
be activated in the production of the work, because the scanning software needed to run on it in 
order to generate much of the work’s subsequent “informational content”. The machine was a x86 
computer, the x86 processor is Turing-complete, and any machine with appropriate hardware run by
a x86 CPU is approximately equivalent to a Universal Turing Machine (Intel, 2014). This computer 
collected information from a network, and stored it in its own memory, clearly becoming a 
“container” of “informational content”. Hence, I was dealing with a Turing-complete medium in the
production of the work, despite the fact that, as described above, no Turing-complete machine is 
necessarily needed in the work's final presentation.
It is important to note that 0100101110101101.org Pentest is like many computer-based artworks, 
perhaps even the vast majority of such artwork, in that it does not need a computer for its display. 
The research’s medium definition has the ability to include a computer as a medium, and not 
necessarily the medium, of works such as this – Davies’s definition and Lopes’s defintion, among 
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others, likely also have this ability (D. Davies 2004, Lopes 2009) My definition only states that any 
container that holds informational content at “any time in a work’s production” is a medium in the 
work. A literal reading of this definition in the case of 0100101110101101.org Pentest would 
suggest that computers, along with “ink” or “print”, are some of the information containers that 
could be mediums here, although the examination of medium in this research is limited to those 
which are Turing-complete. In the form included in the USB Media, 0100101110101101.org 
Pentest is a data file readable by a computer, so any discussion of non-computational mediums in 
the work is somewhat theoretical, although the reader is encouraged to explore the work however 
they wish, including by potentially using a computer to print the work onto paper.
Interface:
My interface to a Turing-machine in the work was an application called “Nessus” (Nessus, 2015), 
developed by Tenable Network Security Inc. Nessus is a software program that scans networked 
computer systems for vulnerabilities in ways that can be configured through various menus in the 
application, and once a user has configured a scan, they can click a GUI menu item and let the scans
run. It’s very easy. The Nessus application provides no general programming functionality, or any 
equivalent of Turing’s “tape”, and is therefore not Turing-complete. It is also relatively automated 
and has an ability to generate a text-based listing of found vulnerabilities using a selection of 
‘default’ text layouts. I used Nessus to collect information from the 0100101110101101.org site, 
evaluate the information, format it, and save it as a text file. I then printed the information as text 
onto paper, with little modification, using a very common program that is also not Turing-complete 
called Microsoft Word (Word, 2015). I should perhaps note here that, although none of the software
interfaces I employed in the production of the work were Turing-complete, the fact I was able to run
two different software applications on the same machine (one to scan for vulnerabilities, the other to
print text) is another example of how that machine – a general purpose x86-based laptop – is 
approximately equivalent to a Universal Turing Machine.
Intention:
The question of Intention in this work is somewhat removed from my normal meaning for it. In 
examining Intention, understood in the research as analogous to the literary “authorial intention” 
embedded within the code in an artwork, and previously examined in terms of a relationship 
between specific machine code instructions executed by a computer in an artwork and the nature of 
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my specification of them, the reader may not find much use for it in this work. There is almost no 
code that I authored, there are no human-readable instructions to inspect, and the final form of the 
work was a piece of paper with text printed on it. 
In this case I think it will help an analysis of intention to divide the work into two parts and look at 
them, for the moment, separately: the process of collecting the information used in the work, and 
the selection and printing some of that information onto paper. In the first part, I configure and then 
run a computer program that automatically probed for potential security vulnerabilities in a website.
What I'm doing is activating certain blocks of instructions already stored in the program, which then
execute, and return information. I believe the information is true, based on my previous experience 
with Nessus, although I haven't verified it in any other way. So not only is there little direct 
relationship between any configuration-instructions of Nessus and any code the CPU executes, 
there is also no verification of the data the program returns.
In the second phase of the work I took the information that Nessus returned, visually arranged it 
slightly, and had this information transferred to paper by a printer that was connected to the 
computer. Again it would be difficult to draw out any authorial intention through the analysis of any
executed code in terms of the way the research has previously explored Intention, and further, the 
information that is transferred to the printer isn't a direct copy of the information returned from the 
scanning software. Rather, it's a copy of what that information 'expresses' – in the sense that what's 
sent to be printed is some data that only appears similar to what I see on the screen. That is to say 
the information returned by the scanning software is in a particular binary format, which Microsoft 
Word interprets to display on the screen, and when I instruct Microsoft Word to send this 
information to the printer, it doesn't send along that same binary information, it converts it to 
Postscript (Postscript, 2015) – a separate language for printing – and sends that Postscript data to 
the printer. Neither Postscript nor Microsoft Word format files are necessarily human readable, and 
they are also mutually unintelligible to an application that might only understand the one format or 
the other. The way I decide that that what is printed is equivalent to what is on the screen isn't by 
directly examining any program code or machine data itself for equivalence, it's by examining what 
the data visually 'expresses' in specific formats: the text on the screen vs. the text on the paper.
It's important to differentiate here between the understanding of Intention as a location of literary 
authorial intention, and a more general and colloquial understanding of intention that at times might
be more useful, such as “what an artist might want” in terms of the general functioning or 
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appearance of their work. An analysis of computer-based art might want to fall into looking at 
things through a general understanding when the literary understanding doesn't offer much. As 
“single-tape” works of the practice such as N.O.S. or the Untitled were discrete units of code, 
entirely authored by me, often functioning at a specific abstraction layer, an analysis of authorial 
intention was able to be drawn out in that code and the literary understanding of code as speech was
identifiable and useful. Not so much, perhaps, with 0100101110101101.org Pentest. However, a 
more general understanding of “intention” is still useful as a way to interrogate what I ‘did’ to make
the work. For example, it would still allow some examination of the work’s production, such as that 
while the proposition of exhibiting a vulnerability scan of an artwork might be novel, the actual 
technique necessary to run such a scan is relatively trivial – the click of a button in a 
preprogrammed GUI software.
I will also make a brief remark about such a general view of intention from the perspective of Eva 
and Franco Mattes. As I mentioned in the description of the work, I wanted to explore the potentials
of 'outside' authorial intention being reflected in a network-based artwork. I doubt it was the 
Mattes’s general ‘intention’ for 0100101110101101.org to be the subject of a work such as this, but 
even if it was, the fact that the site is accessible via the public Internet would suggest that any 
agency they might have as to how their website is used is limited. 
Abstraction:
Like with the Artbox, here an Abstraction Layer analysis is also more complicated than in any of the
“single-tape” works. In its printed form, 0100101110101101.org Pentest is not running on a 
computer, hence this form has no place in the Abstraction layer model. However, as per the 
examination of intention, the research can still look to see how a computer was used in the work 
before the work's final form was generated, and whether the Abstraction Layer might provide 
insight. Examining the work in this way is likely justified in light of my definition of medium, 
which again can consider computer usage at any point in a work's production. With 
0100101110101101.org Pentest I operated exclusively at Layer 5 in all phases of the work when 
using a computer. I used specific Layer 5 applications to retrieve information, organize that 
information, and then have that information transferred to a device which would store/display the 
information as ink on paper. Having said that, it would be hard to argue that the work “lives” at 
Layer 5 when its final form doesn't require a functioning computer. If, for example, I'd displayed the
information as text on the screen of a running computer as the final form of 0100101110101101.org 
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Pentest, it would be a simple case of Layer 5 all around. Here it’s not such a simple case, and I’m 
inclined to think that any benefit of an examination of Abstraction in a work such is this might be 
found in a more general explorations of how operating at any layer might have affected aspects of 
the work. 
Authorization:
An analysis of Authorization in this work is, for lack of a better word, ‘juicy’, and this analysis will 
spend some time with it. I will consider Authorization from the perspective of the actions I took on 
my computer, from the perspective of other networked computers which were involved in those 
actions, and from the perspective of publishing information which was based on those actions.
A short guide to at least the first two perspectives can be found in relevant legislation, although 
again it's not always agreed which national legislation might cover any given network 
communication, being that Internet communications often traverse multiple national borders. In the 
United States, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) defines a variety of transgressions 
related to computer authorization, including the following which describes someone who “...(2) 
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby 
obtains— ...(C) information from any protected computer;” (United States Code, 2015). In this 
usage “Protected Computer” originally meant only US Government Computers, but was amended 
to mean any computer “which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication” (United
States Code, 2015). The current interpretation covers most of the 25 billion (Evans, 2011) devices 
connected to the Internet.
However even with legislation like this in place, authorization itself has a vague legal definition, 
often because the concept of authorization itself can seem vague. Certainly we implicitly know 
what is meant to “authorize” something, but in the case of authorizations about computer usage the 
overlapping domains of computer ownership, End User License Agreements, and public/networked 
space are often in conflict about how authorization is interpreted. To give but one recent and high 
profile example of this confusion, Andrew Auernheimer was convicted in a Federal US court of 
“one count of conspiracy to gain unauthorized access to computers” per the CFAA for releasing to 
Gawker magazine details of how he had found a publicly accessible AT&T server on the Internet 
that published the (assumed) private email address of 114,000 iPad users (Crook, 2013). The FBI 
investigated, and AT&T successfully argued that even though the computer which provided the 
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information in question was publicly accessible, with no password protection, and anyone could 
access it, they didn't intend for it to be set up this way, hence Auernheimer's access was 
unauthorized. After spending close to a year in prison (from a 41 month sentence) and paying 
$73,000 in restitution, an appeals court vacated Auernheimer's conviction. The appeals court noted 
that that no security features had been circumvented by Auernheimer, and the information was 
publicly available, yet they did not address the issues of authorization and site access specifically, 
rather they vacated on the simpler basis that the New Jersey court where Auernheimer was 
convicted was an improper venue (United States v. Auernheimer, 2014).
An example of a court’s finding that seems a much more reasoned interpretation of “authorization”, 
especially within the context of this research, is that of the District Court of Głogów, Poland, 6th 
Grodzki Department, on 11 August 2008, when it acquitted a defendant of several charges related to
“breaking the electronic security” of a company’s server and extracting unauthorized information 
(vagla.pl, 2008). In this situation, a man had discovered a basic SQL injection vulnerability in a 
particular marketing company’s webserver that allowed him to login as a random (corporate) user. 
He logged in, collected some of the user’s data, and then contacted the company who owned the 
server to report the problem, in the meantime discovering that all of the company’s servers had the 
same vulnerability. The company invited the man to a meeting on the pretense of hiring him to fix 
the vulnerabilities, and then had Polish police arrest him when he arrived. The court acquitted the 
man on all chargers, reasoning that the man had only accessed the database congruent with the way 
the database had been set up, used no special software, and did not influence the functioning of any 
security of company’s SQL database. The court also included in its verdict the inspiring phrase “Nie
można przełamać czegoś, co nie istnieje.”, which Google Translate renders in English as “You can 
not break something that does not exist” (vagla.pl, 2008).
Returning to 0100101110101101.org Pentest, any consideration of authorization issues first needs to
take into account that I, of course, had the authorization to run the vulnerability scanning software 
on my own computer: I implicitly give this to myself. It should also be noted that the vulnerability 
scanning software is freely available, and meant to be used as I used it, hence it can at least be 
argued that I had the authorization to use the scanning software as I did. Additionally, the 
0100101110101101.org webserver is publicly accessible, and this public access was crucial to 
0100101110101101.org becoming the subject of my vulnerability scan. Did the owners of 
0100101110101101.org authorize me to scan it? I've never communicated with them so I can say 
with certainty that they did not. Do they even know I scanned it? Likely they do not – my scan was 
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set to a relatively “non-invasive” configuration, it only scanned for publicly disclosed 
vulnerabilities, and the work has only been discussed in this research which is not public at the time
of writing. However under an American court’s understanding of “authorization”, it appears they 
would be able to claim, at any time, that the access I had to their “protected computer” was 
unauthorized, although this claim would likely be interpreted in different ways under different legal 
contexts.
After completing the scan I then used information obtained from the scan in the production of an 
artwork, which if exhibited, would publish the information. The owners of 0100101110101101.org 
gave me no such authorization to publish information about their site. Does that mean that 
0100101110101101.org Pentest is “unauthorized”? Perhaps, although considering that my scan used
standard Internet protocols and did not circumvent any security features, there really is nothing 
inherently ‘private’ about the information it uncovered. As explored in the inspection of Intention in
the work, it’s understood that the capability to run such a scan is trivial to acquire. So there is 
neither anything private or special about what I did to acquire this information which is publicly 
available. Does someone need authorization to publish publicly available information? A reasonable
person might say “by definition, of course not” and point to millions of existing web sites as proof. I
also certainly hope not as I am a researcher who, like most of us, publishes publicly available 
information all the time. However cases like Andrew Auernheimer's shows that this is still an open 
question, with varying understandings of the concepts involved. It certainly seems as though, were 
the Mattes’s interested in charging me with any “unauthorized” access to their site during the 
production of this artwork, a certain American court might send me to prison, whereas a certain 
Polish one would send me home and pay for my legal fees. I should also remark here that, based on 
the nature of their public persona, I feel quite certain that the owners of 0100101110101101.org 
couldn't care less what I did with their site.
139
Chapter 4: Conclusion
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter I present conclusions that I have been able to draw from the research, incorporating 
the Practice and the analysis I have done on the practice. The general proposal of the research is in 
the creation of practice which explored computers, or “Turing-complete machines”. The research 
then supplemented the Practice with a ‘functional’ analysis grounded in the idea of a “Turing-
complete medium” of art, which runs through all computers used in the production of art, including 
those used in the Practice. The Contextual Review and two POC’s had already demonstrated that 
there is a relative lack of functional analysis of computer-based art in various fields involved in the 
theorization of art practice, and showed how in the examples where it had occurred, it was 
beneficial for various type of evaluation. Each element of the Practice emphasized a different 
exploration of a computational system – the exploration of hardware, software, re-programmability, 
and active and passive network connections. The Practice was examined through five frames of 
reference, abbreviated MIIAA, which allowed for a generalized and comprehensive analysis of how
the Practice related to its computational underpinnings, how it engaged with the idea of a Turing-
complete medium, and how the elements of the Practice related to each other. 
4.2 MIIAA Recap
The research employed five frames of reference in the analysis of the practice – Medium, Interface, 
Intention, Abstraction and Authorization, as defined in Chapter 3. This section gives overall 
conclusions that were drawn out through each frame of reference.
Medium:
The definition of medium developed in the research - “A medium of a work of art is any container 
of the work's informational content at any time during a work's production” - was successfully 
located in each work, and a Turing-complete machine functioning as a container of “informational 
content”, and therefore a medium, was identified in each work as well. This was not surprising, and 
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likely tautological. General purpose computers, by design, are processors of “information”, and as 
containers of “informational content”, they contain the practical equivalent of the Turing’s “tape”. 
A more interesting idea drawn from the practice was that while running, or 'activated', the research 
needed to expand its understanding of medium to include the entire computational system when any
initial container's information (such as a Nintendo cartridge) was “duplicated, interpreted and acted 
upon throughout”. This is interesting because computer-based works, especially as legal or 
commercial objects (i.e. property), are often defined by just the storage system where the code 
temporarily resides in a powered off state. For example, the cartridge of a Nintendo, the CD-ROM 
of many software works, or the DVD of a limited edition video – these are the objects that are sold 
and valued, often independently of the computer they need to run.
Networked or “multi-tape” artworks were identified with a Turing-complete medium just as easily 
as stand-alone or “single-tape” artworks. Both types of work run on the same types of machines, 
machines which are approximately equivalent to a Universal Turing Machine, and on those 
machines it was trivial to identify a Turing-complete medium in all cases. Whether a machine is or 
isn't on a network, or has the equivalent of multiple tapes, had no apparent effect on its functionality
as a medium. Analysis of the Practice suggested that, in theory, when a work takes or stores 
information via a network into its program functionality, either the network or the machine on the 
other end of the network connection becomes part of this medium, although this was not examined 
directly. Following on, it could also makes sense to propose that not all machines on a network 
necessarily would be part of that medium – for example a router that runs as a non-Turing-complete
machine to move/copy information along without storing or processing it.
The examination of medium in Untitled (P.Davis, 2009) also led to a comparison between the 
instructions in its code and instruction-based conceptual art, specifically Sol Lewitt’s Wall 
Drawings. The comparison noted similarities in the instruction-basis of both works but observed 
that Lewitt’s instructions did not have to be executed as part of any definition of the work, and this 
was likely related to Lewitt’s instructions being “human-readable”. Untitled’s instructions, however,
did have to be executed, and specifically executed by a Turing-machine in the work as the machine-
code instructions are not human readable. That instructions in a work are, or are not, human-
readable was theorized as the major factor in whether an instruction-based work contains an 
identifiable Turing-complete medium.
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Interface:
The examination of Interface in the Practice was meant partly to locate the artist's “software or 
programming interface” to the computer in the production of the work, and partly to determine if 
that interface was Turing-complete in itself. In some elements of the Practice it was Turing-
complete, for example in N.O.S., in some it wasn't, for example in the Compression Studies. The 
difference between the two is analogous to the difference between writing one’s own program in the
process of creating an artwork, or using an existing program in the process of creating an artwork. 
However, in some cases it was a much more complicated question, as in the Artbox, that led instead 
to an examination of a historical shift in the accessibility of Turing-complete interfaces in personal 
computers. What seemed clear, was that in all examples of the Practice, the interface bound the 
artist to sets of possible information and ‘output’. With a Turing-complete interface, the artist was 
theoretically bound only to the very limits of computation itself, although the artist may have found 
little existing code to aid them. When using existing programs, often as a non Turing-complete 
interface, they were bound by the computable limits of that program, though the program itself may 
have significant capabilities. There were also observable ties between types of Interface and the 
ease of identification of authorial Intention, at least in the single-tape works. The examination of 
Interface in the multi-tape works showed no significant differences to single-tape works, aside from
one informal observation: that networking is really hard to do (Hall, 2015), so it's likely that 
networked computers will be accessed more often through existing code-bases and not entirely 
‘from scratch’ through a Turing-complete Interface. This observation appeared to be borne out in 
the Practice.
Intention:
Intention was employed in the sense of of “authorial intention”, using Speaking Code’s (Cox and 
McLean, 2013) understanding of code as “utterance”, and the use of “authorial intention” and 
“utterance” as evaluative concepts in literary theory. The relationship between a specified authorial 
intention in written code and machine code executed by the CPU of a computer was examined, and 
an exact or ‘one to one’ relationship was demonstrated in N.O.S., and a very close relationship was 
demonstrated in the Untitled. In both works, the usage of assembly was crucial in implementing this
tight relationship. In the case of the Compression Studies, it was posited that this idea of intention as
embedded in code had a “wider” or more “macro” scope, which also seemed related to the work 
operating at a higher layer of the Abstraction Layer model. 
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My authorial intention in the “multi-tape” works was much harder to pin down in the code of the 
activated work, mostly as a result of the large amounts of code that comprised the works and which 
had many different authors. In the case of 0100101110101101.org Pentest, the analysis was divided 
in two separate parts, and in one of them I abandoned this usage of ‘Intention’ altogether after 
determining that in this case it “doesn’t offer much”, and replaced it with a general and colloquial 
understanding of Intention as ‘“what an artist might want” in terms of the general functioning or 
appearance of their work’. I acknowledged the vagueness of this understanding, but demonstrated 
that it was still useful in helping to locate “what I ‘did’ to make the work”, which could still be 
useful in evaluating, for example, a claim about the work versus some examination of the 
functioning of the work’s code. In a sense, with the multi-tape works the network itself became an 
embodiment of (potential) authorial intention, and every network connection became a potential 
action of that intention. In effect, by placing a work on a network, there is perhaps no sure way of 
knowing exactly how that work will function, or be used, by whom, or in what way.
Abstraction:
All the works in the Practice had structural differences, evidenced by what was observed from the 
analysis on Abstraction “layers”. These differences were highlighted when the research specifically 
looked at the Abstraction layer where each work ‘lived’: generally, different layers suggested 
different structures, likely as a result of different types of interactions with existing computational 
systems. The Compression Studies are manipulations of a file which, in order to be experienced as 
art, must be 'played' by a video player with the correct codec. This all happens in Layer 5, which 
because of Layer 5's complexity, also means that those manipulations were processed by code that I 
did not write and did not fully understand. The Compression Studies are non-executable data meant 
for execution within the bounds of the video codec I've chosen to work with, as implemented by the
bounds of whatever video player I'm using, and both of these bounds are within “high level” 
software written by other people. This was a structural contrast to the Nintendo code hack Untitled 
which was coded by me in 6502 assembly and lived at Layer 2. As a result, Untitled’s code directly 
interacted with the hardware registers and memory of the NES, drawing imagery to the screen of a 
connected television. This meant that there was no other software affecting or ‘interacting’ with any 
of my code, the computational bounds were theoretically universal, and the ‘real’ bounds were 
essentially physical ones, although again created by someone else (in this case Nintendo Corp). The
artist's interface to the work’s Turing-complete medium in multi-tape vs. single-tape works showed 
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no significant differences, albeit that generally a networked machine will need more complex 
software to enable networking functionality than a stand-alone machine, hence it's more likely that 
the artist's interface would be at a higher level – similar to what an examination of Interface also 
observed. It is likely quite rare, though not unimaginable, to find a networked artwork living at, say,
Layer 3 in the Abstraction layer model.
Authorization:
In the single-tape works there are Authorization issues, but they are not usually central to how the 
works function. With Untitled there was the issue of the Nintendo NES being a proprietary system, 
and any code run on it that was not authorized by Nintendo itself being likely, technically, illegal. 
This was mitigated in practice by the NES being an obsolete, 30 year old system. The Compression 
Studies used copyrighted source material, and this has had an impact via an online venue refusing to
host one of them in a single case, but the work itself has little to say about Authorization 
specifically. This is mostly the result of all the works being both 'static' and unconnected to a 
network, or any other potential source of un-authorized (from the artist's perspective) intention. 
With both works in the Practice that involved networks, it was found that the range of intentions 
that can, potentially, be embodied within them piece naturally gave rise to issues of Authorization. 
This was a significant difference between multi-tape and single-tape work. For example, even 
though someone might have a certain interaction with a given networked object, is that interaction 
“authorized” by the owner of that object? In some cases it's simply difficult to say, partly because 
Authorization itself is a thorny and vague legal concept. 
4.3 The Location of Intention in Abstraction
In the examination of Intention in N.O.S., it was observed that N.O.S. uses BIOS routines in its 
functioning. However, N.O.S. was an attempt to be singularly 'mine', in terms of the authorial 
intention of its code through assembly language programming. As I stated in the analysis: “...while I
might claim a more singular intentionality in the work as reflected by the close relationship between
the code I created and the operations the CPU undertakes, that intentionality is also now potentially 
affected by the BIOS when the N.O.S. machine code uses BIOS routines.”
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This issue is a more general and fundamental one then just the assembly/BIOS relationship of 
N.O.S., and this section is a special attempt to deal with it. The problem is that, in many, many 
cases, an examination of authorial intention (or even a more general understanding of intention) 
runs into techno-ontological roadblocks because it’s common for code besides that which an artist 
might author to also be executed in any contemporary computing system as part of a computer-
based artwork. Anything an artist might code, even at the ‘lowest’ level, will need to run on a 
machine that the artist likely didn't design, and which contains firmware that are essentially, as I 
gave in Chapter 3, “fixed pieces of software contained within a hardware shell.” That is to say, it’s 
more code, written by more authors, so even a machine's basic hardware features could be 
considered expressions of intention by the authors of various third-party code – this point can be 
extrapolated out to most contemporary computational systems and any inspection of their processes.
Luckily, the Abstraction Layer Model combined with the concept of Turing-completeness offers a 
powerful tool here. The Abstraction Layer Model suggests that any computing system provides 
generalized types of inter-operable structures, and Turing-completeness says that all Turing-
complete machines essentially provide the same computational functionality at the bottom. So while
a layer two levels ‘down’ from the Artwork is abstracted from the Artwork, the immediate layer 
below is the Artwork's direct interface through which “informational content” gets to and from both 
it and the Turing-complete CPU of the machine. 
The takeaway here is that the best place to look for intention is at the Layer of Abstraction at which 
the artwork lives and the one immediately below. They are the immediate ‘materials’ that an 
Artwork might use, and everything else can be modeled as an abstraction. In terms of the Practice, 
it's why looking at Layer 2 (the Firmware Layer) for clues about how to understand the 
Compression Studies offered very little. The Compression Studies live at Layer 5.1, and speak with 
Layer 4: those are the two places to look in order to understand how the intentions embedded in the 
code of both mine and others function in the piece. Similarly, the best place to look to understand 
N.O.S. is at Layers 3 (Assembly) and 2 (Firmware), as those are the layers that contain both where 
the piece lives, Layer 3, and its first interface in the Abstraction Model, Layer 2. Here an 
examination can locate both the actual code of the work, and the questions about intentionality 
raised by its interaction with the BIOS. 
If an examination were to look at Layer 1 (one layer below the work) in Untitled, it could inspect 
the direct features and limitations of the Nintendo hardware which is a concern of the work, because
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Layer 1 is the work's direct interface – recall that Untitled lives at Layer 2. And as I showed, 
looking at Layer 2 in Untitled allows direct insights into the workings of Untitled’s code. For more 
examples, looking at Layer 1 of the Compression Studies (four layers below) and Layer 1 of N.O.S. 
(two layers below) both offer little because, as both of those works exist at layers at least two steps 
away from Layer 1, they look to Layer 1 as simply as an abstraction that is assumed to be identical 
on every machine. In fact, that hardware abstraction might be different in many machines. However
those differences – say the exact code that someone else wrote which is sitting in two different 
graphics cards – are arbitrary in a way that won’t often pose questions about the work.
4.4 Statements
In this section, I’ve identified concepts from the analysis of the Practice that I’d like to present in 
distilled form. These generally deal with the overall themes of the practice-based research.
1. Computers are a medium of art.
This was established first using a formalized definition of “computers” - the research employed 
Alan Turing’s definition of what’s now known as a “Turing-machine”. General purpose computers, 
as the research understands them, are approximately equivalent to Universal Turing Machines. The 
research Practice produced a series of works of computer-based art and located a “Turing-complete”
medium in every work inspected, which is equivalent to locating a computer functioning as a 
medium in every work inspected. This statement, however, depends on the use of the definition of 
medium as given in Chapter 2, which is almost tautological with respect to the identification of a 
computer as an art medium. That is to say, in the research, computers as a medium of art were 
defined as an art medium as much as they were demonstrated to function as a medium.
2. When a computer is used in an artwork, it is ALWAYS a medium of that artwork.
In all cases, a computer functioned as a medium when a computer was used in an artwork. It didn't 
matter whether the computer was needed for the final presentation of the work, or at what point a 
computer was used in the production of the work, and it seems extremely likely this would always 
be the case for any computer used in any artwork. This statement is also dependent on the definition
of medium given in Chapter 2.
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3. When an algorithm of any sort is used in an artwork, whether or not it is in human-readable form
is THE major factor in determining the medium of the work.
All the artworks created and discussed in the research involve “instructions” (the research did not 
define the concept of “instruction” and will rely on an intuitive understanding), and both humans 
and machines can, in theory, execute instructions. Analysis in Chapter 3 concluded that if the 
instructions can be interpreted by humans, then computing machines are not a medium in the work. 
The research can then say that the determination of whether an artwork's instructions are human-
readable is key to understanding the work's medium. This can also be understood in the difference 
between an “algorithm” and a “program”: “algorithms”, in the abstract, are meant to be understood 
by humans whereas “programs” are particular implementations of algorithms which are run by 
machines. Therefore, if the work is equivalent to an abstract algorithm, then the medium of the 
work is not Turing-complete, because no Turing-machine needs to be activated in the work. This 
statement can be expanded to suggest that the medium of all instruction-based conceptual art is not 
Turing-complete, although perhaps the instructions could be executed by other agents which are not
human or machine, but this is outside the scope of the research.
4. Potential intention, in a general and intuitive sense, is bounded by the Interface that an artist has
with a machine.
When using a computer, an artist's interface to the computer might or might not be Turing-complete.
In the case of a Turing-complete interface, the resulting artwork is in theory only bounded by 
computational limits themselves. When using an interface that is not Turing-complete, the resulting 
artwork is bounded by the functioning of that particular interface i.e. which particular program an 
artist might be using. A general reading here suggests that programs set specific 'material' 
limitations on work, and it might be worth also examining an artist's choice of those limitations, or 
response to those limitations, in the evaluation of an artwork. A harsher reading of this might 
suggest that using a program like Adobe Photoshop results in only making artworks already 
proposed by Adobe, in the sense that every choice an artist might want to make about an artwork 
has already been 'predicted' and made available as a menu option. 
5. Authorial Intention, using an understanding of code as literary “utterance”, has a tighter 
relationship to the execution of CPU instructions the lower down in the Abstraction Layer Model 
that a work 'lives' and the less it has to do with networks.
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The research usually inspected “Intention” using a form of authorial intention, switching to a 
general form of intention in one case where there was a particularly large amount of third-party 
code executed by the CPU. In works such as Untitled, a single assembly mnemonic could be 
mapped to the execution of a single CPU machine code instruction, so the machine instructions that 
the CPU executed in its entirely as the work seemed easily identifiable as embodiments of the 
authorial intention of the author of the code. This ‘tight’ relationship was not identifiable in works 
such as the Compression Studies, which lived at a higher layer than Untitled, or in the Artbox, 
which had a number of authors of its code. Generally speaking, the farther one gets away from low-
level programming, and the higher up the Abstraction Layer model a work 'lives', the more 
instructions a machine executes, and this has an effect on the identification of authorial intention in 
the code it runs. Network connections add both complexity to a computer, and potentially additional
“tape” in our understanding of computers as Turing-machines (see Chapter 3), which necessarily 
suggests even more complex code-author relationships.
6. Networked artworks are inherently collaborative, even if the artist doesn't mean the work to be 
collaborative. 
This might sound like a provocative finding because typical meanings of “collaborative” carry an 
implication of mutual consent, but the research found in Chapter 3 that it is impossible to control in 
a networked environment. Here the research means “collaborative” in the sense of relinquishing 
control over the uses and final forms of any artwork. An artist may not consent to their work being 
used in a particular way, but in creating and publishing a networked artwork, that consent cannot be 
enforced. It remains true that artists may retain specific legal “authorizations” over a networked 
artwork, but in most cases those legal authorizations are both arbitrarily interpreted and 
retrospective to any creative act delivered over the network. Consent, then, is implicitly and 
preemptively given regarding most network actions because Chapter 3 shows that networked 
artworks are inherently public. A general reading of this statement supports already accepted 
network-enabled creative behavior i.e. manipulating and republishing images found online. A 
stricter reading of this statement suggests that any type of creative intervention, including those 
typically described as “hacking”, are legitimate and collaborative acts when done using any 
networked artwork anywhere, including websites and servers themselves.
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7. There are some immediate, explicit benefits of medium-specific inspections of computer-based 
art, including:
7.a. A better ability to ascertain whether an artist's claims about their work are true.
When an artist uses a computer in their work, and for example has something to say about their 
work's medium, the research provides tools to evaluate what they are saying. This is also stated in 
respect of the research’s demonstration in Chapter 3 that in many cases code “does not do what it 
says”.
7.b. A better ability to ascertain whether third-party text describing an artwork, whether 
       curatorial, theoretical, or otherwise, is accurate. 
Where there is text describing an artwork, perhaps on a gallery wall or on a museum website, and 
that artwork uses computers, the research can help us understand whether that text in fact accurately
describes the work. Likewise, where there is text written about a work, perhaps in a catalog, essay, 
or article, the research can both help determine its accuracy and also the type of examination a 
researcher may have done with the work. For example – did they actually ‘run’ a given software 
artwork in their examination, did they look at its code, or are they just regurgitating what an artist or
gallery has said about it? In institutional cases this may help a viewer/participant, collector, or donor
determine whether a given institution, venue, curator, or theorist is fit for purpose. In academic 
cases this may help a theorist determine whether given third-party research is adequate. Again, this 
is in respect of Chapter 3’s demonstration that code “does not do what it says”, and also possibly the
first hypothetical model from POC2.
7.c. A better ability to understand how an Artwork functions.
In general the M.I.I.A.A. frames of reference created for this research allowed a functional 
inspection of the Practice. It provided a method for examining both what the work 'is' and 'does'. 
M.I.I.A.A. may not necessarily be appropriate for all types of work and it was meant instead to give
a comprehensive view of this Practice. However, this statement contends that M.I.I.A.A. 
demonstrates the general usefulness of medium-specific inspection of computers, as do both POC’s 
149
and Patrick Lemiuex’s research as discussed in the Contextual Review. There are many use-cases 
for where an understanding of how computer-based artworks function would be salient. Two 
examples are to Art professionals who need to authenticate a computer-based work, or in reverse, 
Artist-tricksters attempting to forge one. 
7.d. An ability to determine whether a given computer-based artwork is trivial.
This is a major qualitative benefit of the research. That is to say, in inspecting how an artwork 
functions, the artist's Interface to the computer during its production, and where the artwork 'lives' 
in the Abstraction Layer model, it can reasonably be understood what an artist ‘did’ to produce the 
artwork. If, for example, such an examination shows that a work is trivial or was produced using 
trivial means, the research has nothing to say about whether this triviality may or may not be 
interesting. It might, however, be useful to a viewer/participant or collector if the trivial work in 
question is described or promoted as non-trivial, perhaps either by the artist or “art world” involved 
in its production and distribution (see Conclusion 9.b).
8. It appears that software is not a medium.
This is in response to a question from Chapter 1, and I will also note that I don't believe this 
statement to be conclusive and it also depends on the research’s own definition of medium. Drawing
from the research it can seen that in all cases in the Practice, the computing machine functioned as a
medium regardless of the software it was running. In the case of a Turing-complete medium, this 
medium is defined by a computer system as a whole being approximately equivalent to a Universal 
Turing Machine. It was not defined by a Turing-complete interface to that system or a particular 
programming language or software. In many, many cases it probably feels to an artist like a given 
software is more of a medium than the system underneath the software on which the software runs. 
This is likely because the software they use is their immediate interface whereas the machine itself 
is abstracted away through the software. Software, generally, is an interface, and as an interface it is
probably something closer to a tool than a medium.
9. The increase in complexity of a networked artwork might produce a “perceivably different” Art 
compared to a stand-alone computer artwork, but only on the surface of the work. 
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In response to the questions posed at the end of Chapter 2, nothing in the research suggests that 
networked artworks are ontologically separate from stand-alone artworks. The M.I.I.A.A. frames of 
reference examined and described them both, using the same techniques, and it suggested no 
ontological differences. There is a structural difference in that networked artworks have an 
expansion of potential functions and intentions as encoded in their multiple 'tapes'. In certain cases 
these could, for example, come from unknown sources. But ultimately, multiple-tape Turing-
machines can be simulated by single-tape Turing-machines, and the network doesn't present any 
new type of machine (or non-machine). Tangential to (and outside the scope of) the research, but 
also posed at the end of Chapter 2: the research suggests, but doesn't even attempt to prove, that the 
Internet is not currently describable as a “just a fantastically busy state-machine”. It's expanding at a
rate far greater than any capacity to describe it in total. As as aside, let me remark that as the 
Internet continues to expand, the closer it may come to resembling a theoretical Universal Turing 
Machine and not just an approximation of one. Continuing growth of the Internet could allow it to 
effectively operate as an arbitrarily large storage medium or 'tape'.
10. Any medium-specific or similar inspection of an artwork is limited by access to that artwork. 
In all cases the research had complete and immediate access to every aspect of an artwork that was 
examined, plus my complete memory as the artist who made them, simply as a result of this being 
practice-based research in which I created the Practice. I view this as a success of the research and 
methodology, in that I doubt I would be able to investigate issues of medium in relation computer-
based work without being deeply familiar with the work itself. However the M.I.I.A.A frames of 
reference, if applied to other artwork, are likely to be most useful in examining work where similar 
access is available. Depending on the work, this could mean access to things like the source code of 
a work, the ability to inspect the hardware used to either create or present the work, the ability to 
inspect compiled software programs used to create or present the work, access to accurate 
documentation that details the construction of a work, etc. This is not the sort of access that most 
viewer/participants will have to computer-based artwork, especially not for works exhibited in 
institutional settings. The requirement for this type of access, while formative for this research, is 
also a limitation in its potential application. M.I.I.A.A in this research is likely most influential in its
positioning of the general relevance and usefulness of functional/structural examination of 
computer-based work. However, on the whole, to be at its most useful such examination will likely 
demand intimate access to work that can be difficult to acquire. The research, especially in the 
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POCs and the Literature Review, also suggested that the use of tools generally not used in art 
contexts but used in IT-related fields, such as hex editors and disassemblers, can also be put to novel
and beneficial use in the examination of computer-based art, occasionally in ways that do not 
require particularly intimate access to a work or its author.
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